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Preface 
This final report presents the results of the project “A study on the economic effects of 
the current VAT rates structure”, Specific Contract no. TAXUD/2012/DE/323, 
implementing Framework Service Contract no. TAXUD/2010/CC/104 for the provision 
of economic analysis in the area of taxation. 
 
The main research question of the project is to quantify for each Member State (EU-
27): 
 how much, broken down by categories of goods and services, private households 
and non-taxable and taxable persons carrying out exempt activities spend on VAT  
 how much they would spend in case 
 zero and reduced rates1 were abolished  
 zero and reduced rates were abolished and replaced with a new revenue neutral 
standard rate. 
 zero and reduced rates were abolished and low-income households receive lump 
sum transfers in compensation for their higher VAT bills. 
 
We also calculate VAT revenues for each Member State (EU-27) and the EU-27 as a 
whole for each of these scenarios. 
 
Changes in the prices of goods and services lead to changes in total expenditure and 
expenditure patterns. For some countries these changes in the consumption of private 
households have been analysed in a previous project of the consortium (see IFS et al., 
2011). The present study, however, ignores behavioural reactions while performing the 
analysis on the reform scenarios regarding effects on households, non-households and 
VAT revenues. The underlying assumption is that net expenditures (both of households 
and non-households) remain constant notwithstanding changes in absolute and relative 
prices of goods and services.  
 
The second part of the study includes a simulation of the general equilibrium effects on 
main macroeconomic indicators (GDP, consumption, employment, foreign trade) 
following changes in the VAT regime. This analysis takes into consideration 
                                                     
1 We use “zero and reduced rates” as a short-hand description of the full set of reduced rates, super-reduced 
rates, parking rates and zero rates of VAT applied in different EU countries. 
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behavioural reactions to external shocks such as changes in tax regimes. Given the 
different concepts of analysis (static and general equilibrium analysis) the scenarios 
analysed in the latter are similar, though not equal, to the ones specified above. 
 
The report presents the situation in 2011, as the latest available data for most countries 
are from 2011.  
 
The report presents the results obtained given the available data. Especially the analysis 
for private households has several shortcomings, as a request for additional data to 
Eurostat was not answered favourably2. Therefore, the following information requested 
in the Terms of Reference could not be delivered: 
 VAT paid as a proportion of household income (both disaggregated data on mean 
income in relation to the various household groups and data on mean income per 
income and expenditure quintiles are not available) 
 Results broken down by expenditure quintiles (both data on mean consumption 
expenditure and on the structure of consumption expenditure by expenditure 
quintile are not available) 
For some countries information on certain tables is missing.3 Also, more detailed 
information on the definition of breakdowns could not be obtained. 
 
The final version of the report will extend this version by adding the following: 
 Abstract in French 
 Executive Summary in French 
 
We gratefully acknowledge the comments on a first draft of this report received from 
Tuomas Kosonen, Andreas Peichl and European Commission staff.  
                                                     
2 Unlike other European statistics (such as the EU-SILC or the Labour Force Survey) HBS micro data are 
not yet available for research purposes, although there are intentions to change this in near future when 
aspects of anonymisation and confidentiality are settled.  
3 Italy: missing data for households broken down by income quintiles (we provide results based on micro 
data instead). 
Netherlands: missing data for households broken down by the number of active persons in the household 
and for different household types. 
Romania: missing data for households broken down by the activity status of the household head. 
Sweden: missing data for households broken down by the number of active persons in the household. 
Slovenia: data provided by household type is too fragmentary to enable calculations. 
Slovakia: missing data for households broken down by the number of active persons in the household. 
In addition, some subgroups are missing in some countries (e.g. the self-employed in Sweden). 
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Abstract 
This study provides a comprehensive overview of the distributional effects of the VAT 
rates structures currently in place in the EU-27 Member States. It builds on a consistent 
database and uses a coherent methodology that facilitates the meaningful comparison of 
effective VAT rates across categories of goods and services and across countries. This 
is crucial as the degree to which governments rely on zero and reduced rates varies 
greatly across countries, generating an uneven picture of effective VAT rates in the EU. 
This report sets out to analyse, for each country, the distributional effects of the current, 
diversified VAT rates structure, and to estimate how the abolition of zero and reduced 
rates would affect VAT payments by households and non-households, both overall and 
for socio-economic sub-groups (low-income households, single-parent households, etc.) 
and sector (health, education, etc.). It estimates the magnitude of additional VAT 
revenues that could be generated by abolishing zero and reduced rates, and 
quantitatively assesses the likely macroeconomic consequences (in each Member State 
and across the EU) of the implementation of a uniform VAT rates structure within each 
Member State. 
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Executive Summary 
Objective 
VAT rates structures in the European Union are widely diversified. The objective of 
this study is twofold: first, we collect data on the VAT rates structure currently in place 
in the EU-27 Member States, on expenditures and the corresponding VAT payments. 
Second, we estimate the potential effects of abolishing all zero and reduced rates4 
currently in place on households, non-households, VAT revenues and various important 
macroeconomic indicators, for all EU-27 countries. The data are collected and prepared 
for each Member State, taking into account the country’s rules regarding exemptions, 
zero, super-reduced, reduced and parking rates.  
Data and procedure 
We use several databases to perform the analyses. For the analysis of households, we 
use aggregate information from national Household Budget Surveys provided by 
Eurostat. We uprate the latest available data from 2005 to 2011 using information on 
expenditure growth from National Accounts data. We then apply the VAT rates in place 
in 2011 in each Member State to the various categories of goods and services. We 
calculate how much an average household pays in VAT in absolute terms and as a 
proportion of their total expenditure, and further break down the results by 
socioeconomic characteristics (income, household type). We analyse three reform 
scenarios: 1., abolish all zero and reduced VAT rates (and tax the formerly zero or 
reduced rated goods and services at the standard rate), 2., abolish all zero and reduced 
rates, but lower the standard rate such that the reform is revenue neutral and 3., as 
scenario 1, but compensate households in the first and second (3a) or first income 
quintile (3b) for their higher VAT payments. We analyse how each reform scenario 
would change the average VAT burden in each Member State.  
 
The analysis of non-households and VAT revenues uses data from the World Input 
Output Database (WIOD) and supplemental information gathered from 
communications from national authorities. Again we apply VAT rates to the 
classification of goods and services and calculate VAT liabilities for all Member States 
and different kinds of non-households (exempt sectors, government, non-profit 
institutions serving households and irrecoverable input VAT paid on gross fixed capital 
                                                     
4 We use “zero and reduced rates” as a short-hand description of the full set of reduced rates, super-reduced 
rates, parking rates and zero rates of VAT applied in different EU Member States. 
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formation). We calculate the changes in VAT liabilities for non-households for 
scenarios 1 and 2. Furthermore, we calculate increases in VAT revenues that would be 
expected following the implementation of scenario 1, and consider an additional 
scenario that compensates households in the first and second (scenario 3a) or in the first 
income quintile (scenario 3b) for their higher VAT payments.5 
 
These analyses are performed assuming that behaviour does not change as a 
consequence of the reforms (households and non-households continue to purchase the 
same amount of goods and services). In addition, we perform a general equilibrium 
analysis incorporating behavioural responses using the general equilibrium model 
WorldScan. The impact of different reform scenarios on GDP, employment, 
consumption and trade volumes are analysed for the EU as a whole and separately for 
each Member State (EU-27).  
Results 
Households 
 
Households account for 60 % of all VAT liability across the EU-27 countries. We find 
that the average EU-27 household faces a VAT bill that amounts to 11 % of their total 
expenditure. This ratio is highest in Romania and Hungary (17.8 % and 17.5 %), 
followed by Latvia (15.3 %), Lithuania (14.7 %) and Slovakia (13.7 %). Households in 
Luxembourg (6.2 %), Cyprus (6.8 %), Spain (7.2 %), the Netherlands (7.7 %) and the 
United Kingdom (8.0 %) face the lowest VAT bill as a proportion of expenditure. In 
most countries, the largest part of private households’ VAT bill relates to goods and 
services belonging to the category “Transport”: Expenditure on the purchase and use of 
vehicles is high and usually taxed at the standard rate. In those countries where food is 
taxed at the standard rate, VAT paid on food and non-alcoholic beverages is substantial. 
Expenditure on housing and energy is usually taxed far below the standard rate. 
However, as expenditure on housing is an important part of total expenditure, VAT 
payments relating to these categories are high in many countries.  
 
Abolishing zero and reduced rates (scenario 1) increases the average VAT rate faced by 
households, but the size of the change varies considerably between Member States. The 
effect is almost non-existent in Bulgaria, Denmark, Slovakia and Estonia, where zero or 
                                                     
5 As we lack the necessary information we cannot perform an analysis of scenario 3 for different household 
types. For example, we do not know how many single households are in the first income quintile and are 
therefore not affected by VAT increases in scenario 3 – this could only be done with micro data.  
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reduced rates apply only to very few supplies. Households in Poland, on the other hand, 
face an increase in the average VAT rate of more than 6 percentage points. We also find 
large increases in Portugal, Malta, Ireland, Italy, France, Spain, the UK, Austria, 
Luxembourg, Belgium, Greece, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the Netherlands. 
Scenario 2 (introducing a uniform, but lower VAT rate) increases overall VAT 
payments for private households in most countries, because they benefit more from zero 
and reduced rates in the status quo than non-households.  
 
To analyse the distributional effects of the current and alternative VAT rates structures, 
we separate households into five equally sized income groups or quintiles. In all 
countries, high-income households pay more VAT than low-income households in 
absolute terms. We find the largest gap in Luxembourg – where the highest income 
quintile pays seven times more VAT than the lowest income quintile – and the smallest 
gap in the Czech Republic, Austria and the Netherlands. Looking at VAT bills as a 
proportion of total expenditure, we find Hungary to be the only country with a 
regressive system (low-income households face a higher VAT burden as a fraction of 
total expenditure than high-income households). The VAT system in 11 countries 
(Spain, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia, Estonia, Greece, Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Cyprus and Latvia) is approximately proportional: that is, all income quintiles 
pay roughly the same share of their expenditure in VAT. We find a progressive system 
in the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Italy, Belgium, Poland, Malta, Slovenia, Finland, 
Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, France, the Netherlands and Germany.   
 
Abolishing zero and reduced rates does not have the same effect on households across 
the income distribution. In nine countries (Romania, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Latvia, 
France, Austria, Hungary, Finland and Sweden) the increase in VAT as a fraction of 
expenditure is similar across all income groups (with the average change ranging from 
0.5 percentage points in Latvia to 3.5 percentage points in France). In the remaining 14 
countries,6 poorer households face a larger increase as a fraction of expenditure than 
richer households. Thus, in these countries, the zero and reduced VAT rates currently in 
place seem to do quite well at reducing the VAT burden of poorer households. High-
income households, however, face larger increases in absolute VAT payments in all 
countries as a consequence of the reform. That is, in all countries, high-income 
households benefit more from zero and reduced rates in absolute terms, while low-
income households benefit more as a percentage of expenditure.  
 
                                                     
6 Recall that there are almost no reform effects in 4 countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia and Slovakia). 
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Abolishing zero and reduced rates, but lowering the standard rate to make the reform 
budget neutral, leads to higher losses for lower income than for higher income 
households in most countries. Higher-income households allocate a larger share of their 
expenditure to supplies currently taxed at the standard rate. Therefore, in this scenario, 
they benefit more from the reduction in the standard rate. On the other hand, lower-
income households suffer more from the abolition of zero and reduced rates and benefit 
less from the reduction in the standard rate.7 
 
Non-households 
 
Across all EU-27 countries, on average, exempt sectors account for 19 % of total VAT 
liabilities. Other non-households such as governments and non-profit institutions 
serving households account for 21 %. These numbers differ between countries. We find 
the largest share of VAT liabilities of non-households in Luxembourg (65 %), followed 
by the Netherlands (56 %) and Sweden (48 %), and the lowest in Lithuania (26 %), 
Greece (29 %) and Malta (30 %). Non-households are affected by the reform scenarios 
through non-recoverable VAT they pay on inputs.  
 
In most countries, following the abolition of zero and reduced rates, non-households 
face a lower increase in their VAT bills than households. The increase in VAT 
payments faced by exempt sectors is 14 % for the EU-27 on average, while VAT 
liability for other non-households increases by 13 %. Seven of the 36 sectors are 
affected by the reform in all countries (average increase in VAT liabilities across the 
EU-27 given in brackets):  
 Real Estate Activities (20 %) 
 Education (20 %) 
 Health and Social Work (19 %) 
 Other Community, Social and Personal Services (18 %).  
 Public Administration and Defence (11 %) 
 Financial Intermediation (7 %) 
 Post and Telecommunications (5 %) 
 
Abolishing zero and reduced rates and lowering the standard rate accordingly, by 
construction, does not change overall VAT liability. However, in most countries non-
                                                     
7 Although we focus on the analysis of VAT expenditure patterns across the income distribution, this study 
also shows breakdowns by other household characteristics (activity status of the household head, number 
of active persons in the household, household type and age of the household head). 
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households benefit from such a reform because the reduction in the standard rate is 
more than sufficient to compensate for the abolition of zero and reduced rates on 
supplies purchased by exempt sectors and other non-households. On average, VAT 
liability for exempt sectors decreases by 4 %. For other non-households, VAT liability 
decreases by 5 %.8 
 
Additional VAT revenues 
 
We calculate additional VAT revenues for the reform scenario in which zero and 
reduced rates are abolished. In addition, we consider a scenario where low-income 
households are reimbursed for their additional VAT burden via a lump-sum transfer 
allowing them to buy the same basket of supplies as they did in the base scenario 
(scenario 3). We consider two different definitions of “low-income” households. First, 
we compensate households in the first and second income quintile (3a); second, we 
compensate households in the first income quintile only (3b). 
 
Abolishing zero and reduced rates in all Member States (EU-27), on the EU-27 average, 
leads to an increase in VAT revenues of 1.6 % of GDP. The increase is largest for 
countries making extensive use of zero and/or reduced rates, such as Poland and 
Portugal (these countries experience an increase in VAT revenues of 3.3 % of GDP), 
followed by Italy (+3.0 %), Spain (+2.9 %) and Malta (+2.8 %). On the other hand, the 
effect is virtually zero in Denmark, Bulgaria and Slovakia. On the EU-27 average, 
compensating low-income households decreases the additional VAT revenues to 1.3 % 
of GDP (compensating first and second quintile, scenario 3a) or 1.5 % (compensating 
first quintile only, scenario 3b). This is because higher income households are 
responsible for the lion’s share of spending, even on zero and reduced rated supplies, in 
absolute terms. 
 
General equilibrium effects of VAT reforms 
 
We estimate the medium-term effects of various VAT reform scenarios using a 
Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) model, WorldScan. This analysis of the 
broader economic consequences of VAT reforms is conceptually different from the 
static analysis of households, non-households and VAT revenues; therefore, the 
                                                     
8 In Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia exempt sectors face an increase in their 
VAT burden. This is the case for other non-households in Spain, France and Italy. 
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scenarios analysed in this dynamic part do not directly correspond to the three scenarios 
analysed above. 
 
In scenario A, we abolish zero and reduced VAT rates, and the additional VAT 
revenues are channelled back into the economy by increases in transfers and public 
spending. In this scenario, effective VAT rates increase, reducing production in those 
sectors facing the highest increases in VAT (agriculture, low-tech manufacturing and 
transport) in the medium-run. For the EU-27 as a whole, we find relatively small 
changes in the main macroeconomic indicators. EU-27 GDP decreases by 0.4 %. These 
reductions are in line with reductions in consumption (-0.7 %), employment (-0.5 %, 
with a larger reduction for low-skilled than for high-skilled workers) and international 
trade (export and import volumes decrease by 0.7 % and 0.5 %, respectively). Targeting 
the additional VAT revenue specifically to economically weak households (low-skilled 
employed and unemployed households, scenario E) does not substantially change these 
results.  
 
When we decrease the standard VAT rate such that the abolition of zero and reduced 
rates is revenue neutral (scenario B), we find no effect on GDP on the EU-27 average. 
The effects on the other macroeconomic variables are also small; however, we do find 
some employment growth, this time benefitting low-skilled households relatively more 
than high-skilled households. In addition, wages of low-skilled workers increase 
compared to those of high-skilled workers. In this scenario, the effects vary between 
Member States. GDP increases in 14 Member States (Latvia experiences the biggest 
increase – 1.02%, Portugal and Cyprus are tied for the second largest increase – 0.36%) 
and decreases in 11 Member States (Hungary faces the largest decrease -0.18 %, 
followed by France and Lithuania with -0.17 % and -0.16 % respectively). There is no 
change in two Member States (Estonia and Malta).  
 
Scenarios A, B and E disregard the potential reduction of the administrative burden of 
VAT collection that could arise from a simpler VAT rates structure. Taking these 
effects into account (scenario C) leads to very small positive effects on all main 
macroeconomic variables (GDP +0.11 %, consumption +0.08 % employment +0.04 %, 
export volumes +0.14 % and import volumes +0.05 %) in the EU-27 on average. 
Finally, using the additional VAT revenues to finance cuts in the capital-investment tax 
(scenario D) leads to increases of GDP in the EU-27 average (+0.6 %). 
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Conclusions 
Given the heterogeneous VAT rates system in the EU-27, the reform scenarios have 
very different effects in the different Member States. This makes drawing general and 
committed conclusions on the results of this study somewhat difficult. We can, 
however, conclude that: 
 
 Zero and reduced rates overall achieve their goal of lowering the VAT burden of 
low-income households when we look at VAT payments as a proportion of 
expenditures.  
 However, in Member States with an extensive use of zero and reduced rates, 
substantial additional VAT revenues could be raised by abolishing these VAT rate 
reductions; and most of these additional VAT revenues would be paid by high-
income households. This demonstrates that the potential of zero and reduced VAT 
rates as a tool for redistribution is limited. More targeted policy instruments could 
accomplish the task of compensating low-income households for their additional 
VAT payments at comparably low costs. 
 The introduction of a budget-neutral uniform VAT rate, replacing all zero, reduced 
and standard rates, benefits non-household entities while households suffer a loss in 
most countries. In particular, we find that low-income households suffer more in 
proportion to their expenditures. When transfers are paid to compensate these 
households, revenue-neutrality of the reform requires a higher uniform VAT-rate 
(Crawford et al., 2010). 
 Concerning the medium-run macroeconomic consequences of reforms of the VAT 
rates structure, we find that harmonising diverging VAT rates within each Member 
State does not necessarily have significant effects, as both VAT exemptions and 
large rate differences between Member States continue to exist. However, if we 
allow for possible efficiency gains generated by simpler VAT rates systems, we 
find larger positive effects on Member States’ economies.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The VAT in the European Union 
On 17 May 1977, the Sixth VAT Directive was adopted which led to a uniform VAT 
coverage in the European Union. The VAT Directive9, enacted on 1 January 2007 and 
replacing the Sixth Directive, contains legislations concerning the common VAT 
system currently in place.10 The Directive does not stipulate one uniform percentage 
rate for the whole Union, but sets boundaries for the Member States. It restricts the 
minimum standard rate to 15 % (this regulation has been extended to 31 December 
2015) and allows for two reduced rates of at least 5 % for goods and services listed in 
the Annex III of the VAT Directive. Moreover, after consultation of the VAT 
Committee, each Member State may apply a reduced rate to the supply of natural gas, 
electricity or district heating. Some derogations and exceptions for Member States are 
in place, entailing the existence of zero rates, super reduced, reduced and parking rates. 
These derogations were granted during the negotiations of the VAT rates provisions or 
in the Acts of Accession to the European Union. Most of them are part of the so called 
"stand-still" situation and apply until the adoption of definitive arrangements of VAT 
relating to the trade between Member States. The main objective of these derogations is 
to ensure the gradual transition towards the application of uniform rules. Overall, such 
derogations prevent a coherent system of VAT rates in the EU from being applied.  
 
The VAT is a major source of tax revenue in the EU, yielding € 904 billion in 2011 
alone. This amounts to generating 7.2 % of the EU’s GDP or 17.8 % of all public 
revenues. The average standard rate in the EU was 20.7 % in 2011, compared to 19.4 % 
in 2008, mirroring the need for financial consolidation in many Member States in the 
wake of the financial crisis. In 2011, the lowest standard rates could be found in Cyprus 
and Luxembourg, which both exhausted the minimum 15 %. The highest standard rates 
were applied in Denmark, Hungary and Sweden with 25 %. It is also Denmark where 
the VAT made up the biggest share of GDP, 9.9 %, whereas Spain had the lowest share 
with 5.4 %.11 Table 1 illustrates the differences in VAT revenue and its share of GDP 
across EU Member States.  
                                                     
9 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006. 
10 see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:347:0001:0118:en:PDF 
[2013/03/25] 
11 Source: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database, Economy 
and finance, Government statistics, Annual government finance statistics, Main national accounts tax 
aggregates [2013/06/29] 
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Not only is the VAT a vital source of tax revenue but being a consumption tax, it also 
has some valuable economic advantages over other taxes. Not taxing intermediate 
supplies12 avoids distortions in the production process. Furthermore, taxing only 
consumption avoids disincentives on savings and investments (IFS et al., 2011). 
 
As mentioned above, Member States are entitled to introduce up to two reduced VAT 
rates of at least 5 %. In addition to these reduced rates, some Member States also have 
super-reduced rates, parking rates (see below) and zero rates.13 The main reasons for the 
existence of reduced rates are equity concerns (this applies especially to every day 
goods that lower-income households spend a higher fraction of their income on, e.g. 
foodstuffs) and accounting for positive externalities and internalities (IFS et al., 2011).14 
Even if a good or service is not listed in Annex III of the VAT Directive, Member 
States can tax it at a reduced rate, if it was subject to a reduced rate before 1 January 
1991 and the reduced rate is at least 12 % (a “parking rate”). Furthermore, regardless of 
whether or not a good or service is listed in Annex III of the Directive, if it was subject 
to a zero rate or a rate lower than 5 % before 1 January 1991, Member States may 
continue using this rate, provided that the reductions are “in accordance with 
Community law and […] have been adopted for clearly defined social reasons and for 
the benefit of the final consumer” (the zero and the so called super-reduced rates).  
 
Table 2 gives a general overview of the different VAT rates in place in all Member 
States. The table reflects the VAT rates applicable in 2011 which have been used for 
the analysis carried out in this study. An updated situation of the VAT rates applied in 
the Member States can be found on the Commission's website.15 
 
In addition to the already large number of exceptions, one can find further special rates 
scattered across some of the EU-27 Member States for very specific supplies, such as 
                                                     
12 VAT is applied at each stage of production; however, businesses have a right to deduct the tax on their 
inputs. 
13 In addition, several supplies are completely exempt from VAT. In article 132, the VAT directive lists 
supplies that shall be exempt from VAT; Annex X, part b lists supplies Member States can continue to 
exempt. A zero rate is different from an exemption of VAT in so far as a zero rate indeed guarantees a tax 
free product. The producer can deduct VAT on inputs for the production of zero rated supplies, which is 
not the case for supplies that are exempted from VAT. In that case, although the final consumption good 
is tax free, the producers have no right to deduct the VAT they had to pay on their input goods. 
14 The following section 1.2 will summarise the discussion on reduced rates in economic theory. 
15http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/vat/how_vat_works/rates/vat_rates_e
n.pdf [2013/06/29] 
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for tolls on bridges in the Lisbon area, or for the supply of liquid petroleum gas (LPG) 
in cylinders in Cyprus. Generally speaking, the VAT systems in place across the 
European Union are still quite heterogeneous, despite the common legal framework and 
guidelines in place. 
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Table 1: Total VAT revenue – in absolute terms and relative to GDP (as of 2011) 
Country 
VAT Revenue 
(in millions of €) 
% of GDP 
BE 26,021 7.0 
BG 3,352 8.7 
CZ 10,994 7.0 
DK 23,870 9.9 
DE 189,920 7.3 
EE 1,363 8.5 
EL 15,027 7.2 
ES 57,376 5.4 
FR 140,506 7.0 
IE 9,782 6.2 
IT 98,557 6.2 
CY 1,517 8.4 
LV 1,368 6.8 
LT 2,444 7.9 
LU 2,667 6.3 
HU 8,517 8.5 
MT 520 7.9 
NL 41,610 6.9 
AT 23,447 7.8 
PL 29,843 8.0 
PT 14,235 8.3 
RO 11,412 8.7 
SI 3,049 8.4 
SK 4,711 6.8 
FI 16,915 8.9 
SE 36,642 9.5 
UK 128,299 7.3 
EU 27 903,961 7.2 
Source: Eurostat16  
Note: Exchange rates of 1.956 Bulgarian levs, 24.590 Czech koruny, 7.451 Danish kroner, 0.706 Latvian 
lats, 3.453 Lithuanian litai, 279.370 Hungarian forints, 4.121 Polish zloty, 4.239 Romanian lei, 9.030 
Swedish kronor and 0.868 British pounds to 1 Euro. 
                                                     
16 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database, Economy and finance, 
Government statistics, Annual government finance statistics, Main national accounts tax aggregates 
[2013/06/29] 
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Table 2: VAT rates in Member States (as of 2011) 
Country 
Standard 
Rate 
Reduced 
Rate(s) 
Super 
Reduced 
Rate 
Parking 
Rate 
Zero Rate 
BE 21 6|12 - 12 Yes 
BG 20 9 - - No 
CZ 20 10 - - No 
DK 25 - - - Yes 
DE 19 7 - - No 
EE 20 9 - - No 
EL 23 6.5|13 - - No 
ES 18 8 4 - No 
FR 19.6 5.5 2.1 - No 
IE 21 9|13.5 4.8 13.5 Yes 
IT 20 10 4 - Yes 
CY 15 5|8 - - No 
LV 22 12 - - No 
LT 21 5|9 - - No 
LU 15 6|12 3 12 No 
HU 25 5|18 - - No 
MT 18 5|7 - - Yes 
NL 19 6 - - No 
AT 20 10 - 12 No 
PL 23 5|8 - - No 
PT 23 6|13 - 13 No 
RO 24 5|9 - - No 
SI 20 8.5 - - No 
SK 20 10 - - No 
FI 23 9|13 - - Yes 
SE 25 6|12 - - Yes 
UK 20 5 - - Yes 
Note: All countries have VAT exemptions in place for some supplies. 
Source: European Commission (2011a).   
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1.2 The case for a diversification of VAT rates – insights from economic theory 
In this section, we discuss differentiated VAT rates from the perspective of economic 
theory, relying on general economic reasoning and recent literature on the subject. The 
aim of this section is to review which arguments have been put forward in favour of 
taxing some goods and services at zero or reduced rates, and assess the theoretical merit 
of reduced VAT rates as compared to other policy instruments. Any conclusions in this 
section are based on the cited literature and not on the original results of this study (for 
conclusions based on our own results, see chapter 4). 
 
The theory of optimal taxation takes as a benchmark the case in which consumption 
taxes are uniform on all final consumption goods, and zero on all intermediate goods. 
Not taxing (intermediate) production inputs17 prevents distortions in the allocation of 
factor inputs, while taxing final consumption at a uniform rate avoids the distortion of 
consumption choices (e.g. Mankiw et al., 2009). In addition to distorting consumption 
choices, VAT exemptions distort competition (as exempt sectors, most prominently the 
financial sector, face different input prices across EU countries)18, and create a bias 
towards self-supply and towards imports19 (Crawford et al., 2010).   
 
Reasons put forward for nevertheless taxing some goods and services at reduced rates 
can be grouped into three categories (IFS et al., 2011, Copenhagen Economics, 2007):  
 equity concerns (alleviate the potentially regressive nature of 
consumption taxes)  
 efficiency (counteract adverse effects of other features of the tax system 
on the incentive to purchase goods and services on the market, or 
produce them at home) 
 positive production/consumption externalities, and what IFS et al. 
(2011) and Copenhagen Economics (2007) call “internalities”, that is, 
positive effects of the consumption of a good or service on the 
                                                     
17 VAT is applied at each stage of production; however, businesses have a right to deduct the tax on their 
inputs. 
18 Financial service providers face different input taxes in different countries of the European Union, which 
distorts competition if financial services are especially transferable across countries. 
19 To understand why VAT exemptions can create a bias towards imports, consider a sector that is exempt 
in country A. As a domestic exempt firm cannot deduct VAT on its inputs, unrecovered VAT is 
cascading into the cost price of this supplier. In contrast, a firm producing in country B (not an exempt 
firm, just a firm producing supplies that are exempt in country A) and exporting to country A can deduct 
VAT on inputs. As the price of the supplies of the foreign firm does not include VAT on its inputs, this 
creates a bias towards imports (Crawford et al., 2010, p. 305) 
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consumers themselves, that are not fully taken into account when 
making consumption decisions.  
 
1. Equity concerns 
 
The first point – equity concerns – relates to the frequently asserted regressive nature of 
consumption taxes. Poorer households tend to spend a larger share of their income on 
consumption than wealthier households, who tend to have a higher savings rate. As a 
consequence, VAT payments disproportionally burden households at the bottom of the 
income distribution (European Commission, 2012). Taxing goods and services that are 
considered to cover basic needs, such as food, water or social housing, at a reduced rate 
aims to ease this burden. The reasoning is that, as wealthier households have more 
income left to spend on non-essential goods after fulfilling their basic needs, taxing 
non-essential goods at higher rates means that a larger share of the total tax revenue is 
being borne by higher income households. The reduced rates therefore work to 
redistribute purchasing power from richer to poorer households (IFS et al., 2011), 
softening the burden on the latter (note that introducing reduced rates on necessities 
make the VAT system more progressive, regardless of the ex-ante distributional impact 
of a VAT system). This notion is supported empirically: it has been shown that the 
regressive effect of consumption taxes varies considerably between countries, and that 
countries with similar levels of standard VAT rates can exhibit very different overall 
distributional effects of the VAT system (European Commission, 2012, O’Donoghue et 
al., 2004). For instance, Belgium and France have nearly the same standard VAT rate 
(21 % and 19.6 %, respectively), but the incorporation of consumption taxes into an 
assessment of disposable income inequality leaves the Gini Coefficient20 of Belgium 
nearly unchanged (it increases by less than 0.25 percentage points), while France’s Gini 
Coefficient increases by more than 3.3 percentage points (O’Donoghue et al., 2004). 
The authors attribute this primarily to the share of goods and services that are exempt 
from VAT or taxed at a lower rate, and to the differences in savings rates across the 
income distribution (European Commission, 2012).  
 
The VAT system is regressive when the analysis is based on VAT payments expressed 
in terms of (disposable) income. However, this conclusion no longer holds when the 
relationship between VAT payments and total expenditures is considered (IFS et al., 
                                                     
20 The Gini Coefficient is a measure of income inequality that takes the value of 0 if income is distributed 
equally, and 1 if one household (or person) has all income in the economy. That is, a lower Gini 
Coefficient corresponds to a more equal income distribution.  
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2011). When looking at VAT payments as a percentage of total expenditure (as 
opposed to disposable income), Figari and Paulus (2012) conclude that for the five 
European countries they consider (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Hungary and the UK), the 
VAT system does not seem to be regressive. Indeed, households in the richest 
disposable income decile pay a higher fraction of their total expenditure on VAT than 
households in the lowest income decile (because they spend a higher proportion of their 
expenditure on goods and services that are taxed at higher rates).   
 
Richer households also pay more VAT in absolute terms (Crawford et al., 2010), and, 
since expenditures rise with income, also benefit more from VAT exemptions and 
reduced rates in absolute terms (IFS et al., 2011).  
 
Furthermore, there exist other policy tools, such as means-tested transfers and income 
tax exemptions, which might be better suited to reach distributional objectives, because 
they can be more effectively targeted at low income households. Revenues generated by 
the abolition of reduced rates could be used to increase income related benefits to low 
income households (Crawford et al., 2010).  
 
From a theoretical point of view, the main argument against using differentiated 
consumption taxes as a tool for redistribution is that if personal preferences for 
consumption do not directly depend on income (or the underlying ability determining 
income)21, any information conveyed by individual consumption choices is also 
available in individual incomes. But redistributing income through the income tax is 
less costly in efficiency terms, because it does not distort individual consumption 
(Mankiw et al., 2009). That is, if the policy objective is to tax individuals based on their 
income, it is preferable to directly tax income, unless consumption choices reveal 
something about income that cannot be captured by personal income tax (e.g. there is 
significant tax evasion and underreporting that hinders the efficient collection of 
income tax, and consumption tax is less prone to evasion).22 
 
                                                     
21 It is important to distinguish preferences from demand, because demand will typically be influenced by a 
household’s budget constraint, and therefore household income.  
22 Consider a country in which all high income individuals have a well-known proclivity for caviar, while 
all low-income individuals despise it, and personal income tax collection is problematic because of 
prevalent misrepresentation of income and fraud. In this country, consumption of caviar would convey 
information about income that income does not, because income is not correctly reported, and caviar 
consumption is a tell-tale sign of high income. If, on the other hand, income is observable, income can be 
taxed directly without distorting the caviar price; therefore, taxing caviar is not necessary.  
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2. Efficiency 
 
A second reason for taxing some goods and services at a lower rate is to mitigate 
distortions that arise elsewhere in the tax system. This applies to labour intensive 
services that can be substituted by (tax-free) household production, such as household 
cleaning, minor repairs (Do-It-Yourself) or food preparation.23 Income tax and VAT 
generate a disparity between the market price of work and take-home pay; therefore, 
workers value hours worked less than the market does. Individuals might choose to 
perform tasks themselves (which is tax free) rather than to buy the same service on the 
market and work additional hours in their normal job (both of which are taxed), if the 
price of the service including taxes exceeds the take-home pay they would receive if 
they worked the time necessary to perform the task themselves. If the same services 
would have been purchased on the market in the absence of earnings and commodity 
taxation, the result is a welfare loss. Therefore, there is an economic case for taxing 
services that can be substituted by home production at a lower rate, because subsidising 
their consumption in fact counteracts inefficiencies caused by the tax system. But this 
argument in favour of differentiated VAT rates only applies to services that can 
reasonably be substituted by home-production (e.g. childcare services). Other labour 
intensive, though professionalised services (such as hairdressing), that are in fact 
eligible for a reduced VAT rate under EU law24, are less suitable to be substituted by 
(untaxed) home production. Therefore, the case for taxing such services favourably is 
weak (IFS et al., 2011, Copenhagen Economics 2007). 
 
Also, as IFS et al. (2011) observe, some goods and services that are presently eligible 
for a reduced VAT rate under EU law do not correspond well with the labour intensive 
services prone to substitution by home production. For example, basic food supplies 
that are taxed at a reduced rate in many countries should be seen as a substitute for 
work because they require preparation (and hence time input), whereas expenditure on 
restaurants, which are currently taxed at the standard rate in 15 Member States, 
generally rises with hours worked. Nonetheless, 12 Member States currently apply a 
reduced rate to restaurants. 
 
                                                     
23 Specifically, EU VAT law allows for reduced rates on minor repairs of bicycles, shoes, leather goods, 
clothing and household linen, renovation and repairs of private dwellings (excluding materials), domestic 
cleaning and cleaning of windows in private households, as well as restaurant services, in all Member 
States (IFS et al., 2011, pp. 539).  
24 IFS et al., 2011, p. 540. 
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Another reason to tax labour intensive sectors at a lower rate is to promote employment 
in general by promoting products and services provided by low-skilled workers. This 
argument is not limited to sectors that are at risk to be substituted by home production, 
but products and services produced or provided primarily by lower skilled workers. 
This argument relies on the assertion that structural unemployment by low skilled 
workers is at least partly due to restrictive labour market regulations, high minimum 
wages and non-wage labour costs that have disproportionally affected low skilled 
workers. Taxing sectors that primarily employ low skilled workers at favourable rates is 
therefore an adequate way to boost demand, drive up wages and increase employment 
in those sectors; while employment in other sectors characterised by a higher skilled 
workforce is not harmed to the same extent, because labour markets for higher skilled 
workers are more flexible, and therefore better able to adjust to changes in demand 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2007).25 This argument only applies if the joint design of 
labour market regulations, minimum wages and unemployment benefits is such that it 
creates structural unemployment to a markedly higher degree for low skilled than for 
higher skilled workers. If this is not the case, any reductions in low skilled 
unemployment will be matched by an increase in structural unemployment of highly 
skilled workers (due to a distortion of demand away from the goods and services that 
are primarily produced by them). In addition, favourable VAT treatment is unlikely to 
reduce structural unemployment if the targeted products or services are tradable, and 
the boost in demand will partly boost imports. Furthermore, differences in employment 
shares of low-skilled workers between sectors are actually rather modest (Copenhagen 
Economics, 2007), which implies that allowing VAT reductions to improve the 
employment prospects of low skilled workers is a poorly targeted policy measure. 
 
3. Production/consumption externalities 
 
A third reason why some products are taxed at reduced rates is that their consumption is 
deemed desirable in a way that is assumed not to be fully internalised by consumers. 
For example, some goods may have positive production and/or consumption 
externalities to the wider society that are not fully taken into account by individual 
consumers, such as public transport or other environmentally friendly products. Other 
supplies may be more beneficial to the consumers than they themselves realise, such as 
                                                     
25 See also Report (COM(2003) 309) from the Commission on the experimental application of a 
reduced rate of VAT to certain labour-intensive services. 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/vat/how_vat_works/labour_intensive_services/ind
ex_en.htm, [2013/06/30] 
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sports activities, books and other cultural or educational events, and should therefore be 
promoted through favourable VAT treatment. Also here, the question is whether a 
subsidy through the VAT rates system is the best policy to boost consumption of these 
goods and services. The first issue is that, because VAT is calculated as a fraction of the 
product price, reduced VAT rates provide a larger subsidy to more expensive products 
than to cheaper ones. Therefore, for reduced VAT rates to be a well-designed subsidy, 
the social benefit of a product needs to rise with its price. In many cases this would be 
hard to argue – why would it be desirable to subsidise first class train tickets more than 
second class train tickets, as the former reduce the trains capacity by more than the 
latter, driving up ticket prices? Why would one want to subsidise the hard cover version 
of a book by more than the soft cover version? Also, reduced VAT rates on such 
products can only incentivise consumers, not businesses, because VAT paid on 
immediate inputs can be deducted by most businesses. Therefore, subsidising 
environmentally friendly technology and the like through reduced VAT rates only 
encourages their use by private consumers, not businesses. Likewise, in this case, the 
problem of the VAT as a subsidy is that it cannot be specifically targeted at certain 
groups of consumers. For example, if under-consumption of books and other 
educational activities is seen as a problem for certain groups of people – e.g. young 
people or those on moderate incomes – significant subsidies may be enjoyed by those 
who already read aplenty. So, even if aggregate demand for books is higher because 
they are less burdened by VAT, it is not certain that the original problem is alleviated. 
More targeted policies apart from reduced VAT rates – such as direct price subsidies 
for cultural or educational events for young people, or people on moderate incomes – 
are thinkable to reach the goal of boosting consumption of goods and services that are 
deemed desirable.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
To sum up, whether zero and reduced VAT rates are the best means to achieve the goals 
they have been introduced for is questionable, although an economic case for a 
differentiated VAT rates structure does exist for some very specific goods and services 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2007). This already somewhat ambiguous case in support of 
zero and reduced rates is accompanied by adverse effects of the heterogeneous VAT 
rates structure in the EU: differentiated VAT rates distort consumption choices and can 
therefore decrease efficiency. Furthermore, the complexity of the current VAT system 
generates important compliance costs for businesses and may harm the functioning of 
the internal market by discouraging intra-EU trade (European Commission, 2011b). 
The European Commission’s communication on the future of VAT (European 
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Commission, 2011b) therefore suggests a fundamental overhaul of the EU VAT 
structure towards a simpler, more unified design.  
 
This study sets out to assess the likely effects of a change in the differentiated VAT 
structures that presently exist in the EU-27 Member States. It aims to inform policy 
makers about the likely risks and benefits of changes to this important source of 
revenue. 
1.3 Tasks performed, reform scenarios and report outline 
We analyse the current VAT rates structure in 27 Member States of the European 
Union and calculate the distributional, revenue and macroeconomic effects of reforms 
of this structure. For this purpose we perform four tasks.  
 
The first three tasks are purely static. We calculate the effects of three reform scenarios 
on VAT payments of households and non-household entities assuming no behavioural 
reactions.  
 Scenario 1: zero and reduced rates are abolished, and all goods and services that 
were taxed at these rates are now taxed at the standard rate applicable in each 
Member State.  
 Scenario 2: the abolition of zero and reduced rates is compensated by lowering the 
standard VAT rate to a level that makes the reform budget neutral for each Member 
State. 
 Scenario 3: zero and reduced rates are abolished, but households in the first and 
second (3a) or first (3b) income quintile (bottom 40 % or 20 % of the income 
distribution, respectively) are compensated for their (average) loss with lump sum 
transfers.  
 
Task 1 
For scenarios 1 and 2, we analyse how much, broken down by category of goods and 
services (12 expenditure categories following the COICOP26 classification), households 
pay on average in VAT in absolute terms and in relation to household expenditure. 
 
We disaggregate these results by the following household characteristics:  
 activity status of the household head  
                                                     
26 Classification Of Individual COnsumption by Purpose; a description of categories can be found in the 
Annex (section A.2). 
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 number of household members who are active in the labour force  
 income quintile 
 household type (single person household, single person household with dependent 
children etc.)  
 age of the household head. 
 
Task 2 
Broken down by categories of goods and services, we analyse how much the different 
types of non-taxable persons and taxable persons other than households, who carry out 
exempt activities, spend on VAT payments in the status quo and how much they would 
spend if zero and reduced rates were abolished. 
 
Task 3 
We provide an estimate of the additional revenues that would be generated if all zero 
and reduced rates were abolished and if low income households were compensated for 
their additional VAT payments, separately for 27 Member States and for the EU as a 
whole. 
 
Task 4 
We analyse the effects of an abolishment of zero and reduced rates on macroeconomic 
indicators using a computational general equilibrium (CGE) model of the European 
economy, WorldScan. WorldScan, as CGE models in general, is a complex model that 
incorporates all major parts of an economy (firms, households, and government), their 
interaction and their behavioural adjustments to external shocks. The results of 
WorldScan are medium-term and show the difference of the new equilibrium values of 
important macroeconomic indicators (GDP, consumption, employment, foreign trade) 
following an external shock (such as a change in effective VAT rates due to a change in 
the VAT rates structure) compared to the status quo.  
 
Due to the conceptual differences to the analyses performed in tasks 1 to 3, the reform 
scenarios analysed in task 4 are similar but not identical to those examined in the first 
part.  
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 Scenario A: Zero and reduced rates are raised to the level of the standard rate. The 
additional government revenues are channelled back into the economy according to 
the share of public spending (consumption and transfers).27 
 Scenario B: Zero and reduced rates are abolished and the standard rate is replaced 
by a new rate that is calculated to be revenue neutral after behavioural response.28 
 Scenario C: We would expect that the abolition of zero and reduced rates eases the 
administrative burden associated with VAT collection. The practicalities of tax 
collection (and any compliance or administrative costs to governments or firms) are 
not modelled in WorldScan. Hence, scenarios A and B do not take into account 
possible gains from a decreased administrative burden that could result from a 
simpler, uniform VAT rates structure. In scenario C, we therefore explore the 
economic effects of simplifying VAT compliance and administration. 
 Scenario D: In this scenario, the VAT increase of scenario A is compensated by a 
decrease in the capital-investment tax such that the reform is overall budget neutral.  
 Scenario E: This scenario simulates the same VAT increase as scenario A, but the 
additional tax revenues associated with the VAT increase are transferred to low-
skilled unemployed and employed households. 
 
This report is structured according to these four tasks. Tasks 1 to 3 are tackled in 
chapter 2. In section 2.1 we describe the data and procedures used in the analysis. 
Section 2.2 gives a short introduction to the results for the EU-27 Member States. 
Section 2.3 presents the analysis for private households, section 2.4 for non-household 
entities with non-refundable VAT liabilities on their intermediate consumption, section 
2.5 presents the additional VAT revenues expected from reform scenarios 1 and 3. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology and discusses the results of the general equilibrium 
analysis performed to answer the questions of task 4. Chapter 4 concludes.  
 
This report includes several annexes. Section A.1 contains the growth rates used to 
uprate the data for the household analysis to the reference year (2011). Section A.2 
shows the COICOP classification, used for the break-down of household consumption 
expenditures. Section A.3 compares our results based on aggregate data to results of an 
analysis using micro data as a validation exercise. Section A.4 deals with goods and 
services that are eligible for zero and reduced VAT rates, while potentially being in 
                                                     
27 In WorldScan as in other CGE models the government cannot save or borrow money – all additional 
revenues are spent. As some of this additional spending is transferred to low-income households by an 
increase in transfers, scenario A is more comparable to scenario 3 than to scenario 1. 
28 This new standard rate takes into account behavioural responses and therefore differs from the one 
calculated in scenario 2. 
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conflict with other EU policies trying to reduce or change their consumption.29 Section 
A.5 showsA.4 the WIOD classification of products and sectors used for the analysis on 
non-households and additional VAT revenues. And section A.6 shows the GTAP 
classification used in World Scan (the model used to perform task 4). 
 
In addition to this report we deliver an Addendum, containing more detailed analyses 
on the results of tasks 1 and 2 for each Member State. Furthermore, we provide 
spreadsheets with detailed tables for the results of tasks 1 and 4. A reading instruction 
to the spreadsheets on the results of task 1 can be found at the end of the Addendum.   
                                                     
29 See European Comission (2011b), section 5.2.2. 
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2 Static analysis of VAT structure and reforms 
2.1 Data and procedure 
Analysis for households 
Data 
 
As we were not granted access to micro data for every EU Member State, we use 
summary data of the national Household Budget Surveys (HBS) provided publicly by 
Eurostat30 to conduct distributional analyses on the current VAT rates structure and the 
reform scenarios.31  
 
Eurostat publishes National Accounts (NA) data on an annual basis and figures are 
available up to 2011 for most countries. In contrast, Household Budget Survey (HBS) 
data are published in longer intervals, with the data from 2005 being the most recent 
data accessible at the time of writing. We could have performed the analysis using data 
from 2005 applying 2005 VAT rates, essentially analysing what would have been the 
effect if zero and reduced rates had been abolished in 2005. However, in the eight years 
since 2005, VAT rates have changed considerably; therefore, this type of analysis 
would not give a satisfying answer to the research question. We decided to uprate the 
HBS data from 2005 to the last available year of NA data (2011) and apply the VAT 
rates of that year. Rather than using one single average growth rate per country, we 
calculated separate rates for the main groups of expenditures. In this way, not only we 
can account for the nominal increase in expenditure, but also for changes in the 
structure of household consumption. In order to control for population growth, we used 
per capita figures rather than absolute numbers. Rates for all countries were calculated 
in Euros32 and can be found in the annex (section A.1). 
 
Generally speaking, Household Budget Surveys are sample surveys of private 
households which provide information on household consumption expenditures on 
                                                     
30 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database, Population and social 
condition, Living conditions and welfare, Consumption expenditure of private households [2013/03/18] 
31 We perform a validation exercise and repeat our simulations using micro data for a subgroup of countries 
for which we have access to disaggregated consumption surveys: Austria, Italy and the UK. The results of 
this exercise can be found in the Annex (section A.3). 
32 All results are presented in Euros. The applied exchange rates – calculated from NA in 2011 – are 
specified for each table. 
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goods and services. Eurostat provides aggregated data on household expenditures for 
categories of goods and services at the two-digit level (12 categories) or at the more 
detailed three-digit (47 categories) and four-digit (113 categories) levels. Detailed 
information on the COICOP classification can be found in the annex (section A.2). In 
addition, consumption expenditure is broken down according to some demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics such as number of economically active persons in the 
household, household type or income quintiles (see below).  
 
Eurostat receives these data from Member States’ National Statistical Offices which 
carry out the Budget Surveys in their respective country. Unlike other European 
statistical domains, however, the provision of HBS data is voluntary; consequently, the 
extent to which figures are available varies considerably (European Commission, 
2005). As a result, some statistics are missing for some countries in the Eurostat data 
set.33  
 
When assessing the quality/accuracy of the data we must be aware that the Eurostat 
statistics, generated from HBS data, may be prone to errors, which are inherent to any 
sample survey. Perhaps most importantly, sampling and non-sampling errors must be 
considered. Sampling errors arise from assuming that it is possible to adequately 
estimate the characteristics of a population by looking at a subset of that population. 
Non-sampling error is an umbrella term for many types of errors, e.g. coverage and 
measurement errors.  
 
When it comes to sampling errors, it should be mentioned, that in comparison to other 
EU household surveys, e.g. the Labour Force Survey (LFS) or the Statistics on Income 
and Living Conditions (SILC), the HBS samples are rather small for some countries 
(European Commission, 2005). For about half of all countries, the sample size is lower 
than 5,000; one of the lowest numbers being 1,570 households in the Netherlands. On 
the other hand, sample sizes larger than 20,000 were achieved for Germany, Italy, 
Poland and Romania (Table 3). Obviously, the level of sampling errors directly depends 
on the achieved sample size: the higher the sample size, the better the accuracy. All in 
                                                     
33 We specified these in the Preface: For all countries, we cannot calculate VAT paid in proportion to 
household income and we cannot break down our results by expenditure quintiles. In addition, for some 
countries, specific tables are missing: Italy (income quintiles), Netherlands (number of active persons in 
the household, household types), Romania (activity status of the household head), Sweden (number of 
active persons in the household), Slovenia (household types), Slovakia (number of active persons in the 
household). 
40 
 
TAXUD/2012/DE/323 
all, however, Eurostat concludes that from a policy making perspective the attained 
sample sizes are still more than satisfactory (European Commission, 2005). 
Table 3: Sample Size Household Budget Surveys 2005 
Country 
Sample Size 
(households) 
BE 3,550 
BG 2,870 
CZ 2,965 
DK 2,449 
DE 52,217 
EE 3,432 
EL 6,555 
ES 8,881 
FR 12,240 
IE 6,884 
IT 24,107 
CY 2,990 
LV 2,774 
LT 7,586 
LU 3,202 
HU 9,058 
MT 2,586 
NL 1,570 
AT 8,400 
PL 34,767 
PT 16,700 
RO 33,066 
SI 3,725 
SK 4,710 
FI 4,007 
SE 2,079 
UK 6,785 
Source: European Commission (2005) 
 
When it comes to non-sampling errors, potential coverage errors are an issue. 
Generally, coverage errors occur if the probability of being included in the HBS is not 
equal for all households, which can lead to over- or under-coverage, causing bias in the 
estimated figures, e.g. if certain types of households with very specific consumption 
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patterns are not sampled. One should be aware that HBSs generally only sample private 
households, disregarding collective households such as elderly homes, military barracks 
or jails. Moreover, some countries exclude specific categories of households or certain 
remote geographical areas which are difficult to access. For example, Germany, did not 
sample households with a monthly net income exceeding € 18,000, and the United 
Kingdom excluded some Scottish off-shore Islands and the Isles of Scilly (European 
Commission, 2005). 
 
Non-response is another source of bias in sample estimates, particularly if the non-
respondents have specific characteristics (i.e. they differ from sampled households in a 
non-random way). This is an important point, considering that for the Household 
Budget Survey 2005, the mean response rate for the EU as a whole was around 60 %, 
with important variations between countries – ranging from 6 % in Belgium to 89 % in 
Cyprus and 90 % in Romania. Measurement and processing errors resulting from recall 
problems, underreporting of expenditures on certain “undesirable” products (such as 
gambling, alcoholic drinks, tobacco or drugs) and interviewer influence represent other 
potential sources of non-accuracy. Also, for about half of all countries, the year in 
which interviews for the HBSs took place did not match the reference year of 2005, and 
price coefficients were used to adjust for this difference. Finally, the HBS data for four 
countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta and Romania – do not contain 
information on imputed rents, leading to an underestimation of expenditures for 
housing and presumably an overestimation of the VAT burden in proportion to 
expenditures (see below). 
 
In conclusion, while a lot of progress has been made and much harmonization has been 
achieved over the past years, methodology of data collection and quality of data can 
still vary substantially between Member States. For more detailed information on this 
issue, the reader is referred to the “Quality report of the Household Budget Surveys 
2005”, provided by Eurostat (European Commission, 2005).  
 
Procedure 
 
For the distributional analysis for private households (task 1) we calculate the VAT 
liability on private household consumption expenditures in 2011 as well as in reform 
scenarios 1 and 2. From our data we know how much households in the EU-27 Member 
States spend on goods and services. From this information we deduce how much VAT 
they had to pay on their consumption, using information on VAT rates applicable in the 
respective countries. However, it is likely that some fraction of household expenditure 
42 
 
TAXUD/2012/DE/323 
is made abroad, leading to different VAT payments due to different VAT rates. We do 
not know the share of expenditures spent abroad or in which country money was spent 
and assume that all expenditures take place in the Member State where the HBS data is 
from. For each country, we associate the categories of goods and services with the VAT 
rate they are taxed with. We apply the rates to the most detailed classification available 
and calculate weighted averages for the average household and each sub-group of 
interest. The assumptions we made when associating expenditure categories with VAT 
rates are listed in the Addendum, delivered with this report; it also contains more 
detailed country analyses. The spreadsheets, also delivered with this report, contain 
additional, detailed country tables. A reading instruction for these spreadsheets is 
provided in the Addendum. In addition, this Addendum contains a comprehensive list 
of assumptions we made when applying the VAT rates to the data. Moreover, every 
country chapter contains a short introduction to the relevant national VAT system.  
 
Regarding our assumptions on VAT rates on passenger transport services, two issues 
should be kept in mind. First, our data does not distinguish between expenditures on 
domestic or international transport services. In many countries, though, VAT rates 
differ depending on whether the service was domestic or international. Second, even if 
we could distinguish the two, we would still be ignorant as to the specific destination 
and transit countries involved or how travel costs are divided between countries, 
information that would be necessary to accurately calculating VAT on transport.34 
Researching the exact share of transport expenditures accruing to domestic or 
international transport, respectively, for each Member State would require a tedious 
exploration of a vast number of different data sources. This venture would be even 
further complicated by obtaining information on the travel destinations. Given the 
comparably small amount of household expenditures spent on transport services (on 
average over the EU-27 1.4 % of household expenditures, ranging from 0.7 % in Spain 
to 2.5 % in Latvia) this effort is not reasonable. We therefore make simplifying 
assumptions.35 We use the domestic rate for all modes of transport apart from air 
travel.36 
                                                     
34 Passenger transport services are taxable where they are performed. In case of cross-border (intra-
community) transport services VAT applies proportionate to the distance covered. 
35 Some Member States further distinguish VAT rates on passenger transport, e.g. depending on whether 
the rail transport is long- or short distance or whether the transport service is scheduled or not. The 
assumptions made to deal with these issues are listed in the Addendum. 
36 For transport services by rail we base this assumption on data provided by Eurostat, stating that EU wide 
international passenger transport by rail makes up less than 6 % of total passenger transport by rail. (See 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Passenger_transport_statistics, 
2013/08/23)  
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We deviate from this general assumption for passenger transport by air and apply the 
rate for international flights (a zero rate in all Member States), as Eurostat data37 
indicate that this transport mode is predominantly international. Even for countries 
where more than 10 % of total air travel is national (seven countries38, Italy leads the 
ranking with a share of 27 %) we assume that private households spend most of their 
expenditures on flights on international flights.39 Therefore we keep the assumption of a 
zero rate for expenditures on air travel for all Member States. This assumption is not 
quantitatively important: Taxing all expenditures on transport by air in Italy, Spain and 
Sweden (the countries with the highest share of domestic flights) with the domestic rate 
would lead to increases in average VAT expenditures by € 3 to € 4. 
 
Unless stated otherwise, the following supplies are exempted in all Member States40:  
 imputed rentals for housing41 (CP041) 
                                                                                                                                              
For transport by road and sea/inland waterway EU-wide data on the share of national and international 
transport are not available. Regarding transport by road the assumption that household expenditures are 
mostly spent on national services seems sensible. Regarding transport by sea or inland waterway one 
would need to go further into detail on whether expenditures are higher on transport on inland waterways 
or on sea, and whether the routes are national or international. Again, the share of expenditures on 
passenger transport by sea and inland waterway is very small (on average 0.05 %, highest in Malta with 
0.2 %) such that we refrain from this option and use the simplifying assumption that all expenditures on 
this transport mode are for domestic services only. 
37 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database, Transport, Air Transport, 
Air transport measurement – passengers, Overview of the air passenger transport by country and airports, 
Air passenger transport by reporting country [2013/08/09] 
38 UK (10 %), DE (14 %), FI (17 %), FR (21 %), ES (23 %), SE (24 %), IT (27 %) 
39 National flights are presumably more important for business clients or tourists. In case households fly 
nationally they presumably spend less money on these flights than they do on international ones.  
40 The EU VAT Legislation contains two sorts of exempt supplies. Supplies mentioned in Annex X/b (e.g. 
telecommunication services, services provided by artists or members of free professions, supply of water 
by public institutions etc.) can be exempted from VAT. Other supplies such as those mentioned in Article 
132 (postal or hospital services, social security, education, etc.) or in Article 135 (insurance and financial 
services, some supplies related to immovable property, etc.) have to be exempted from VAT. 
41 Comprehensive measures of consumption and income both need to incorporate housing as a major 
element. This is complicated by the fact that housing consumption and housing income are often not 
observable cash-flows. Most importantly, owner-occupiers can be thought of as implicitly paying 
themselves a (notional or imputed) rent for their property: in their capacity as occupiers they are 
consuming a valuable stream of ‘housing services’, and in their capacity as owners they are receiving an 
‘in-kind’ income in the form of those services. 
The consumption value of living in a property is given by the market rental value of the property being 
occupied. This is observed in the data for those households who rent their property from a private 
landlord. To consider the rental value for owner-occupiers or for tenants of ‘social landlords’ (paying a 
rent which is typically lower than the market rent) National Accounts data as well as most Household 
Budget Surveys contain imputed rents as part of household consumption. Since consuming dwellings one 
owns involves no monetary transaction, imputed rents are not liable to VAT. In accordance with the 
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 actual rentals paid for housing (CP042) 
 out-patient and hospital services (CP062 and CP063) 
 postal services (CP081) 42 
 games of chance (CP0943) 
 education (CP10)43 
 social protection (CP124) 
 insurance services (CP125) 
 financial services (CP126) 
 
We assume households do not adjust their consumption; that is, following the reform, 
they buy the same basket of goods and services as before. This is a simplifying 
assumption, as zero and reduced VAT rates distort consumption choices because they 
change relative prices. The abolition of zero and reduced rates would have a 
substitution effect (as consumers switch away from products and services that were 
previously taxed at favourable rates) and an income effect (as overall purchasing power 
decreases following an effective VAT increase), and the removal of the price distortion 
caused by VAT could lead to an increase in consumer welfare (that is, the utility 
consumers derive from the bundle of goods they purchase). The magnitude of these 
effects depends on the change in the effective VAT rate and the relevant demand 
elasticities.44  
                                                                                                                                              
approach used in IFS et al. (2011), we include expenditures on imputed rents when calculating average 
expenditures, but treat these payments as VAT exempt. (Changing) VAT rates on the purchase or 
construction of dwellings by private households cannot be captured with the data at hand.  
42 For the purposes of our analysis we treat all postal services as exempted from VAT, even though services 
not provided by universal postal services providers are usually subject to the respective standard rate of a 
country. This approach has two reasons. First, average household expenditure on postal services in EU 
Member States only makes up a marginal part of total household expenditure (this share is highest in 
Malta with 0.14 %), allowing for a rather simple assumption. Second, universal postal services providers 
still hold major market shares in all EU Member States, though this varies between different mailing 
segments and countries (see Copenhagen Economics, 2010). Assuming the opposite, i.e. taxing the whole 
sector at the standard rate, only leads to marginal changes in VAT expenditures. In Malta, for example, 
this would lead to an increase in VAT expenditures of less than € 5 for an average household. 
43 Some expenditures falling in category CP10 “Education” might not be exempt from VAT, such as 
expenditures for school excursions. We could not make this distinction in the aggregate data, as 
expenditure on subgroups of CP10 (or even on the main aggregate) is rarely specified. Our simplifying 
assumption, therefore, is to exempt the whole category CP10. 
44 Alm and El-Ganainy (2013) find that for a sample of fifteen EU countries the effective VAT rate is 
negatively correlated with aggregate consumption: a one percentage increase in the VAT rate is 
associated with about a one percentage decline in per capita aggregate consumption. IFS et al. (2011) 
estimate the effect of an abolition of zero and reduced VAT rates on private expenditures for five EU 
Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and the UK) using a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand 
System (QUAIDS) framework. While results differ between countries, they conclude that abolishing zero 
45 
Study on VAT rates structure 
VAT reforms also affect labour supply because they influence real wages, specifically, 
a VAT increase would be expected to decrease labour supply (because consumption 
becomes more expensive in comparison to leisure, this mechanism is the same as in the 
case of personal income taxes). Moreover, a VAT on work-related expenses such as 
travel or clothing could provide further disincentives for work, in particular for 
secondary earners (Metcalf, 1995).45  
 
In addition, we assume that an increase in VAT rates is fully incident on consumer 
prices. From a theoretical perspective, the degree to which changes in VAT rates are 
passed-through (‘shifted’) onto consumer prices depends on the structure of the relevant 
market. Consumption taxes may be under-, fully or even overshifted onto consumer 
prices; that is, prices can rise less, by the same amount or even more than VAT (IFS et 
al. 2011). In the short-run (i.e. before firms can adjust their capacity to a change in 
VAT rates and hence relative prices), in a perfectly competitive market (i.e. individual 
consumers and producers assume that they cannot influence the market price), VAT is 
passed onto consumer prices to a lower degree the more elastic the demand is. That is, 
the easier it is for consumers to substitute away from the good, the lower the fraction of 
the VAT increase that is passed onto them. Conversely, VAT changes are passed onto 
consumer prices to a higher degree for a given demand if the supply is elastic (that is, 
producers curb or expand production readily in response to small price changes), see 
e.g. Fullerton and Metcalf (2002). 
 
In a monopolistic market, VAT is expected to be fully shifted onto prices as firms have 
full control over prices. In an oligopolistic market, all degrees of tax shifting are 
possible depending on the level of competition and supply and demand elasticities (i.e. 
how strongly supply and demand react to changes in prices). If demand reacts more 
strongly to price increases than to price decreases (i.e. if the demand function is 
sufficiently concave), price increases have a strong effect on demand if the price level is 
high, i.e. undershifting might occur in this case. Conversely, if demand reacts less 
                                                                                                                                              
and reduced VAT rates would lead to a welfare gain. Also, they find that the distributive effect of this 
VAT reform – that is, the relative additional VAT burden for households according to expenditure deciles 
– is very similar to the static analysis. 
45 Blumkin et al. (2008) compare income and consumption taxes in an experimental framework. They find 
that consumption taxes discourage labour supply less than wage taxes, because of the temporal separation 
between the labour supply and the consumption decision. Metcalf (1996) estimates the labour supply 
effects of a shift from income to consumption taxation. He finds that the adverse effects on labour supply 
are quite small in such a scenario. Lehmus (2011) analyses a similar reform scenario in a dynamic general 
equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. He replaces the progressive labour tax with a flat-rate 
consumption tax and also finds negligible changes in labour supply and gross labour income distribution. 
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sensitively to price increases (i.e. the demand function is sufficiently convex), small 
price increases have a strong effect on demand if the price level is low, but the absolute 
decrease in demand diminishes as prices increase further. In this case, it might be more 
profitable for a firm to increase prices by more than the VAT increase, as the increase 
in price will be sufficient to more than offset the reduction in sales volume and possible 
rise in costs (Delipalla and Keen, 1992, and Carbonnier, 2006). 
 
The empirical literature confirms that markets that can be described as close to perfect 
competition tend to feature full shifting, while less competitive markets feature both 
under- as well as overshifting of taxes, e.g. Delipalla and O’Donell (2001), Carbonnier 
(2007) and Smart and Bird (2009). Concerning the effect of an overall VAT rate change 
on the average price level, studies have found full or near-full shifting of taxes – at least 
in the long-run –, e.g. Copenhagen Economics (2007).  
 
To sum up, the theoretical and empirical literature provides inconclusive results on the 
degree of the incidence of VAT, with both under- and overshifting being possible 
depending on the market structure. However, both the theoretical and the empirical 
literature suggests that pass-through of VAT onto consumer prices is generally closer to 
full-shifting in competitive markets and for broader-based VAT changes. In line with 
Copenhagen Economics (2007) and IFS et al. (2011), and since we do not possess 
sufficient information that would allow us to define different levels of shifting across 
countries and sectors with any reasonable certainty, we assume full-pass through of 
VAT changes to prices. As the reform scenarios analysed here stipulate VAT changes 
for many broadly defined categories of goods and services (such as foodstuffs) in many 
countries, this assumption does not seem unreasonable.  
 
We calculate household VAT bills on average as well as broken down by COICOP 
categories and household characteristics. The household characteristics we consider are 
the following:  
 Activity status of the household head46: 
- manual worker in industry and services 
- non-manual worker in industry and services 
- employed person except employees (self-employed person, farmer or 
agricultural worker) 
                                                     
46 The household head (or the household reference person) is usually defined as the household member 
contributing most to household income. However, not all countries follow this definition (European 
Commission, 2005). 
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- unemployed person 
- retired person 
- other inactive person (student or in national service, person exclusively 
dedicated to household duties / caregiving, person engaged in a non-economic 
activity, person unable to work) 
 Number of active persons in the household: “active” includes all employed persons 
from above (workers, self-employed, farmers) as well as unemployed persons. 
 Income quintile: For each country households are sorted according to their 
household income47 (from poorest to richest) and then divided into five equally 
sized groups. The 20 % of households with the lowest household income make up 
the first quintile, the next 20 % the second quintile and so on. The fifth quintile 
contains the 20 % of households with the highest household income.  
 Household type: Households are separated according to the number and age of their 
members (number of adults and dependent children; a dependent child is a person 
aged 15 years or younger, or a person aged 23 years or younger if the person is not 
yet active on the labour market, i.e. not working and not unemployed). 
 Age of the household head48 
 
In order to analyse the distributional consequences of the current VAT rates structure 
and of prospective reforms we calculate VAT payments in absolute values as well as in 
proportion to total expenditure. As a measure of the living standard of a household we 
refer to the income quintile the household belongs to. Data on expenditure is sometimes 
considered to be a better measure of living standards than income because it conveys 
more information on households’ well-being over the life cycle (e.g. Crossley et al., 
2009, IFS et al. 2011). This is because individuals can smooth their consumption over 
the life-cycle by borrowing, saving, and subsequently drawing on their savings. An 
individual in her peak earning years with a high savings rate, for example, would 
appear to be less affected by VAT because of her low consumption expenditure. As a 
retiree, however, she would be hit by the tax, as she uses up her savings to complement 
her decreased income. She would not be spared from incurring VAT payments, but only 
                                                     
47 We assume household incomes were not equivalised in this procedure. “Equivalisation” intends to make 
income comparable across differently sized households. This adjustment typically consists of dividing 
expenditure by the modified OECD scale. This scale gives a weight of one to the first member of the 
household, a weight of 0.5 to every additional adult member and a weight of 0.3 to every child living in 
the household. This approach assumes economies of scale in consumption. A family of two adults and 
one child would thus have to earn 1.8 times as much as a single person to be considered as having the 
same “equivalised” income.  
48 The information on all definitions was obtained from European Commission (2006). We could not verify 
whether every country followed these definitions.  
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defer them over time. As pointed out by IFS et al. (2011), ideally, we would be 
interested in the impact of VAT on the lifetime-rich versus the lifetime-poor. However, 
data on lifetime income and lifetime expenditure are generally not available. Because 
consumption expenditure varies less over the life-cycle than income, it can be argued to 
be more informative of individual lifetime resources than income (Crossley et al., 
2009). 
 
Also, whether the VAT burden of a household is measured in terms of VAT payments 
as a percentage of income or expenditure has implications on whether a VAT system 
appears to be distributionally regressive, neutral or progressive. This is because 
households’ savings rate varies with income: low income households tend to spend 
more than their income, while high income households tend to spend less than their 
income (IFS et al. 2011, Carrera 2010).  
 
When looking at VAT payments as a proportion of expenditure, across the expenditure 
distribution49, VAT will appear more progressive than when looking at VAT payments 
as a proportion of income, across the income distribution. Because many low income 
households have expenditures higher than their income, the VAT burden on low income 
households measured as a fraction of their income will appear high, making the VAT 
system look regressive. On the other hand, looking at VAT payments as a percentage of 
expenditure, over the expenditure distribution, will make the system look progressive, 
because low expenditure households tend to spend a higher fraction of their total 
expenditure on zero and reduced rated items than high expenditure households, which 
will result in a lower VAT burden on low expenditure quintiles when measured as a 
percentage of expenditure. The VAT system will look even more progressive when 
assessed based on VAT payments as a proportion of income, across the expenditure 
distribution, because low spending households generally have incomes exceeding their 
spending, leading to a low ratio of VAT payments to disposable income, while the 
reverse is true for high spending households. Carrera (2010) shows that, when looking 
at quintiles of the expenditure distribution, VAT as a percentage of disposable income 
increases in the UK, hence makes the system appear progressive, while it decreases 
over the income distribution, implying it to be regressive.  
 
                                                     
49 That is, we define households with high expenditures as rich, and those with low expenditures as poor. If 
we use the income distribution as a benchmark, we define those with low incomes as poor, and those with 
high incomes as rich. As argued above, the expenditure distribution might carry more information on life-
time resources, but one still might prefer to use the income distribution. 
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This introduces some ambiguity into the assessment of the progressivity of VAT 
systems. However, it can be argued, that measuring VAT as a proportion of income can 
be misleading (IFS et al. 2011). Consider the example of an economy where lifetime 
income equals lifetime expenditure (that is, there are no bequests), individuals can 
borrow and save, and there is a uniform VAT rate on all goods and services; in this 
case, the VAT system would not influence the distribution of resources in the economy 
(everyone would pay the same fraction of their lifetime resources on VAT). When 
assessing this VAT system empirically using a cross section of income and expenditure 
data, we would correctly identify this VAT system to be distributionally neutral when 
looking at VAT payments as a fraction of expenditure, regardless of whether we look at 
the income or expenditure distribution. When looking at VAT payments as a proportion 
of income, however, we would judge it to be regressive if individuals with high income 
save, and those with low income borrow, when looking at the income distribution. 
When looking at the expenditure distribution, we would mistakenly judge it as 
progressive.  
 
Total VAT liabilities of households 
 
Because of a host of potential problems with Household Budget Surveys (as discussed 
above) we use another data source (WIOD data, see below) to estimate households’ 
total liabilities as well as any changes in revenues due to changes in the VAT rates 
structure (task 3). Using this database not only gives us more accurate estimations of 
the static revenue effects, estimation of revenues obtained from households are 
furthermore congruent with the calculations of those obtained from non-household 
entities.50 The WIOD database is, among others, based on National Accounts, which 
are, in turn, based on the information provided by the Household Budget Surveys. 
However, both NA and WIOD data include additional estimates for underrepresented 
categories or households that are not part of the reference population in the Household 
Budget Surveys. It has to be noted, however, that HBS, NA and WIOD all exhibit 
different expenditure structures, which can lead to different estimations of average 
VAT rates. We will discuss this issue briefly below and draw attention to it when 
necessary while discussing the results.  
 
                                                     
50 For this reason we also refrain from the possibility to calculate additional VAT revenues for households 
based on National Accounts data. Although basing on each other there are differences in total household 
expenditures as well as in expenditure structures between NA data and the WIOD database for most 
countries.  
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Scenario 3 calculates by how much households defined as low-income households 
would have to be compensated in scenario 1 in order to be able to buy the same bundle 
of goods and services as in the base scenario. We use two definitions of low-income 
households based on income quintiles. In scenario 3a we compensate the 40 % of 
households with the lowest incomes (first and second income quintiles); in scenario 3b 
we compensate the 20 % of households with the lowest incomes (first quintile only). 
Scenario 3 calculates the additional VAT liabilities that can be expected from 
abolishing zero and reduced rates even though especially vulnerable groups are 
compensated for their increase in VAT such that they are able to buy the same bundle 
of supplies as before the reform.  
 
In order to compensate especially vulnerable households for an increase in VAT, 
vulnerable households have to be specified. There is a vast literature on the definition 
and measurement of income inequality and poverty, and some approaches stress non-
economic components to well-being such as health or varying needs across individuals 
(see e.g. Sen, 2000). As far as income inequality is concerned, the concept of income 
quintiles has a number of practical advantages, e.g. it can deal with negative incomes 
and is invariant to the scale in which income is measured. It is not the only measure that 
satisfies these requirements, others include the Gini-Coefficient (see e.g. Cowel, 2000), 
the income quintile share (S80/S20) ratio or the at-risk-of-poverty (ARP) rate. The two 
latter measures are the most commonly used ones according to Eurostat (2013b). The 
income quintile share is the ratio of total income received by the fifth income quintile to 
that of the first income quintile (income in terms of equivalised disposable income) 
(Eurostat, 2013a), while the ARP rate is the share of the population whose income is 
lower than the at-risk-of-poverty threshold of 60 % of the median (equivalised) income 
(Eurostat, 2013a). Households at-risk-of-poverty would be a candidate for 
compensation in the present analysis; however, our data does not contain this 
information. While we would expect a substantial overlap between households in the 
first and second income quintiles with those at-risk-of-poverty, and the poorest 
households would be considered poor according to both measures, they do not need to 
coincide. For example, in a very egalitarian society, only the poorest households might 
have incomes that are lower than 60 % of the median income, so policy makers might 
not even want to compensate the entire first income quintile; in a society with an 
income distribution that features many equally poor households, more than 40 % may 
have an income beneath the at-risk-of-poverty threshold. For the EU as a whole, around 
16 % of the population are currently at-risk-of-poverty (Eurostat, 2012). In the context 
of our study, this indicates that when compensating the first income quintile, we would 
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compensate those households who either are at-risk-of-poverty, or barely escape this 
definition. When we also compensate the second income quintile, while we would be 
still compensating those with incomes below the median, we would be compensating 
many households towards the centre of the income distribution. While income quintiles 
are the only measure we can use in this study because of the data availability, they are a 
heavily used measure in the empirical literature (e.g. OECD (2008) and OECD (2011), 
IFS (2011) to name a few). It is however a drawback that our data do not reveal more 
about the composition of the income quintiles with regards to household type, activity 
status etc. This is also the reason why we cannot make a distributional analysis of 
scenario 3 for other aspects of household characteristics: We simply do not know how 
many households with children or households headed by a retired head will be 
compensated according to our definition. 
 
As discussed in detail above, both income and expenditure can be used as a measure of 
material well-being, but representing VAT payments as a percentage of total 
expenditure is a more accurate measure of the relative VAT burden of a given 
household. Compensating low income households (as opposed to low expenditure 
households) for their losses after a VAT increase makes sense if life-time income is not 
equal to life-time expenditure (that is, individuals with high savings rates will not 
ultimately consume their savings and therefore be hit by VAT at a later point in life). In 
this case, compensating low expenditure individuals would be akin to a subsidy to 
savings, and not necessarily benefit the life-time poor. 
 
As there is no information on income distribution in the WIOD tables, we use HBS and 
NA data to calculate the share of additional VAT payments that accrue to low income 
households.51 Specifically, when calculating the budget effect of the reform, we subtract 
the fraction of the additional VAT paid by low income households, as estimated with 
HBS and NA data, from the additional revenue calculated using WIOD data, because 
this fraction is assumed to be used to compensate low income households for the reform 
by enabling them to buy the same basket of supplies as before the reform. 
                                                     
51 In some countries expenditure structures are similar in HBS and NA data. When this is the case, it does 
not matter whether we calculate the share of the additional VAT burden arising from scenario 1 accruing 
to low income households with HBS data only or with a combination of HBS and NA data. However, for 
countries with deviating expenditure structures (and thus deviating average VAT rates on the households’ 
consumption) the shares calculated with HBS and NA data typically differ. As we are interested in 
additional revenues and NA data are more appropriate to calculate revenues, we prefer using the 
combination of HBS data (from which we obtain the shares in expenditure of low income households) 
and NA data (from which we obtain the average VAT rates). 
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Analysis for non-households  
We estimate for each Member State how much, broken down by category of goods and 
services, the different types of non-households would have to spend on irrecoverable 
VAT payments in the status quo and in scenarios 1 and 2.52  
 
The estimation involves the following tasks and data: 
 Gathering relevant data for tax rates by product, following the 59-product 
classification (see section A.4 in the Annex) in the Eurostat tables, as updated by 
WIOD53, and collecting comparable data on exemptions;  
 Estimating the 2011 use tables, extrapolated from the 2009 WIOD tables;  
 Estimating the propex factor (percentage of sector output which is exempted from 
VAT, and which therefore cannot recover VAT on inputs) for each of the 35 sectors 
considered in the WIOD classification, as well as other items that increase the 
amount of unrecoverable VAT (small business exemptions, limits on deductibility 
of expenses on company cars and expenses for entertainment purposes); 
 Estimating the percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) belonging to 
non-household, non-government sectors which are exempt from VAT. 
Details on each of these components are as follows. 
 
Calculations of VAT rates and exemptions  
 
We calculate VAT rates for 59 CPA (Classification of Product Activities) supplies for 
all EU countries, for 2011 (7,965 cases total, NACE Rev 1 classification). Relevant data 
sources include:  
 EU TAXUD publications on VAT rates (European Commission, 2011a),  
 International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) database on VAT rates54,  
 IBFD publication of national tax codes and  
 IBFD taxation news to track any changes in the legislation. 
 
The estimation involved several steps:  
 
 We constructed VAT rates for each of the 2,531 6-digit CPA supply categories, 
using the IBFD database. All EU countries taken together, we defined VAT rates 
                                                     
52 In addition, as mentioned above (p. 46), changes in VAT liabilities in total (for households and non-
households) are calculated based on the data and procedure described below.  
53 World Input-Output Project, available at http://www.wiod.org/database/nat_suts.htm [2013/03/26] 
54 See http://www.ibfd.org/ [2013/07/04]. The referenced database is available by subscription only. 
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for 68,319 cases. However, even at this level of detail, in 2,727 cases it was not 
possible to define a single VAT rate applying to the entire category. For example, 
different VAT rates commonly apply to international and domestic transport 
services, which fall into the same 6-digit CPA category. In cases as this, we took 
note of the possible differing VAT rates, and used additional assumptions when 
aggregating those rates to the 2-digit level.  
 With respect to standard vs. reduced rates or exemptions, we found that in 80 % of 
all 68,319 cases, the standard VAT rate applies to the category in question. The 
remaining cases (13,341) are either taxed at a reduced rate or exempt. We 
researched rates applying to these categories in the relevant appendices of national 
tax codes or EU TAXUD publications. 
 Finally, we aggregated the 6-digit CPA VAT rates into 59 2-digit categories (a total 
of 1,674 total cases per annum). 
 
2011 Use tables: choice and estimations 
 
There are three different types of use tables that are widely available and comparable 
across countries: EUROSTAT NACE Rev 1, EUROSTAT NACE rev 2 and WIOD 
(which provides estimates for all countries, albeit based on 2007/2008 original data). 
For ease of comparison across countries, we chose to use the WIOD database and 
proceeded to forecast the 2011 use tables through rescaling based on actual National 
Accounts data for Final Demand and Intermediate Consumption. 
 
Propex factor (unrecoverable VAT on inputs in exempt entities) 
 
Due to the lack of data on the number of supplies that are exempt from VAT at the level 
of disaggregation of the WIOD tables, we have adopted the propex methodology 
developed by Reckon consultancy in the estimation of the VAT gaps (Reckon LLP, 
2009). In a nutshell, this methodology consists of assuming that the share of output 
within a 2-digit NACE sector reflects the share of inputs used to produce that set of 
goods and services. For example, “postal services”, which belong to “Post and 
telecommunication services” NACE rev 1 I.64 sector, are exempted in Austria and 
other Member States. We assume that the propex (or the share of VAT non-deductible 
inputs) for I.64 sector is equal to the share of “postal services” output in the total “Post 
and telecommunications” sector total output. 
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We used this method to compute propex for all exempt activities, with the exception of 
the financial services sector, for which we use estimates based on information gathered 
through communications from national authorities.55  
 
We also allowed for restrictions generally imposed on firms to deduct VAT related to 
the purchase of cars, as well as for purposes of entertainment. Finally, and again on the 
basis of country submissions, we estimate the number of small businesses (businesses 
below the threshold for VAT registration in countries that have such thresholds) that 
might choose to register in order to recover VAT on their inputs. 
 
GFCF not attracting VAT 
 
Entities that are exempt or sell exempted goods are also unable to recover VAT on their 
expenditures on GFCF (Gross Fixed Capital Formation). In order to estimate this 
unrecoverable liability, we first disaggregate the GFCF data provided in the use tables 
(GFCF is recorded as a single column, distributed among the 59 products) between 
non-financial corporations, financial corporations and other economic agents 
(government, households, non-profits). We then use data provided by national 
authorities to calculate the average VAT rate on purchases of goods and services for 
GFCF purposes by exempt entities. 
Comparison of average effective VAT rates 
For both analyses on private households (task 1 distributional analysis and task 3 
additional revenues) we calculate average effective VAT rates. The analysis on task 1 is 
based on HBS data, the analysis of task 3 on WIOD data. The resulting rates differ (see 
Table 4). For most countries the deviations are acceptable, given the fact that the 
average VAT rates depend on the expenditure structure and that there are necessary 
differences between data taken directly from surveys and data incorporating other 
sources as well.56 
 
For the following countries, however, the gap amounts to more than 1.5 percentage 
points, with the average VAT rate from HBS data being larger than the one obtained 
from WIOD data: 
                                                     
55 Generally, financial services are exempt from VAT, with a few exceptions. In some countries, VAT is 
recoverable for exports of financial services to non-EU countries. 
56 See the short discussion above on supplies typically underestimated in survey data and populations 
excluded from the sample population.  
55 
Study on VAT rates structure 
 Czech Republic (1.6 percentage points) 
 Hungary (5.4 percentage points) 
 Latvia (3.4 percentage points) 
 Malta (1.8 percentage points) 
 Austria (1.6 percentage points)  
 Romania (4.0 percentage points)  
 
The fact that rents are not imputed in HBS data contributes considerably to the 
divergences between the results from the two data-sources in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Malta and Romania. In these countries household expenditures are calculated 
without adding this notional consumption expenditure. Since imputed rents are exempt 
(because no actual transaction takes place) including them in total household 
expenditure automatically reduces the average VAT rate. Comparing the HBS to the 
NA data (which do contain imputed rents)57 shows a difference in the average VAT 
rates for these countries (average VAT rates of 12.3 %, 17.3 %, 9.2 % and 17.1 % in 
NA data for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta and Romania, respectively). Also for 
Latvia, the difference to the average VAT rate calculated from NA data (which is 
15.9 %) is considerable. Primarily responsible for this divergence is that, in some 
expenditure categories, there are marked differences in the distribution of expenditure 
over sub-categories between the two datasets. For example, CPO4 has a higher share of 
exempt rents in the NA data, or in CP12, exempt insurance and banking services are 
more important as a fraction of total expenditure in the NA data than in the HBS data. 
For Austria there is a difference between rates obtained from HBS and NA data as well, 
even though not as big as in the other countries analysed above.58 
                                                     
57 The WIOD data are based on NA data; a comparison to WIOD data nevertheless is not straightforward, 
as WIOD data uses a different categorization of goods and services, see above.  
58 The rate estimated from NA data amounts to 12 %, which is closer to the rate estimated from WIOD data 
(11 %). Some categories are taxed at a lower rate in NA due to a higher share of exempt supplies within 
the main categories (CP04 with a higher share in imputed rents, CP06 with a higher share in health 
services, CP08 with a higher share of postal services). Tables on this and the other comparisons are 
available upon request. 
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Table 4: Comparison of average effective VAT rates in 2011 in HBS and WIOD 
Country HBS data 
WIOD 
data 
BE 11.1% 10.0% 
BG 14.8% 13.6% 
CZ 13.8% 12.3% 
DK 15.3% 14.8% 
DE 10.1% 10.0% 
EE 14.6% 15.0% 
EL 13.0% 12.2% 
ES 7.7% 8.3% 
FR 9.0% 10.3% 
IE 9.7% 8.7% 
IT 9.3% 10.2% 
CY 7.3% 6.4% 
LV 18.1% 14.7% 
LT 17.2% 17.2% 
LU 6.6% 8.0% 
HU 21.2% 15.8% 
MT 11.2% 9.4% 
NL 8.3% 8.3% 
AT 12.8% 11.3% 
PL 11.9% 11.4% 
PT 9.9% 11.3% 
RO 21.7% 17.7% 
SI 11.7% 11.4% 
SK 15.9% 14.9% 
FI 12.3% 11.2% 
SE 13.3% 12.2% 
UK 8.6% 9.7% 
Source: WIOD, Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
 
This problem also affects reform scenario 2, where a new budget neutral standard rate is 
applied to all supplies not exempt from VAT. The simulation of scenario 2 with WIOD 
data suggests a decline in aggregate VAT payments of households for Estonia, Italy, 
Lithuania and Romania. Simulating scenario 2 with HBS data arrives at the same 
results for Estonia, in the other countries listed above it predicts an increase in the VAT 
burden of private households. On the other hand, HBS data predict a decrease in the 
VAT bill of households in Denmark, Latvia and Hungary, while WIOD data calculate 
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an increase. Also, the gaps between the situation in 2011 and scenario 2 are different in 
some countries. HBS data predict a much higher increase for France (21 % compared to 
2 % according to WIOD data), Luxembourg (27 % compared to 10 %), Poland (13 % 
compared to 4 %), Portugal (16 % compared to 3 %) and the UK (16 % compared to 
5 %).  
 
Again, a detailed analysis of the differences between HBS and WIOD data is not 
straightforward. Looking at the differences between HBS and NA data – both of which 
use the same classification of goods and services – we get significant differences in the 
average VAT rates, originating in different shares of consumption for specific supplies. 
In most countries we observe large discrepancies in CP04 (relation between imputed 
and actual rents as well as share of other expenditures in this category compared to – 
usually exempt – rents), CP12 (share of insurances and financial activities) and CP02 
(alcohol and tobacco).  
 
Although it is not desirable to work with different average VAT rates in the analysis, 
we do not have a choice, as HBS data are the only available data source for the analysis 
of the distributional effects of the VAT rates structure. This problem should therefore 
be kept in mind, and we will mention it in the remainder of the report whenever some 
results deviate strongly from results based on WIOD data. In order to maintain 
consistency in the calculation of additional VAT revenues due to the reform scenarios 
(section 2.5) we calculate these based on WIOD data for all institutional sectors 
(households and non-households).  
2.2 Results: Overview  
This section provides a bird’s eye view of the overall VAT liability in 2011, and the 
VAT liabilities of institutional sectors (see below). Table 5 toTable 9 provide baseline 
information for the EU-27. Table 5 and Table 6 show three institutional sectors: 
Households, Intermediate Consumption and Others. Intermediate Consumption 
accounts for the VAT liability on inputs of sectors producing exempt goods and 
services; exempt sectors cannot recover VAT liabilities on production inputs. The 
category “Others” subsumes non-recoverable VAT liability relating to government 
consumption, Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households (NPISHs) and Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation (GFCF) activities by exempt sectors, and other small adjustments. 
Table 7 toTable 9 provide more detailed information on the most important (exempt) 
sectors, government consumption, NPISHs and GFCF.  
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Overall, in 2011, the Household sector accounts for an average of 60 % of all VAT 
liability in the EU-27 countries. Unrecoverable VAT liabilities from intermediate inputs 
purchased by sectors producing exempt supplies account for 19 %, and the remaining 
21 % accrue to the Government, NPISHs and unrecoverable VAT on GFCF 
expenditures of exempt sectors. There is considerable dispersion in these ratios across 
the EU, with the share of Household consumption on total VAT liabilities ranging from 
a low of 35 % in Luxembourg, to a high of 74 % in Lithuania. This range reflects both 
the existence of multiple rates and of exemptions (for instance, the low value for 
Luxemburg is due to the importance of financial services in the economy). 
 
While statutory VAT rates range from 15 % to 25 % across the European Union, there 
is a much wider dispersion of effective rates59 faced by the institutional sectors 
considered in our analysis. For instance, Household Consumption, once zero and 
reduced rates and exempt supplies are taken into account, faces an effective rate that 
ranges from 6 % in Cyprus (standard rate 15 %) to 18 % in Romania (standard rate 
24 %). Sectors producing exempt goods and services (the sector Intermediate 
Consumption) face an effective VAT rate ranging from 2 % in Luxembourg to 17 % in 
Romania. Effective rates faced by government and NPISH range from less than 1 % in 
Greece or Cyprus to 5 % in Romania due to a high share of exempted or non-taxable 
expenditures (e.g. salaries of teachers) in total government final consumption. 
 
                                                     
59 We calculate the effective VAT rate by dividing VAT liabilities by the tax base (net expenditures). 
Contrary to the standard VAT rate the effective VAT rate informs about how much the different 
institutional sectors really pay on their consumption, taking into consideration zero and reduced rates as 
well as exemptions.  
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Table 5: 2011 Baseline VAT Liability (million Euros)60 
Country Total 
Statu-
tory 
Rate 
House-
hold 
Liability 
Percent 
of Total 
Effect. 
rate 
Interm. 
Cons. 
Percent 
of Total 
Effect. 
rate 
Others 
Percent 
of Total 
Effect. 
Rate 
(Gov. 
and 
NPISH) 
Total 
effect. 
rate 
BE 30,612 21% 16,845 55% 10% 6,788 22% 10% 6,979 23% 1% 8% 
BG 4,001 20% 2,565 64% 14% 816 20% 14% 620 15% 2% 11% 
CZ 15,481 20% 8,573 55% 12% 3,805 25% 14% 3,102 20% 3% 10% 
DK 26,112 25% 14,291 55% 15% 6,959 27% 16% 4,862 19% 1% 11% 
DE 219,804 19% 129,502 59% 10% 38,895 18% 10% 51,406 23% 2% 8% 
EE 1,694 20% 1,060 63% 15% 274 16% 14% 360 21% 2% 11% 
EL 24,813 23% 17,686 71% 12% 3,266 13% 15% 3,861 16% 0% 10% 
ES 72,315 18% 47,372 66% 8% 12,066 17% 9% 12,876 18% 1% 7% 
FR 175,004 20% 104,721 60% 10% 24,875 14% 12% 45,407 26% 2% 8% 
IE 10,831 21% 5,876 54% 9% 2,585 24% 8% 2,370 22% 1% 7% 
IT 133,938 20% 90,607 68% 10% 15,290 11% 9% 28,041 21% 3% 8% 
CY 1,422 15% 814 57% 6% 147 10% 7% 461 32% 0% 5% 
LV 2,340 22% 1,570 67% 15% 464 20% 12% 306 13% 1% 11% 
LT 3,805 21% 2,818 74% 17% 436 11% 16% 550 14% 2% 13% 
Source: WIOD, EUROSTAT, IBFD, European Commission, Communications from national authorities and own calculations. 
The statutory rates depict the situation in 2011. 
                                                     
60 Numbers in the column “Total” differ from actual VAT collected (as shown in Table 1). Here we calculate VAT liabilities, that is given the tax 
base and the respective VAT rates how much VAT households and non-households have to pay on VAT (see also section 2.1)  
60 
 
TAXUD/2012/DE/323 
Table 6: 2011 Baseline VAT Liability (million Euros), continued from Table 5 
Country Total 
Statu-
tory 
Rate 
House-
hold 
Liability 
Percent 
of Total 
Effect. 
rate 
Interm. 
Cons. 
Percent 
of Total 
Effect. 
rate 
Others 
Percent 
of Total 
Effect. 
Rate 
(Gov. 
and 
NPISH) 
Total 
effect. 
rate 
LU 3,281 15% 1,135 35% 8% 944 29% 2% 1,203 37% 1% 3% 
HU 11,630 25% 7,215 62% 16% 1,963 17% 14% 2,451 21% 4% 13% 
MT 541 18% 377 70% 9% 90 17% 8% 74 14% 2% 8% 
NL 46,146 19% 20,253 44% 8% 13,693 30% 11% 12,200 26% 1% 7% 
AT 26,349 20% 16,632 63% 11% 5,418 21% 12% 4,298 16% 1% 9% 
PL 35,241 23% 21,993 62% 11% 6,268 18% 13% 6,981 20% 2% 9% 
PT 16,892 23% 11,505 68% 11% 3,302 20% 13% 2,085 12% 1% 9% 
RO 21,789 24% 12,206 56% 18% 2,466 11% 17% 7,116 33% 5% 15% 
SI 3,319 20% 2,237 67% 11% 506 15% 12% 576 17% 2% 9% 
SK 7,573 20% 5,059 67% 15% 1,133 15% 13% 1,380 18% 2% 12% 
FI 19,465 23% 10,010 51% 11% 4,880 25% 15% 4,575 24% 2% 9% 
SE 38,067 25% 19,613 52% 12% 10,095 27% 14% 8,360 22% 2% 9% 
UK 149,809 20% 95,391 64% 10% 36,829 25% 10% 17,590 12% 1% 8% 
                         
Average       60% 12%   19% 12%   21% 2% 9% 
Source: WIOD, EUROSTAT, IBFD, European Commission, Communications from national authorities and own calculations. 
The statutory rates depict the situation in 2011. 
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Table 7: Baseline VAT Liability for main exempt sectors and activities 
  
Total 
VTTL 
Total 
non-HH 
Post and Tele-
communications 
Real Estate Activities 
Financial 
Intermediation 
Baseline 
VTTL 
% of 
Total 
VVTL 
Baseline 
VTTL 
% of 
Total 
VVTL 
Baseline 
VTTL 
% of 
Total 
VVTL 
BE 30,612 45% 48 0% 976 3% 1,489 5% 
BG 4,001 36% 0 0% 323 8% 82 2% 
CZ 15,481 45% 21 0% 1,509 10% 693 4% 
DK 26,112 45% 53 0% 1,509 6% 621 2% 
DE 219,804 41% 803 0% 6,562 3% 9,733 4% 
EE 1,694 37% 6 0% 10 1% 32 2% 
EL 24,813 29% 2 0% 338 1% 508 2% 
ES 72,315 35% 153 0% 2,166 3% 1,696 2% 
FR 175,004 40% 275 0% 2,491 1% 5,209 3% 
IE 10,831 46% 37 0% 256 2% 487 5% 
IT 133,938 32% 177 0% 347 0% 3,123 2% 
CY 1,422 43% 1 0% 28 2% 24 2% 
LV 2,340 33% 1 0% 201 9% 34 1% 
LT 3,805 26% 0 0% 134 4% 57 1% 
LU 3,281 65% 6 0% 48 1% 684 21% 
HU 11,630 38% 5 0% 604 5% 344 3% 
MT 541 30% 1 0% 0 0% 19 4% 
NE 46,146 59% 1,299 3% 3,864 8% 2,214 5% 
AT 26,349 37% 75 0% 1,585 6% 1,014 4% 
PL 35,241 38% 16 0% 2,363 7% 1,093 3% 
PT 16,892 32% 63 0% 133 1% 615 4% 
RO 21,789 44% 66 0% 916 4% 310 1% 
SI 3,319 33% 4 0% 79 2% 80 2% 
SK 7,573 33% 14 0% 110 1% 151 2% 
FI 19,465 49% 0 0% 1,627 8% 479 2% 
SE 38,067 48% 0 0% 3,808 10% 947 2% 
UK 149,809 36% 438 0% 3,396 2% 8,973 6% 
                  
Mean   40%   0%   4%   4% 
Source: WIOD, EUROSTAT, IBFD, European Commission, Communications from national authorities 
and own calculations. 
VTTL=VAT Total Tax Liability 
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Table 8: Baseline VAT Liability for main exempt sectors and activities (continued from 
Table 7) 
  
Public Admin and 
Defence; Compulsory 
Social Security 
Education 
Health and Social 
Work 
Other Community, 
Social and Personal 
Services 
Baseline 
VTTL 
% of 
Total 
VVTL 
Baseline 
VTTL 
% of 
Total 
VVTL 
Baseline 
VTTL 
% of 
Total 
VVTL 
Baseline 
VTTL 
% of 
Total 
VVTL 
BE 1,303 4% 312 1% 1,678 5% 419 1% 
BG 170 4% 58 1% 117 3% 67 2% 
CZ 555 4% 252 2% 614 4% 162 1% 
DK 1,403 5% 536 2% 1,825 7% 299 1% 
DE 8,897 4% 2,479 1% 8,993 4% 1,428 1% 
EE 99 6% 41 2% 54 3% 34 2% 
EL 1,260 5% 135 1% 803 3% 252 1% 
ES 3,335 5% 644 1% 3,061 4% 1,550 2% 
FR 5,822 3% 1,488 1% 4,509 3% 5,331 3% 
IE 403 4% 217 2% 727 7% 181 2% 
IT 5,170 4% 486 0% 5,054 4% 513 0% 
CY 54 4% 9 1% 24 2% 8 1% 
LV 103 4% 37 2% 54 2% 35 1% 
LT 69 2% 45 1% 105 3% 27 1% 
LU 96 3% 19 1% 85 3% 6 0% 
HU 442 4% 170 1% 342 3% 57 0% 
MT 23 4% 3 1% 11 2% 34 6% 
NE 4,645 10% 648 1% 1,945 4% 409 1% 
AT 974 4% 348 1% 1,091 4% 331 1% 
PL 958 3% 406 1% 737 2% 696 2% 
PT 658 4% 179 1% 767 5% 434 3% 
RO 280 1% 188 1% 705 3% 0 0% 
SI 128 4% 60 2% 121 4% 33 1% 
SK 417 6% 95 1% 212 3% 135 2% 
FI 1,192 6% 354 2% 890 5% 337 2% 
SE 2,114 6% 623 2% 1,661 4% 941 2% 
UK 9,410 6% 2,883 2% 10,662 7% 1,066 1% 
                  
Mean   4%   1%   4%   1% 
Source: WIOD, EUROSTAT, IBFD, European Commission, Communications from national authorities 
and own calculations. 
VTTL=VAT Total Tax Liability  
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Table 9: Baseline VAT Liability for main exempt sectors and activities (continued from 
Table 8) 
  
Other IC 
Government final 
consumption 
NPISH final 
consumption 
GFCF of exempt 
sectors 
Baseline 
VTTL 
% of 
Total 
VVTL 
Baseline 
VTTL 
% of 
Total 
VVTL 
Baseline 
VTTL 
% of 
Total 
VVTL 
Baseline 
VTTL 
% of 
Total 
VVTL 
BE 564 2% 1,266 4% 58 0% 5,655 18% 
BG 0 0% 83 2% 4 0% 533 13% 
CZ 0 0% 827 5% 151 1% 2,124 14% 
DK 713 3% 943 4% 0 0% 3,919 15% 
DE 0 0% 7,823 4% 1,535 1% 42,048 19% 
EE 0 0% 66 4% 11 1% 282 17% 
EL 0 0% 82 0% 40 0% 3,740 15% 
ES 0 0% 2,946 4% 102 0% 9,828 14% 
FR 0 0% 9,591 5% 861 0% 34,955 20% 
IE 277 3% 287 3% 131 1% 1,952 18% 
IT 421 0% 7,926 6% 207 0% 19,909 15% 
CY 0 0% 4 0% 1 0% 455 32% 
LV 0 0% 26 1% 1 0% 280 12% 
LT 0 0% 93 2% 0 0% 457 12% 
LU 0 0% 49 1% 7 0% 1,147 35% 
HU 0 0% 745 6% 186 2% 1,520 13% 
MT 0 0% 33 6% 2 0% 39 7% 
NE 0 0% 2,160 5% 133 0% 9,908 21% 
AT 0 0% 762 3% 45 0% 3,491 13% 
PL 0 0% 1,137 3% 126 0% 5,718 16% 
PT 495 3% 311 2% 105 1% 1,669 10% 
RO 0 0% 731 3% 259 1% 6,127 28% 
SI 0 0% 125 4% 6 0% 446 13% 
SK 0 0% 285 4% 7 0% 1,087 14% 
FI 0 0% 850 4% 97 1% 3,628 19% 
SE 0 0% 1,658 4% 0 0% 6,702 18% 
UK 0 0% 1,775 1% 1,745 1% 14,069 9% 
                  
Mean   0%   3%   0%   17% 
Source: WIOD, EUROSTAT, IBFD, European Commission, Communications from national authorities 
and own calculations. 
VTTL=VAT Total Tax Liability 
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While scenario 1 abolishes all zero and reduced rates, in scenario 2, zero and reduced 
rates are abolished, and the standard rate is changed to a new value, without affecting 
total VAT liabilities of all institutional sectors. Table 10 and Figure 1 show this new 
standard rate and compare it to the standard rate in 2011. In the EU-27 average, the 
revenue neutral rate would be 3 percentage points lower than the average standard rate. 
It is, however, apparent that the exercise would have very different consequences for 
individual countries.61 The required reduction in the standard rate ensuring a revenue-
neutral outcome depends on the pervasiveness of the zero and reduced rates in the VAT 
rates system in place in 2011. Thus, Poland, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy would 
see a reduction in the standard rate of more than five percentage points. On the other 
hand, for countries such as Bulgaria, Slovakia, Denmark and Lithuania (which rely less 
on zero and reduced rates) the actual standard rate in 2011 and the “revenue neutral” 
rate are virtually identical. 
 
In the following two sections we analyse the situation for the different institutional 
sectors paying VAT (households in section 2.3, non-household entities in section 2.4) in 
2011 in more detail, and perform our analysis for scenario 1 and scenario 2. Section 2.5 
analyses the estimated additional revenues generated in reform scenarios 1 and 3 
(compensating low income households for their additional VAT payments in scenario 
1). All these tasks are performed statically, without behavioural reactions to changes in 
the VAT rates structure. Chapter 3 analyses the general equilibrium effects of a change 
in the VAT rates structure on GDP growth, employment, consumption, and import and 
export volumes, allowing for behavioural reactions. 
                                                     
61 Note that this is the arithmetic average of the budget-neutral rate of all EU-27 countries, not the EU-27 
average. Thus, introducing a new standard rate of 17.7 % in all EU-27 Member States while abolishing 
all zero and reduced rates would not be a budget neutral reform. 
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Table 10: Standard and revenue neutral rates 
Country 
Standard 
rate 
Revenue 
neutral 
rate 
BE 21.0% 16.9% 
BG 20.0% 20.0% 
CZ 20.0% 17.5% 
DK 25.0% 24.7% 
DE 19.0% 16.8% 
EE 20.0% 19.4% 
EL 23.0% 18.9% 
ES 18.0% 12.6% 
FR 20.0% 16.1% 
IE 21.0% 15.2% 
IT 20.3% 15.1% 
CY 15.0% 12.1% 
LV 22.0% 20.7% 
LT 21.0% 20.6% 
LU 15.0% 12.5% 
HU 25.0% 22.1% 
MT 18.0% 13.5% 
NL 19.0% 16.1% 
AT 20.0% 16.8% 
PL 23.0% 17.0% 
PT 23.0% 17.2% 
RO 24.0% 22.9% 
SI 20.0% 16.3% 
SK 20.0% 19.8% 
FI 23.0% 20.2% 
SE 25.0% 21.6% 
UK 20.0% 16.3% 
Average 20.7% 17.7% 
 
Source: WIOD, EUROSTAT, IBFD, European Commission, Communications from national authorities 
and own calculations. 
Note: The revenue neutral rate is the standard rate that keeps revenues from all institutional sectors constant 
when zero and reduced rates are abolished. The standard rates depict the situation in 2011. 
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Figure 1: Standard and revenue neutral rates 
 
Source: Table 10 
Note: The revenue neutral rate is the standard rate that keeps revenues from all institutional sectors constant 
when zero and reduced rates are abolished. 
2.3 Results: VAT paid by private households  
This section analyses in detail the effects of the current VAT rates structure on private 
households. As explained in section 2.1, we use aggregate data from national 
Household Budget Surveys (HBS) as provided by Eurostat.62 We calculate VAT 
liability on private household consumption expenditures in 2011, as well as in reform 
scenarios 1 and 2. We calculate total VAT liabilities for the average household as well 
as broken down by COICOP categories and household characteristics. In addition to the 
VAT payments of the average household, the focus of this chapter is on the breakdown 
of VAT payments by income quintile. As summarised in section 1.2, equity concerns 
are an important argument in favour of reduced rates. Therefore, it is interesting to 
know how the present and proposed VAT rates structures affect different income 
                                                     
62 Section A.3 in the Annex contains a validation exercise comparing the results calculated on aggregate 
data with results calculated from micro data for three countries. In addition, we compare the results 
obtained in this study with results in IFS et al. (2011). 
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groups. Further breakdowns (by number of active household members and household 
types) can be found in the Addendum containing the country analyses. All breakdowns 
specified in section 2.1 can be found in the tables provided in the spread sheets. 
 
Table 11 contains the standard VAT rate as of 2011 for each Member State (EU-27), 
the average VAT rate as calculated using the expenditure structure in HBS data63 and 
the average VAT rates for the two reform scenarios. The deviation from the standard 
rate to the average VAT rate faced by private households (given their average 
consumption patterns) is caused by reduced, super reduced, parking and zero rates as 
well as exemptions.  
 
The abolition of zero and reduced rates (scenario 1) yields higher average VAT rates 
for all countries. However, the size of this increase varies considerably. Poland, Malta, 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy and France face increases of more than 4 percentage points; the 
highest increase occurs in Poland (6.3 percentage points). An increase of more than 3 
percentage points occurs in several other countries (Austria, Spain, the UK, 
Luxembourg, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Slovenia). At 
the other end of the scale, some countries experience almost no increase: Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Slovakia and Estonia experience increases of less than 0.5 percentage points.  
 
Scenario 2 uses the new standard rate calculated using WIOD data, taking all 
institutional sectors into account. This new standard rate is not automatically revenue 
neutral for households. That is, the new, budget neutral standard rate taking all 
institutional sectors into account can increase the VAT burden of all private households 
(when this is the case, of course, the VAT burden of at least one other institutional 
sector has to decrease). When we simulate the effect of this new rate on private 
households using HBS data, we see that in fact in almost all countries, the average VAT 
rate that households face, increases. Only Hungary (-1.0 percentage point), Latvia (-0.5 
percentage points) and Denmark (-0.1 percentage points) experience decreases. In 
Estonia there is no change. France, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, the UK, the 
Netherlands, Malta and the Czech Republic face increases in their average VAT rates of 
more than 1 percentage point.64 
 
                                                     
63 For a short discussion on differences to the effective VAT rates obtained from WIOD data in Table 5 and 
Table 6, please refer to section 2.1. 
64 We already mentioned that the average VAT rate in 2011 is different when calculated using HBS or 
WIOD data. This is also the case in the other scenarios, leading to different effects of the “neutral” rate in 
scenario 2 (see section 2.1).  
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Table 11: Average VAT rates of private households of EU Member States in 2011 
Country 
Standard 
rate 
Average VAT rates 
2011 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
    %p change  %p change 
BE 21.0% 11.1% 14.6% +3.5%p 11.8% +0.7%p 
BG 20.0% 14.8% 14.9% +0.1%p 14.9% +0.1%p 
CZ 20.0% 13.8% 17.0% +3.2%p 14.9% +1.1%p 
DK 25.0% 15.4% 15.5% +0.1%p 15.3% -0.1%p 
DE 19.0% 10.1% 12.0% +1.9%p 10.5% +0.4%p 
EE 20.0% 14.5% 15.0% +0.5%p 14.5% +0.0%p 
EL 23.0% 13.0% 16.4% +3.4%p 13.5% +0.5%p 
ES 18.0% 7.7% 11.4% +3.7%p 8.0% +0.3%p 
FR 19.6% 9.0% 13.3% +4.3%p 10.9% +1.9%p 
IE 21.0% 9.7% 14.3% +4.6%p 10.3% +0.6%p 
IT 20.3% 9.3% 13.6% +4.3%p 10.1% +0.8%p 
CY 15.0% 7.2% 9.9% +2.7%p 8.0% +0.8%p 
LV 22.0% 18.1% 18.8% +0.7%p 17.6% -0.5%p 
LT 21.0% 17.2% 17.9% +0.7%p 17.6% +0.4%p 
LU 12.0% 6.6% 10.1% +3.5%p 8.4% +1.8%p 
HU 25.0% 21.2% 22.7% +1.5%p 20.2% -1.0%p 
MT 18.0% 11.2% 16.6% +5.4%p 12.4% +1.2%p 
NL 19.0% 8.3% 11.5% +3.2%p 9.7% +1.4%p 
AT 20.0% 12.8% 16.5% +3.7%p 13.8% +1.0%p 
PL 23.0% 11.9% 18.2% +6.3%p 13.4% +1.5%p 
PT 23.0% 9.9% 15.3% +5.4%p 11.4% +1.5%p 
RO 24.0% 21.7% 22.8% +1.1%p 21.8% +0.1%p 
SI 20.0% 11.7% 14.8% +3.1%p 12.1% +0.4%p 
SK 20.0% 15.8% 16.2% +0.4%p 16.0% +0.2%p 
FI 23.0% 12.3% 15.1% +2.8%p 13.3% +1.0%p 
SE 25.0% 13.3% 16.2% +2.9%p 14.0% +0.7%p 
UK 20.0% 8.7% 12.3% +3.6%p 10.1% +1.4%p 
Source: Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
* The standard rate in Italy increased from 20 % to 21 % in September 2011; hence, we use a weighted 
average of both rates.  
 
Table 12 shows the average VAT bills of private households in the EU-27 Member 
States as a proportion of total household expenditures and in Euros per year. In contrast 
to the average VAT rate that is calculated relative to net expenditures, the average VAT 
bill is calculated as a fraction of gross expenditures. We can see that the VAT bill as a 
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percentage of total expenditure ranges from about 6.2 % to 17.8 %, with Luxembourg, 
Cyprus and Spain being on the lower and Romania, Hungary, and Latvia on the upper 
end of the spectrum. In absolute terms, Danish households face the highest average 
VAT bill of over € 5,000 per year, followed by countries with comparatively low 
average VAT rates but high expenditure levels (Sweden, Finland, Austria and 
Luxembourg). Households in countries with comparatively low expenditures (Bulgaria, 
Romania and Poland) face the lowest VAT bills in absolute terms (although Bulgaria 
and Romania have very high average VAT rates).65 
 
Looking at the development of average VAT rates in Table 11, it is hardly surprising 
that the average increase of the VAT bill as a fraction of expenditure in scenario 1 is 
highest for Poland (+4.8 percentage points), Portugal (+4.3) and Malta (+4.2) and 
lowest for Bulgaria (+0.1), Denmark (+0.1), Slovakia (+0.3) and Estonia (+0.3). With 
respect to absolute increases, Luxembourg ranks first (plus € 2,000), followed by 
Ireland and France. This is because these countries face a large increase in average 
VAT rates, and have comparably high average consumption expenditures. In Portugal, 
Poland and Luxembourg, average VAT payments increase by more than 50 %. 
 
Scenario 2 has much smaller effects, although they are not zero for private households 
in most countries. VAT bill increases in absolute terms are again highest in 
Luxembourg (in excess of € 1,000), followed by France and the Netherlands. In 
Luxembourg, this increase is 27 % compared to pre-reform VAT payments, in France 
21 %. On the other end of the spectrum, Hungary, Latvia and Denmark experience 
slight decreases in their VAT payments.  
                                                     
65 This ranking remains the same when we adjust average expenditures by the average household size in 
each country. 
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Table 12: Average VAT bills of private households of EU Member States as a proportion 
of total household expenditure and in € per year66 
Country 
VAT bill (in % of expenditure) VAT bill in € 
2011 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 2011 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
BE 10.0% +2.7%p +0.5%p 3,735 +1,156 +207 
BG 12.9% +0.1%p +0.1%p 639 +3 +3 
CZ 12.1% +2.4%p +0.8%p 1,275 +294 +98 
DK 13.3% +0.1%p -0.0%p 5,035 +41 -20 
DE 9.2% +1.7%p +0.5%p 3,078 +631 +180 
EE 12.7% +0.3%p -0.0%p 1,139 +35 -0 
EL 11.5% +2.6%p +0.4%p 3,521 +925 +135 
ES 7.2% +3.1%p +0.2%p 1,914 +920 +70 
FR 8.3% +3.5%p +1.6%p 2,767 +1,311 +586 
IE 8.9% +3.6%p +0.5%p 3,684 +1,726 +232 
IT 8.6% +3.3%p +0.5%p 2,682 +1,170 +184 
CY 6.8% +2.3%p +0.7%p 2,417 +903 +261 
LV 15.3% +0.5%p -0.3%p 1,595 +57 -41 
LT 14.7% +0.5%p +0.3%p 1,275 +53 +28 
LU 6.2% +2.9%p +1.5%p 3,841 +2,006 +1,031 
HU 17.5% +1.1%p -0.7%p 1,303 +96 -61 
MT 10.0% +4.2%p +1.0%p 2,321 +1,122 +261 
NL 7.7% +2.6%p +1.2%p 2,548 +957 +422 
AT 11.4% +2.8%p +0.8%p 4,089 +1,164 +324 
PL 10.6% +4.8%p +1.3%p 988 +528 +132 
PT 9.0% +4.3%p +1.3%p 1,827 +1,002 +289 
RO 17.8% +0.8%p +0.1%p 853 +45 +4 
SI 10.5% +2.5%p +0.3%p 2,426 +656 +83 
SK 13.7% +0.3%p +0.2%p 1,591 +37 +20 
FI 11.0% +2.1%p +0.7%p 4,105 +926 +314 
SE 11.7% +2.2%p +0.6%p 4,355 +958 +236 
UK 8.0% +3.0%p +1.2%p 2,609 +1,108 +420 
Source: Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
Note: Exchange rates of 1.956 Bulgarian levs, 24.590 Czech koruny, 7.451 Danish kroner, 0.706 Latvian 
lats, 3.453 Lithuanian litai, 279.370 Hungarian forints, 4.121 Polish zloty, 4.212 Romanian lei, 9.030 
Swedish kronor and 0.868 British pounds to 1 Euro. 
                                                     
66 The second guiding principle of the European Commission’s current assessment of the VAT rates 
structure states that reduced rates on goods and services “for which the consumption is discouraged by 
other EU policies” should be abolished. Further, it states that “this could notably be the case for goods and 
services harmful to the environment, health and welfare” (European Commission 2011b, p. 11). We 
provide an estimate of the likely effect of an abolition of VAT reductions for those supplies that have been 
identified to fit this description – Water, Energy products, Street cleaning, refuse collection and waste 
treatment, and Housing – in the EU-27 countries in Table 47 in the Annex. In the EU-27 average, the VAT 
bill of a private household would increase by € 64; the UK and France would see the biggest increases 
(€ 242 and € 210 respectively), while Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, 
Finland and Sweden would not see any increases. Note that this only includes households, while most 
businesses can deduct VAT paid on their inputs, so they would not be affected by such a reform.  
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Goods and services categories  
As can be seen more clearly in the country analyses in the Addendum, VAT payments 
in 2011 differ considerably among the 12 main COICOP categories. The extent of this 
depends on the expenditure share for each category of goods and services as well as on 
the average VAT rate. Table 13 shows the categories with the highest VAT payments 
and their share of total VAT payments for all EU-27 countries. In 16 of 27 countries, 
CP07 “Transport” is the category to which most VAT payments relate. Within this 
group of countries, the share of payments relating to supplies in CP07 as a share of total 
VAT payments ranges from 33 % in Luxembourg to 20 % in Spain. The category can 
be further disaggregated into the subcategories CP071 “Purchase of vehicles”, CP072 
“Operation of personal transport equipment” and CP073 “Transport services”. In all 
countries most VAT is paid on one of the first two subcategories, purchase and 
operation of a car. This is because expenditures on these categories are high and the 
average VAT rate is almost the standard rate on all goods and services in these two 
subcategories.67 Transport services, on the other hand, only account for a small share of 
expenditures. In addition, public transport services are not taxed at the standard rate in 
many Member States.  
 
In the remaining nine Member States, CP01 “Food and non-alcoholic beverages” and 
CP04 “Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels” rank first. Whether or not VAT 
payments on CP01 are high depends almost entirely on the VAT rates structure of the 
country: Expenditures on this category are high in all Member States, however, in only 
seven countries all supplies within the category are taxed at the standard rate. Among 
these are Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. Thus, 
only in Greece the average share of VAT payments is highest for CP01, although the 
category is not taxed at the standard rate. The importance of expenditures on CP04 is 
driven by the importance of this category in the household budgets. Apart from two 
exceptions (Hungary and Romania) the average VAT rate on expenditures in this 
category is normally well below the standard rate. Actual rents for private households 
are exempt in most countries, the notional consumption expenditures on owner-
occupied dwellings (imputed rents) are treated as exempt supplies, and some additional 
expenditures in this category are subject to reduced rates in some countries. 68  
                                                     
67 In some Member States minor repair services are taxed at a reduced rate.  
68 The HBS for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta and Romania do not contain information on imputed 
rents. In addition, in Hungary and Romania actual rents are taxed at the standard rate. Thus, the average 
VAT rate on CP04 according to HBS data is equal to the standard rate in these two countries. 
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Table 13: Categories with the highest VAT expenditure, their share and their combined 
share of total VAT expenditure for EU Member States, 2011 
  Most Important Categories Share of VAT 
Country 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd Sum 
BE CP07 CP12 CP04 22% 12% 12% 46% 
BG CP01 CP04 CP02 36% 14% 10% 60% 
CZ CP04 CP01 CP07 22% 15% 13% 50% 
DK CP01 CP04 CP07 18% 18% 17% 54% 
DE CP07 CP04 CP09 22% 16% 13% 51% 
EE CP01 CP04 CP07 31% 17% 14% 62% 
EL CP01 CP04 CP07 15% 15% 15% 46% 
ES CP07 CP01 CP03 20% 14% 13% 47% 
FR CP07 CP05 CP03 25% 12% 12% 48% 
IE CP07 CP09 CP04 21% 13% 12% 46% 
IT CP07 CP01 CP03 21% 15% 12% 48% 
CY CP07 CP03 CP01 21% 14% 11% 46% 
LV CP01 CP07 CP04 31% 14% 14% 60% 
LT CP01 CP04 CP07 39% 15% 9% 62% 
LU CP07 CP05 CP03 33% 13% 12% 58% 
HU CP04 CP01 CP07 26% 25% 13% 65% 
MT CP07 CP05 CP04 22% 14% 12% 49% 
NL CP07 CP09 CP04 22% 17% 14% 53% 
AT CP07 CP04 CP09 24% 16% 13% 52% 
PL CP04 CP07 CP01 27% 14% 13% 54% 
PT CP07 CP11 CP01 21% 14% 10% 45% 
RO CP01 CP04 CP08 40% 16% 12% 68% 
SI CP07 CP04 CP01 24% 14% 12% 51% 
SK CP01 CP04 CP07 29% 24% 9% 61% 
FI CP07 CP12 CP01 22% 15% 13% 51% 
SE CP07 CP09 CP04 21% 16% 12% 49% 
UK CP07 CP09 CP11 23% 16% 16% 54% 
Source: Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
 
In addition to these three categories, CP09 “Recreation and culture” (Germany, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom), CP03 “Clothing and 
footwear” (Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus and Luxembourg), CP05 “Furnishings, 
household equipment and routine maintenance of the house” (France, Luxembourg, 
Malta), CP11 “Restaurants and hotels” (Portugal and the United Kingdom), CP12 
“miscellaneous goods and services” (Belgium and Finland) and CP02 “Alcoholic 
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beverages, tobacco and narcotics” (Bulgaria) and CP08 “Communications” (Romania) 
appear among the top three. We can see that, on EU-27 average the three most 
important expenditure categories taken together account for more than 50 % of total 
expenditure, in Romania they account for nearly 70 % of total expenditure. It is worth 
noting that Romania and Bulgaria are the only countries without CP07 in the three most 
important categories.69 
Income Distribution 
Table 14 to Table 18 show average VAT payments, both as a fraction of total 
household expenditure and in absolute terms, by income quintile70, for all Member 
States (EU-27). Comparing average VAT payments for the 20 % of households with the 
lowest income (first quintile) and the 20 % of households with the highest income (fifth 
quintile), we see that in all countries, richer households paid more VAT in 2011 than 
poorer households. The gap is largest in Luxembourg, where the fifth quintile on 
average pays more than seven times as much VAT as the first quintile, followed by 
Portugal and Italy (5.2 and 5.1, respectively). The gap is lowest in the Czech Republic, 
Austria and the Netherlands (1.4, 1.7 and 2.1, respectively).  
 
A country’s VAT rates structure can be described as either proportional, regressive or 
progressive, depending on the importance of VAT payments in relation to total 
expenditure. Broadly speaking: A tax is progressive if it puts more burden on richer 
households (relative to their expenditure); a regressive tax over-proportionally affects 
the poor, while a proportional tax affects each income group similarly. We define these 
terms loosely by restricting our attention to the first and fifth quintile71. Only one 
country (Hungary) had a regressive VAT system in 2011; the gap between VAT 
payments of the first and the last income quintile as a proportion of average expenditure 
was 1.5 percentage points.72 In 11 countries (Spain, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
                                                     
69 Results on how this ranking changes when zero and reduced rates are abolished are found in the 
Addendum containing the more detailed analyses for each Member State. 
70 For a definition of income quintiles refer to section 2.1. 
71 proportional: VAT as a fraction of total expenditure differs by less than 0.5 percentage points between 
the first and the fifth quintile 
regressive: VAT as a fraction of total expenditure in the first quintile is more than 0.5 percentage points 
higher than in the fifth quintile 
progressive: VAT as a fraction of total expenditure in the fifth quintile is more than 0.5 percentage points 
higher than in the first quintile 
72 Recall that the data for Hungary do not contain information on imputed rents, which might distort the 
picture as typically richer households face higher notional consumption expenditures on owner-occupied 
dwellings. 
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Slovakia, Estonia, Greece, Austria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Latvia) we find 
that the VAT system affects households proportionally across income quintiles. In the 
15 remaining EU-27 countries, VAT payments as a fraction of expenditures are more 
than 0.5 percentage points higher for the richest households than for the poorest 
households; we therefore define these VAT systems to be progressive. Among these, 
the United Kingdom shows the largest gap (2.6), followed by Luxembourg (2.4), Italy 
and Belgium (2.3) and Poland (2.2).  
 
Abolishing all zero and reduced rates – scenario 1 – affects income groups differently 
depending on the country. In thirteen countries (Romania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Estonia, Slovakia, Latvia, France, Austria, Hungary, Finland 
and Sweden) the increase in VAT as a proportion of expenditure is similar over all 
quintiles (the lowest quintile faces an increase in VAT per expenditure under 0.5 
percentage points more than the highest quintile).73 In the remaining 14 countries, there 
are differences of more than 0.5 percentage points between the poorest and richest 
households: the gap is highest in Malta (2.4 percentage points), followed by Portugal 
and Poland (1.5), Ireland (1.2) and Italy (1.1). Relative to their expenditures, low-
income households in these 14 Member States suffer more from an abolition of zero 
and reduced rates. Regarding absolute values, however, higher income households face 
higher increases in their average VAT bills in all countries. Households in the fifth 
quintile in Luxembourg, Ireland, France and Italy are faced with the highest absolute 
increases (€ 3.473, € 2.216, € 1.851 and € 1.695, respectively). The gap in the increase 
borne by the fifth and the first quintile is greatest in Luxembourg, where the fifth 
quintile experiences an increase 3.5 as big as the first quintile, followed by 
Portugal (3.3) and Italy (2.8).74 On the other side of the spectrum we can find the Czech 
Republic (1.0), Austria (1.5) and Spain (1.6). That is, high income households in 
Luxembourg benefit 3.5 as much in absolute terms from zero and reduced rates as low 
income households. Coming back to our definitions of the VAT rates systems we see 
that scenario 1 transforms the VAT rates systems of Spain, Cyprus and Greece from 
being proportional to regressive75, while the systems of Portugal, Malta, Germany and 
Ireland change from being progressive to proportional. Thus, scenario 1 hits lower-
                                                     
73 Recall that there are almost no reform effects in 4 countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia and Slovakia). 
74 Actually the gap is greatest in Bulgaria, where the fifth quintile experiences an increase 7.2 times as big 
as the first quintile, followed by Romania (4.0). Also in Denmark, Lithuania and Estonia we find a 
comparably high gap. However, as the absolute changes households experience in these countries are 
rather small, we omit these results. 
75 Our validation exercise comparing the analysis performed based on aggregate data with the one based on 
micro data put Austria into this group of countries as well. As discussed in section A.3, we suspect there 
to be an error in the aggregate data for Austria in the break down by income quintiles. 
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income households harder when we look at VAT payments as a fraction of total 
expenditure in most countries; in absolute terms, however, it is higher-income 
households who suffer more. That is, in absolute terms, high-income households benefit 
more from the zero and reduced rates that are in place at the moment than low-income 
households. 
 
Scenario 2 yields much smaller effects (as a fraction of expenditure, the changes range 
from -0.7 to 1.6 percentage points) than scenario 1 (0.1 to 4.8 percentage points). 
However, we see very different results with respect to the effects on different income 
groups:  
 In Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK there is no 
continuous pattern in absolute changes in VAT payments over the quintiles. In most 
of these countries increases in absolute payments increase from low to middle 
income groups, and then decrease again for the highest income group.  
 In five countries (the Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Malta) changes in 
absolute VAT payments decrease with income, that is, in absolute terms, lower 
income households lose more due to the reform. In Greece and Spain the higher 
income groups even gain from the reform, while lower income groups face 
increases in their VAT payments. In Hungary the average household gains from the 
reform according to HBS data. Here the absolute gain is higher for high income 
households. 
 In the remaining seven countries (Bulgaria, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Romania and Finland) increases in absolute VAT payments increase with 
income.76 
 
As for the change in VAT payments relative to expenditures, we find that in 16 
countries it is higher for lower incomes77 and decreasing with income. The gap between 
the first and fifth quintile is highest for Malta (2.3 percentage points), followed by 
Poland (1.6) and Portugal (1.4). In the remaining countries there is either no clear 
pattern or almost no effect. The same countries as in scenario 1 change from 
proportional to regressive (Spain, Cyprus and Greece) and from progressive to 
proportional (Portugal, Malta, Germany, Ireland).  
 
                                                     
76 In Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Romania and Slovakia there are almost no reform effects. 
77 Difference of more than 0.5 percentage points. 
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Thus, in most countries, scenario 2 is a regressive reform. Higher income households 
spend a higher share of their expenditures on supplies taxed at the standard rate – this 
increases their VAT burden in the base scenario. Hence, in scenario 2, they benefit 
more from the lower standard rate than lower income households. Households at the 
bottom of the income distribution suffer from the abolition of the reduced rates to an 
extent that cannot be compensated by the lower standard rate.  
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Table 14: Average VAT bill of private households as a proportion of total household expenditure and in Euros per year, by 
income quintile in 2011 and reform scenarios 1 and 2, for BE, BG, CZ, DK, DE and EE 
  
Income 
Quintiles 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE 
in % in € in % in € in % in € in % in € in % in € in % in € 
2
0
1
1
 
First 8.8% 2,061 13.2% 342 12.0% 1,155 12.5% 2,654 7.7% 1,315 13.0% 607 
Second 9.3% 2,889 13.1% 490 12.1% 1,081 12.5% 3,563 8.2% 2,017 12.3% 752 
Third 9.7% 3,567 12.6% 604 12.0% 1,109 13.0% 5,043 8.5% 2,694 12.3% 915 
Fourth 10.2% 4,303 12.7% 729 12.2% 1,393 13.7% 6,195 8.5% 3,335 12.6% 1,327 
Fifth 11.1% 5,850 12.9% 1,030 12.3% 1,639 13.9% 7,697 8.5% 4,714 13.0% 2,090 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 1
 First +2.9%p +780 +0.0%p +1 +2.7%p +302 +0.1%p +16 +2.3%p +430 +0.4%p +20 
Second +2.8%p +1,003 +0.0%p +2 +2.6%p +274 +0.1%p +38 +2.2%p +602 +0.3%p +23 
Third +2.8%p +1,159 +0.1%p +3 +2.5%p +274 +0.1%p +56 +2.0%p +721 +0.4%p +30 
Fourth +2.8%p +1,349 +0.1%p +4 +2.3%p +313 +0.1%p +45 +1.8%p +803 +0.3%p +40 
Fifth +2.4%p +1,487 +0.1%p +6 +2.0%p +306 +0.1%p +51 +1.5%p +945 +0.3%p +60 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 2
 First +0.9%p +228 +0.0%p +1 +1.1%p +120 -0.1%p -16 +1.1%p +211 +0.0%p +1 
Second +0.7%p +248 +0.0%p +2 +1.0%p +105 -0.0%p -5 +1.0%p +270 -0.0%p -0 
Third +0.6%p +242 +0.1%p +3 +1.0%p +101 -0.0%p -5 +0.8%p +291 +0.0%p +2 
Fourth +0.5%p +253 +0.1%p +4 +0.8%p +100 -0.1%p -30 +0.7%p +281 -0.0%p -1 
Fifth +0.1%p +62 +0.1%p +6 +0.4%p +63 -0.1%p -42 +0.4%p +238 -0.0%p -4 
Source: Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
Note: Exchange rates of 1.956 Bulgarian levs, 24.590 Czech koruny and 7.451 Danish kroner to 1 Euro. 
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Table 15: Average VAT bill of private households as a proportion of total household expenditure and in Euros per year, by 
income quintile in 2011 and reform scenarios 1 and 2, for EL, ES, FR, IE, IT and CY78 
  
Income 
Quintiles 
EL ES FR IE IT CY 
in % in € in % in € in % in € in % in € in % in € in % in € 
2
0
1
1
 
First 10.4% 1,939 7.3% 1,271 7.6% 1,654 7.8% 1,658 7.0% 1,011 6.4% 933 
Second 10.5% 2,387 7.2% 1,606 7.9% 2,203 8.1% 2,409 7.8% 1,891 6.7% 1,731 
Third 10.5% 2,876 7.4% 1,903 8.3% 2,682 8.7% 3,780 8.1% 2,269 6.8% 2,447 
Fourth 10.6% 3,711 7.2% 2,135 8.4% 3,156 9.1% 4,794 8.7% 3,282 6.8% 2,931 
Fifth 10.5% 5,148 6.9% 2,665 8.6% 4,145 9.5% 5,763 9.3% 5,140 6.8% 4,047 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 1
 First +2.7%p +579 +3.7%p +722 +3.6%p +879 +4.4%p +1,065 +3.8%p +612 +3.0%p +481 
Second +2.5%p +665 +3.4%p +844 +3.5%p +1,103 +4.0%p +1,368 +3.4%p +934 +2.6%p +739 
Third +2.4%p +759 +3.2%p +909 +3.4%p +1,267 +3.8%p +1,875 +3.3%p +1,054 +2.4%p +931 
Fourth +2.2%p +895 +3.0%p +990 +3.4%p +1,462 +3.5%p +2,125 +3.1%p +1,333 +2.3%p +1,063 
Fifth +1.9%p +1,086 +2.6%p +1,132 +3.4%p +1,851 +3.2%p +2,216 +2.7%p +1,695 +2.0%p +1,303 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 2
 First +0.7%p +150 +0.7%p +124 +1.8%p +427 +1.3%p +313 +1.2%p +193 +1.3%p +208 
Second +0.5%p +122 +0.5%p +109 +1.7%p +514 +1.0%p +325 +0.8%p +205 +0.9%p +261 
Third +0.4%p +111 +0.2%p +65 +1.6%p +564 +0.7%p +314 +0.6%p +197 +0.7%p +278 
Fourth +0.2%p +75 +0.2%p +52 +1.5%p +641 +0.4%p +214 +0.3%p +143 +0.6%p +291 
Fifth -0.0%p -21 -0.0%p -7 +1.5%p +784 +0.0%p +12 -0.1%p -66 +0.4%p +269 
Source: Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. (For Italy also Italian Household Budget Survey 2005, Italian 
EU-SILC 2006, Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth 2006, own calculations.) 
                                                     
78 As the Household Budgets Survey for Italy does not contain information on incomes this result is obtained by matching the HBS 2005 to the EU-
SILC 2006, performed by CAPP. This is meant to give an impression on the proportionality of the Italian VAT rates structure. However, one has 
to keep in mind the different sources of information as compared to the other tables. (More on the comparability of results obtained from 
aggregated HBS data and micro data matched to the EU-SILC can be found in the annex, section A.3.) 
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Table 16: Average VAT bill of private households as a proportion of total household expenditure and in Euros per year, by 
income quintile in 2011 and reform scenarios 1 and 2, for LV, LT, LU, HU, MT and NL 
  
Income 
Quintiles 
LV LT LU HU MT NL 
in % in € in % in € in % in € in % in € in % in € in % in € 
2
0
1
1
 
First 15.2% 868 15.0% 697 4.6% 1,156 17.9% 871 8.5% 938 7.2% 1,859 
Second 15.1% 1,026 14.9% 913 5.0% 1,966 17.7% 984 9.8% 1,762 7.1% 1,831 
Third 15.2% 1,377 14.6% 1,183 5.6% 2,989 17.4% 1,192 10.1% 2,362 7.4% 2,286 
Fourth 15.2% 1,851 14.6% 1,490 6.2% 4,459 17.1% 1,393 10.2% 2,898 7.9% 2,941 
Fifth 15.6% 2,854 14.7% 2,098 7.0% 8,317 16.4% 1,954 10.5% 3,642 8.3% 3,815 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 1
 First +0.5%p +31 +0.4%p +24 +3.6%p +980 +1.2%p +73 +5.9%p +763 +2.6%p +755 
Second +0.6%p +47 +0.6%p +41 +3.3%p +1,408 +1.2%p +86 +4.6%p +969 +2.6%p +747 
Third +0.5%p +56 +0.6%p +57 +3.2%p +1,858 +1.2%p +98 +4.2%p +1,154 +2.6%p +876 
Fourth +0.5%p +72 +0.5%p +66 +2.9%p +2,318 +1.0%p +101 +3.9%p +1,297 +2.5%p +1,054 
Fifth +0.4%p +79 +0.5%p +78 +2.6%p +3,473 +0.9%p +125 +3.5%p +1,430 +2.6%p +1,352 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 2
 First -0.3%p -22 +0.2%p +11 +2.3%p +624 -0.6%p -34 +2.7%p +338 +1.3%p +356 
Second -0.2%p -17 +0.3%p +22 +2.0%p +846 -0.5%p -35 +1.4%p +286 +1.3%p +353 
Third -0.3%p -29 +0.4%p +33 +1.8%p +1,050 -0.6%p -47 +1.0%p +275 +1.2%p +394 
Fourth -0.3%p -42 +0.3%p +36 +1.5%p +1,189 -0.7%p -66 +0.8%p +249 +1.1%p +444 
Fifth -0.4%p -94 +0.2%p +37 +1.2%p +1,508 -0.8%p -106 +0.4%p +162 +1.1%p +563 
Source: Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
Note: Exchange rates of 0.706 Latvian lats, 3.453 Lithuanian litai and 279.370 Hungarian forints to 1 Euro. 
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Table 17: Average VAT bill of private households as a proportion of total household expenditure and in Euros per year, by 
income quintile in 2011 and reform scenarios 1 and 2, for AT, PL, PT, RO, SI and SK 
  
Income 
Quintiles 
AT PL PT RO SI SK 
in % in € in % in € in % in € in % in € in % in € in % in € 
2
0
1
1
 
First 11.3% 3,324 9.3% 427 8.3% 691 18.1% 441 9.0% 938 13.8% 1,028 
Second 11.3% 3,183 9.7% 622 8.4% 1,145 18.0% 611 10.2% 1,823 13.8% 1,292 
Third 11.4% 3,850 10.1% 832 8.8% 1,592 17.9% 777 10.3% 2,295 13.6% 1,510 
Fourth 11.5% 4,449 10.7% 1,133 9.0% 2,139 17.8% 983 10.6% 2,985 13.6% 1,717 
Fifth 11.4% 5,646 11.5% 1,885 9.4% 3,561 17.7% 1,452 11.0% 4,100 13.7% 2,401 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 1
 First +2.9%p +1,002 +5.6%p +301 +5.3%p +510 +0.6%p +19 +3.0%p +351 +0.3%p +26 
Second +3.0%p +1,001 +5.4%p +408 +4.8%p +751 +0.7%p +31 +2.7%p +546 +0.3%p +33 
Third +2.8%p +1,107 +5.2%p +504 +4.5%p +931 +0.8%p +43 +2.6%p +658 +0.3%p +36 
Fourth +2.7%p +1,195 +4.9%p +610 +4.2%p +1,151 +0.8%p +54 +2.4%p +774 +0.3%p +38 
Fifth +2.6%p +1,501 +4.1%p +796 +3.8%p +1,665 +0.8%p +77 +2.3%p +968 +0.2%p +48 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 2
 First +0.9%p +310 +2.1%p +112 +2.2%p +207 -0.1%p -2 +1.0%p +110 +0.2%p +16 
Second +1.0%p +331 +1.9%p +139 +1.8%p +273 +0.0%p +1 +0.5%p +105 +0.2%p +19 
Third +0.8%p +314 +1.7%p +155 +1.5%p +295 +0.1%p +5 +0.4%p +109 +0.2%p +21 
Fourth +0.7%p +292 +1.3%p +155 +1.2%p +322 +0.1%p +7 +0.2%p +75 +0.1%p +20 
Fifth +0.6%p +357 +0.5%p +97 +0.8%p +347 +0.1%p +7 +0.1%p +26 +0.1%p +24 
Source: Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
Note: Exchange rates of 4.121 Polish zloty and 4.212 Romanian lei to 1 Euro. 
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Table 18: Average VAT bill of private households as a proportion of expenditure and in Euros per year, by income quintile 
in 2011 and reform scenarios 1 and 2, for FI, SE and UK 
  
Income 
Quintiles 
FI SE UK 
in % in € in % in € in % in € 
2
0
1
1
 
First 9.8% 1,980 11.0% 2,636 6.3% 1,257 
Second 10.4% 2,966 11.0% 3,216 7.1% 1,797 
Third 10.8% 3,896 11.6% 4,210 7.7% 2,341 
Fourth 11.1% 4,892 12.1% 5,131 8.4% 3,119 
Fifth 11.6% 6,784 12.3% 6,595 8.9% 4,527 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 1
 First +2.4%p +559 +2.5%p +694 +3.6%p +799 
Second +2.3%p +737 +2.4%p +796 +3.4%p +960 
Third +2.2%p +893 +2.2%p +929 +3.2%p +1,086 
Fourth +2.1%p +1,073 +2.2%p +1,077 +2.9%p +1,209 
Fifth +2.0%p +1,365 +2.1%p +1,303 +2.6%p +1,513 
S
ce
n
a
ri
o
 2
 First +1.1%p +250 +0.9%p +241 +1.9%p +418 
Second +0.9%p +286 +0.8%p +250 +1.6%p +450 
Third +0.8%p +310 +0.6%p +230 +1.4%p +452 
Fourth +0.7%p +347 +0.5%p +232 +1.0%p +408 
Fifth +0.6%p +373 +0.4%p +229 +0.7%p +396 
Source: Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
Note: Exchange rates of 9.030 Swedish kronor and 0.868 British pounds to 1 Euro. 
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Household types  
In addition to disaggregating households according to income quintiles, we looked at 
effects on subgroups of households according to all relevant demographic criteria 
available from the Eurostat database. All results are collected in the spreadsheets 
annexed; results on the breakdown by active and non-active households and household 
types are also listed in the Addendum containing the more detailed analyses for all 
countries. Here, we limit the discussion to the group that faces the highest VAT 
payments as a proportion of expenditure in 2011, and the group that is most affected by 
the two reform scenarios in absolute terms and as measured by VAT payments as a 
fraction of expenditure.79  
 
In 2011 (Table 19), the group that pays most VAT as a fraction of expenditure is the 
group that benefits least from exemptions, zero and reduced rates. 
Some groups rank first in more than 2 countries:80  
 three or more active persons in the household (Germany, Greece, Spain, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Portugal, the United Kingdom)  
 three or more adults, with or without children (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Finland and Sweden) 
 households with a head under the age of 30 (Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta 
and Austria)  
 the fifth income quintile (Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland) 
 households with a self-employed head (Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia). 
 
Table 20 lists the socio-economic group most affected by reform scenarios 1 and 2, 
measured by the increase in VAT payments as a fraction of total expenditure (in 
percentage points) for all countries. As a general rule, we observe that, in almost all 
countries, when measured as a fraction of expenditure, the group most affected is the 
group that has (presumably) the lowest disposable income: 
 The first income quintile is listed thirteen times81,  
 followed by households with no active member (five times)  
                                                     
79 Please refer to section 2.1 for the definition of the groups and to the preface to learn which breakdown is 
unavailable for which country.  
80 In some countries, as indicated in the table, there is a tie between two groups.  
81 In scenario 1 the first income quintile is listed 12 times. In Belgium households in the first quintile are 
most affected in scenario 2 whereas scenario 1 affects households with three or more adults and 
dependent children the most.  
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 and households where the reference person is 60 years or older (four times).82  
 
The picture changes again when we look at who benefits most from zero and reduced 
rates in absolute terms, considering all breakdowns by household characteristics. Table 
21 shows the increase in absolute VAT payments for the group most affected in 
scenarios 1 and 2. Because household sizes differ, we equivalise VAT payments using 
the number of adult equivalents provided by Eurostat for each category.83 In 19 
countries the fifth quintile is the group most affected in absolute terms by scenario 1.84 
In these countries, even when we consider different breakdowns of households, the 
richest households always stand to lose the most in absolute terms following the 
abolition of zero and reduced rates. Put differently: in absolute terms, these households 
benefit the most from zero and reduced rates. In Hungary, Romania and Slovakia these 
are households headed by a person over the age of 60 years. In these countries, reduced 
rates only apply to few goods and services, including pharmaceutical products and 
medical appliances, which is why older people particularly suffer from the abolition of 
reduced rates. Reducing the standard rate according to scenario 2, however, changes the 
picture: Only in four countries (France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal), 
households in the fifth quintile remain the group most affected by the reform. In most 
countries, households which are not active on the labour market (that is, there is no 
active person living in the household, or the household is headed by an inactive person) 
are now those most affected. Thus, in many countries, high income households are 
compensated for their losses generated by the abolition of the reduced rate(s) by the 
lower standard rate in the revenue neutral scenario.  
                                                     
82 In the remaining countries, households headed by inactive persons who are neither retired nor 
unemployed, headed by a person below the age of 30, or headed by an unemployed person, rank first.  
83 Eurostat does not provide this number for income quintiles. Therefore we equivalise all quintiles with the 
average number of adult equivalents, implicitly assuming that the households in the quintiles are equally 
sized. 
84 For Italy, we do not have comparable information for income quintiles. Here households with three or 
more active members are the ones most affected. Presumably, additional active members add to a 
household’s income.  
84 
Study on VAT rates structure 
Table 19: Most affected socio-economic groups in 2011, measured by the proportion of 
VAT expenditure to total household expenditure 
Country 
2011 
Group Share of Expenditure 
BE fifth quintile 11.1% 
BG 3 or more adults + 13.9% 
CZ 3 or more adults 12.5% 
DK 3 or more adults +  14.4% 
DE 3 or more active persons* 9.0% 
EE less than 30 years 13.2% 
EL 3 or more active persons 11.6% 
ES 3 or more active persons* 7.8% 
FR 3 or more adults +* 9.1% 
IE 3 or more active persons 9.6% 
IT 3 or more active persons 9.4% 
CY less than 30 years 7.5% 
LV 3 or more active persons* 15.7% 
LT employed except employees 15.4% 
LU less than 30 years*  7.0% 
HU other inactive person 18.1% 
MT less than 30 years 11.4% 
NL fifth quintile 8.3% 
AT less than 30 years 12.1% 
PL fifth quintile 11.5% 
PT 3 or more active persons 9.9% 
RO first quintile* 18.1% 
SI employed except employees 11.2% 
SK employed except employees* 14.0% 
FI 3 or more adults + 12.3% 
SE 3 or more adults 12.6% 
UK 3 or more active persons 9.2% 
Source: Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
"+" indicates a household with dependent children 
"*" indicates that several groups are affected equally 
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Table 20: Most affected socio-economic groups by reform scenarios 1 and 2 in Member 
States, measured by the relative rise in VAT expenditure 
Country Group 
Rise in VAT/EXP 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
BE 3 or more adults+ / first quintile +3.0%p +0.9%p 
BG - - - 
CZ no active person* +2.9%p +1.3%p 
DK no active person* +0.2%p +0.0%p 
DE first quintile   +2.3%p +1.1%p 
EE other inactive person* +0.5%p +0.1%p 
EL first quintile +2.7%p +0.7%p 
ES first quintile +3.7%p +0.7%p 
FR 60 years or over* +3.8%p +2.0%p 
IE first quintile +4.4%p +1.3%p 
IT no active person* +3.6%p +0.9%p 
CY first quintile +3.0%p +1.3%p 
LV no active person* +0.7%p -0.0%p 
LT no active person* +1.0%p +0.7%p 
LU first quintile +3.6%p +2.3%p 
HU 6o years or over* +1.6%p -0.1%p 
MT first quintile +5.9%p +2.7%p 
NL less than 30 years +2.8%p +1.4%p 
AT unemployed person +3.3%p +1.2%p 
PL first quintile +5.6%p +2.1%p 
PT first quintile +5.3%p +2.2%p 
RO 60 years or over +1.8%p +1.1%p 
SI first quintile +3.0%p +1.0%p 
SK 60 years or over* +0.4%p +0.3%p 
FI first quintile* +2.4%p +1.1%p 
SE other inactive person   +3.1%p +1.6%p 
UK first quintile +3.6%p +1.9%p 
Source: Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
"+" indicates a household with dependent children 
"*" indicates that several groups are affected equally 
Remark: There are basically no reform effects in Bulgaria 
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Table 21: Most affected socio-economic groups by reform scenarios 1 and 2 in Member 
States, measured by equivalised absolute increase in VAT expenditure 
Country 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Group VAT Group VAT 
BE fifth quintile   +912 3 or more adults +  +191 
BG - - - - 
CZ three or more adults* +175 no active person   +69 
DK fifth quintile   +35 no active person +10 
DE fifth quintile   +630 third quintile +194 
EE non-manual worker  +39 single person +7 
EL fifth quintile   +610 no active person +87 
ES fifth quintile   +599 first quintile   +66 
FR fifth quintile   +1,149 fifth quintile   +487 
IE fifth quintile   +1,274 60 years or over +217 
IT 3 or more active persons +833 no active person   +175 
CY fifth quintile   +668 no active person   +170 
LV fifth quintile   +39 retired person* -1 
LT no active person +50 no active person   +38 
LU fifth quintile   +2,131 fifth quintile   +925 
HU 60 years or over +75 60 years or over -6 
MT fifth quintile   +715 no active person   +253 
NL fifth quintile   +878 fifth quintile   +366 
AT fifth quintile   +944 single person +292 
PL fifth quintile   +437 no active person* +105 
PT fifth quintile   +930 fifth quintile   +194 
RO 60 years or over +44 60 years or over +27 
SI fifth quintile   +541 no active person   +104 
SK 60 years or over +28 60 years or over +20 
FI fifth quintile   +916 60 years or over +249 
SE fifth quintile   +899 other inactive person +328 
UK fifth quintile   +946 retired person +343 
Source: Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
"+" indicates a household with dependent children 
"*" indicates that several groups are affected equally 
Remark: There are basically no reform effects in Bulgaria 
Note: Exchange rates of 1.956 Bulgarian levs, 24.590 Czech koruny, 7.451 Danish kroner, 0.706 Latvian 
lats, 3.453 Lithuanian litai, 279.370 Hungarian forints, 4.121 Polish zloty, 4.212 Romanian lei, 9.030 
Swedish kronor and 0.868 British pounds to 1 Euro. 
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2.4 Results: VAT paid by non-household entities 
Scenario 1 – Abolition of Reduced Rates 
Table 22 and Figure 2 show, for all Member States (EU-27), the results of the abolition 
of zero and reduced rates for the economy as a whole and for economic agents other 
than households. Note that these results are mechanical in the sense that they do not 
take into account the possible reactions to increases in effective rates (in terms of both 
substitution effects and compliance). This caveat is particularly important, because the 
magnitude of the resulting increases in VAT liability is rather large in several countries, 
with six countries experiencing an overall increase in VAT liability in excess of 30 % 
(Spain 43 %, Ireland 38 %, Italy and Poland 35 %, Malta and Portugal 34 %). Some 
countries that do not rely on zero and reduced rates, on the other hand, would see 
minimal increases in the overall VAT liability (Bulgaria 0 %, Denmark and Slovakia 
1 %, Lithuania 2 %, Estonia 3 % and Romania 5 %). The average, economy-wide 
increase in the VAT liability is 19 %, and so is the median. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2, in most countries, the Intermediate Consumption and 
“Others” sectors85 have a lower relative increase in the VAT burden than the average 
economy. In other words, the highest relative increase in the VAT liability is borne by 
the Household sector (discussed earlier in section 2.3). This is not surprising, since 
most of the reduced rates are targeted at consumption goods. There are, however, some 
exceptions. For instance, in Italy, Spain, France and the Czech Republic, the “Others” 
sectors register a higher percentage increase in liability than the household sector 
(although not in absolute terms), whereas in Cyprus, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia and 
Latvia the same is true for the Intermediate Consumption sector. These results are due 
to the specific features of each country’s VAT system (also see the country sheets in the 
Addendum). For the whole EU-27, the average increase in VAT liability for the sector 
Intermediate Consumption is 14 %, with the median at 11 %. For the “Others” sector, 
the average increase is 13 %, with the median at 8 %. 
                                                     
85 “Others” includes Government and NPISH (Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households), as well as 
GFCF expenses exempted from VAT. 
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Table 22: Scenario 1 – Abolition of zero and reduced rates 
Country 
Total 
New 
VAT 
% 
Change 
IC 
% 
Change 
Others 
% 
Change 
BE 38,003 24% 8,316 23% 8,389 20% 
BG 4,010 0% 816 0% 620 0% 
CZ 17,723 14% 4,003 5% 3,569 15% 
DK 26,454 1% 6,959 0% 4,862 0% 
DE 247,910 13% 41,872 8% 52,158 1% 
EE 1,745 3% 288 5% 365 2% 
EL 30,265 22% 3,670 12% 3,945 2% 
ES 103,339 43% 15,161 26% 19,326 50% 
FR 212,821 22% 27,403 10% 56,048 23% 
IE 14,983 38% 3,051 18% 3,262 38% 
IT 180,661 35% 18,818 23% 40,284 44% 
CY 1,768 24% 209 42% 467 1% 
LV 2,488 6% 495 7% 316 3% 
LT 3,880 2% 462 6% 555 1% 
LU 3,926 20% 1,050 11% 1,378 15% 
HU 13,171 13% 2,126 8% 2,689 10% 
MT 724 34% 113 25% 82 11% 
NL 54,486 18% 14,811 8% 13,048 7% 
AT 31,442 19% 6,120 13% 4,723 10% 
PL 47,623 35% 7,875 26% 8,856 27% 
PT 22,586 34% 4,188 27% 2,630 26% 
RO 22,820 5% 2,760 12% 7,334 3% 
SI 4,084 23% 602 19% 672 17% 
SK 7,658 1% 1,147 1% 1,381 0% 
FI 22,201 14% 5,288 8% 4,864 6% 
SE 44,125 16% 10,852 7% 9,035 8% 
UK 184,118 23% 42,435 15% 18,667 6% 
              
Mean   19%   14%   13% 
Median   19%   11%   8% 
Source: WIOD, EUROSTAT, IBFD, European Commission, Communications from national authorities 
and own calculations. 
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Figure 2: Scenario 1 – Changes in VAT liabilities of non-households 
 
Source: Table 22 
 
Table 23 and Table 24 provide more minute details on the sector consequences of the 
abolition of reduced rates. In most countries seven sectors are affected through their 
intermediate purchases: 
 Post and Telecommunications 
 Real Estate Activities 
 Financial Intermediation 
 Public Administration and Defence 
 Education 
 Health and Social Work 
 Other Community, Social and Personal Services 
 
In addition, five countries (Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Portugal) have other 
(minor) liabilities arising in other sectors.  
 
Of the seven main sectors listed above, the highest average proportional increase 
resulting from an abolition of zero and reduced rates occurs in the Real Estate and 
Education sectors (20 %), followed by Health and Social Work, Other Community, 
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Social and Personal Services, and Public Administration and Defence (19 %, 18 % and 
11 %, respectively). Post and Telecommunications and Financial Intermediation (which 
have a lower degree of connectivity with goods at reduced or zero rates) would see the 
lowest increase in VAT liability, 5.5 % and 6.6 %, respectively. 
 
Table 23 and Table 24 also break down the “Others” category into Government and 
NPISHs (Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households). As mentioned above, 
Government and NPISH final consumption – being largely exempt from VAT – would 
also see a substantial increase in VAT liabilities (23.9 % and 31.8 %, respectively). 
While the Government is the collector of VAT, and therefore in most cases overall 
Government finances would not be affected, the distribution of VAT liabilities among 
government agencies is very uneven. This would likely lead to the need of budgetary 
reallocations that can be rather complicated. With respect to NPISHs, it is apparent that 
the abolition of zero and reduced rates would lead to substantially tighter budgets, in the 
absence of compensatory increases in revenues/subsidies, depending on the type of 
service they perform for the household sector. 
 
Finally, we note that (as seen for the overall changes in IC and Others liabilities above) 
there is wide dispersion across countries with regard to the sectors that would suffer the 
largest increases. Within Intermediate Consumption, the increase ranges from 167 % 
for Real Estate activities in Cyprus, to zero or almost-zero values for several countries 
and sectors. It is difficult, however, to discern patterns, to the extent that such increases 
are the result of the interaction between existing reduced rates and patterns of 
consumption, approximating in many cases random events. 
 
With regard to Government final consumption, it is noticeable that ten countries would 
see increases in their VAT bill of at least 25 % (with the highest values registered for 
Luxembourg, 82 %, and Poland, 72 %). 
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Table 23: Scenario 1 – Effects on main exempt sectors and activities 
  
Post and Tele-
communications 
Real Estate 
Activities 
Financial 
Intermediation 
Public Admin 
and Defence; 
Compulsory 
Social Security 
Education 
  
Base 
VTTL 
% 
incr. 
Base 
VTTL 
% 
incr. 
Base 
VTTL 
% 
incr. 
Base 
VTTL 
% 
incr. 
Base 
VTTL 
% 
incr. 
BE 48 9% 976 55% 1,489 6% 1,303 17% 312 19% 
BG 0 - 323 0% 82 0% 170 0% 58 0% 
CZ 21 3% 1,509 2% 693 2% 555 2% 252 9% 
DK 53 0% 1,509 0% 621 0% 1,403 0% 536 0% 
DE 803 5% 6,562 2% 9,733 2% 8,897 8% 2,479 17% 
EE 6 4% 10 2% 32 2% 99 2% 41 6% 
EL 2 4% 338 0% 508 5% 1,260 5% 135 21% 
ES 153 5% 2,166 45% 1,696 13% 3,335 15% 644 25% 
FR 275 5% 2,491 3% 5,209 4% 5,822 6% 1,488 24% 
IE 37 6% 256 19% 487 10% 403 28% 217 25% 
IT 177 22% 347 24% 3,123 10% 5,170 21% 486 18% 
CY 1 1% 28 167% 24 9% 54 6% 9 41% 
LV 1 3% 201 4% 34 5% 103 12% 37 5% 
LT 0 1% 134 2% 57 11% 69 6% 45 19% 
LU 6 3% 48 9% 684 5% 96 29% 19 50% 
HU 5 3% 604 8% 344 5% 442 6% 170 8% 
MT 1 9% 0 - 19 16% 23 17% 3 50% 
NL 1,299 3% 3,864 1% 2,214 8% 4,645 6% 648 13% 
AT 75 4% 1,585 16% 1,014 10% 974 10% 348 10% 
PL 16 6% 2,363 30% 1,093 12% 958 17% 406 27% 
PT 63 8% 133 81% 615 7% 658 21% 179 24% 
RO 66 13% 916 5% 310 12% 280 9% 188 20% 
SI 4 7% 79 33% 80 5% 128 16% 60 24% 
SK 14 3% 110 1% 151 2% 417 1% 95 2% 
FI 0 - 1,627 1% 479 6% 1,192 7% 354 17% 
SE 0 - 3,808 2% 947 6% 2,114 4% 623 32% 
UK 438 7% 3,396 2% 8,973 6% 9,410 12% 2,883 22% 
                      
Mean   5.5%   19.7%   6.6%   10.6%   19.6% 
Source: WIOD, EUROSTAT, IBFD, European Commission, Communications from national authorities 
and own calculations. 
VTTL= VAT Total Tax Liability 
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Table 24: Scenario 1 – Effects on main exempt sectors and activities (continued from Table 
23) 
  
Health and 
Social Work 
Other 
Community, 
Social and 
Personal 
Services 
Other IC 
Government 
final 
consumption 
NPISH final 
consumption 
  
Base 
VTTL 
% 
incr. 
Base 
VTTL 
% 
incr. 
Base 
VTTL 
% 
incr. 
Base 
VTTL 
% 
incr. 
Base 
VTTL 
% 
incr. 
BE 1,678 26% 419 29% 564 10% 1,266 43% 58 41% 
BG 117 0% 67 0%     83 0% 4 0% 
CZ 614 14% 162 20%     827 19% 151 18% 
DK 1,825 0% 299 0% 713 0% 943 0% 0 - 
DE 8,993 15% 1,428 9%     7,823 8% 1,535 9% 
EE 54 12% 34 4%     66 5% 11 0% 
EL 803 29% 252 20%     82 13% 40 58% 
ES 3,061 27% 1,550 34%     2,946 37% 102 54% 
FR 4,509 16% 5,331 15%     9,591 34% 861 61% 
IE 727 19% 181 16% 277 11% 287 41% 131 10% 
IT 5,054 35% 513 21% 421 14% 7,926 12% 207 24% 
CY 24 18% 8 18%     4 16% 1 43% 
LV 54 8% 35 8%     26 35% 1 0% 
LT 105 2% 27 8%     93 4% 0 - 
LU 85 33% 6 64%     49 82% 7 49% 
HU 342 16% 57 8%     745 23% 186 0% 
MT 11 42% 34 29%     33 11% 2 2% 
NL 1,945 20% 409 27%     2,160 14% 133 140% 
AT 1,091 13% 331 25%     762 40% 45 41% 
PL 737 45% 696 24%     1,137 72% 126 24% 
PT 767 26% 434 29% 495 48% 311 22% 105 39% 
RO 705 20% 0 0%     731 12% 259 37% 
SI 121 19% 33 22%     125 24% 6 86% 
SK 212 1% 135 2%     285 0% 7 0% 
FI 890 20% 337 15%     850 17% 97 27% 
SE 1,661 10% 941 19%     1,658 26% 0 - 
UK 10,662 29% 1,066 12%     1,775 36% 1,745 0% 
                      
Mean   19.0%   17.7%   16.6%   23.9%   31.8% 
Source: WIOD, EUROSTAT, IBFD, European Commission, Communications from national authorities 
and own calculations. 
VTTL= VAT Total Tax Liability 
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Scenario 2 – Revenue-Neutral Abolition of Reduced Rates 
Table 25 displays the results of a simulation that abolishes zero and reduced rates, but 
decreases the overall standard rate to achieve a revenue-neutral outcome for each 
country. Table 10 and Figure 1 in section 2.2 display the 2011 standard rates and the 
“revenue neutral” rates that would be obtained.  
 
By construction, the overall VAT liability does not change, but there are uneven 
consequences on the various sectors. As discussed in section 2.3, the increases in 
liabilities for the Household sector are substantially lower than in scenario 1, but in 
most countries, private households face an increase in their VAT burden in this revenue 
neutral scenario. Figure 3 reveals that the revenue-neutral abolition of reduced rates 
would generally affect the other institutional sectors in a positive way, leading to 
substantial reductions in the VAT liability for Intermediate Consumption (IC) and for 
“Others”, with very few exceptions (notably Cyprus, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia and 
Latvia for Intermediate Consumption, and Italy, Spain, France and the Czech Republic 
for the “Others” category). The main reason for such favourable outcomes for the non-
household sectors is the fact that indeed, as seen in Figure 3 and Table 25, in most cases 
the reduction in the standard rate is more than sufficient to compensate for the abolition 
of the reduced and zero rates applying to the goods purchased by the Intermediate 
Consumption and “Others” sectors. The average reduction in VAT liability for the 
Intermediate Consumption sector is -3.9 %, the median -5.1 %. For the “Others” 
category, the average and median reductions are -4.8 % and -3.2 %, respectively. 
Taking the Intermediate Consumption and “Others” sectors together, the reductions in 
liability amount to 4.6 % on average (median 4.3 %). We find small increases in three 
Member States (Italy 1.1 %; Lithuania 1.0 %; Romania 0.6 %) and virtually no 
increases in Estonia. In all other Member States VAT liabilities for Intermediate 
Consumption and “Others” taken together decrease, with decreases ranging from 
negligible amounts in Bulgaria to high decreases of 12.4 % in Greece. 
 
One conclusion that might be drawn from this exercise is that, to the extent that 
unrecoverable VAT on inputs induces unfavourable economic distortions in the 
affected sectors, the revenue-neutral scenario would seem to lead, for most countries 
and most sectors, into the direction of greater economic efficiency. 
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Table 25: Scenario 2 – Revenue-neutral abolition of reduced and zero rates (new liability 
and percentage change from baseline) 
Country IC 
% 
Change 
Others 
% 
Change 
IC & 
Others 
% 
Change 
BE 6,698 -1.3% 6,757 -3.2% 13,455 -2.3% 
BG 815 -0.2% 619 -0.1% 1,433 -0.2% 
CZ 3,496 -8.1% 3,117 0.5% 6,614 -4.3% 
DK 6,869 -1.3% 4,799 -1.3% 11,668 -1.3% 
DE 37,125 -4.6% 46,244 -10.0% 83,369 -7.7% 
EE 279 1.9% 354 -1.4% 634 0.0% 
EL 3,009 -7.9% 3,234 -16.2% 6,243 -12.4% 
ES 10,610 -12.1% 13,524 5.0% 24,133 -3.2% 
FR 22,534 -9.4% 46,089 1.5% 68,623 -2.4% 
IE 2,205 -14.7% 2,358 -0.5% 4,563 -7.9% 
IT 13,951 -8.8% 29,866 6.5% 43,817 1.1% 
CY 168 14.3% 375 -18.6% 543 -10.6% 
LV 466 0.5% 297 -3.0% 763 -0.9% 
LT 453 3.7% 544 -1.2% 997 1.0% 
LU 877 -7.0% 1,152 -4.2% 2,029 -5.5% 
HU 1,877 -4.4% 2,375 -3.1% 4,252 -3.7% 
MT 84 -6.4% 62 -16.8% 146 -11.1% 
NL 12,544 -8.4% 11,051 -9.4% 23,595 -8.9% 
AT 5,129 -5.3% 3,958 -7.9% 9,087 -6.5% 
PL 5,827 -7.0% 6,554 -6.1% 12,381 -6.6% 
PT 3,132 -5.1% 1,967 -5.7% 5,099 -5.3% 
RO 2,635 6.9% 7,002 -1.6% 9,638 0.6% 
SI 489 -3.2% 546 -5.3% 1,035 -4.3% 
SK 1,134 0.1% 1,366 -1.0% 2,500 -0.5% 
FI 4,637 -5.0% 4,264 -6.8% 8,901 -5.9% 
SE 9,362 -7.3% 7,795 -6.8% 17,157 -7.0% 
UK 34,528 -6.2% 15,189 -13.6% 49,716 -8.6% 
              
Average   -3.9%   -4.8%   -4.6% 
Median   -5.1%   -3.2%   -4.3% 
Source: WIOD, EUROSTAT, IBFD, European Commission, Communications from national authorities 
and own calculations. 
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Figure 3: Scenario 2 – Revenue neutral abolition of reduced and zero rates 
 
Source: Table 25. 
2.5 Results: Effects of different scenarios on VAT liability86  
Table 26 shows the static effects of the abolition of reduced rates on the overall VAT 
liability as a percentage of GDP for each country and for scenarios 1 and 3 (for the 
latter, we show the results for the compensation of the bottom 40 % of households as 3a 
and the results for the compensation of the bottom 20 % only as 3b). Table 27 shows 
the same data, expressed in million Euros. Scenario 2 is revenue-neutral by design, and 
therefore does not require a discussion here. 
 
In scenario 1, the countries that had registered the highest percentage change in VAT 
                                                     
86 The estimates of VAT payments that are presented throughout this report (including in this section) refer 
to the concept of VAT Liability, namely the amount of tax that is due from various economic subjects on 
the basis of existing, country-specific VAT legislation and regulations. Thus, this concept assumes that 
collection of taxes is perfect. The reason to use this concept is that statistics on the sectoral distribution of 
VAT payments are not available. In reality, however, tax enforcement is not perfect for a variety of 
reasons, ranging from the legal to the illegal (for instance, use of legal tax avoidance schemes; 
uncollectable taxes due to bankruptcies; or outright fraud). 
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liability (Figure 2) also experience the largest increase as a proportion of GDP. The 
potential increase ranges from more than 3 % of GDP for Poland and Portugal, to 
virtually zero for Bulgaria and Denmark. The average for the EU-27 countries is 1.6 % 
of GDP, which is also the median. 
 
Scenario 3a, that stipulates to compensate the bottom 40 % of the income distribution, 
reduces the overall potential increase in VAT liability to an average of 1.3 % of GDP 
(which again is the median for the EU-27). The highest increases are again registered in 
Poland and Portugal (2.7 %), followed by Italy (2.5 %) and Spain (2.3 %). As before, 
no increase is registered for Bulgaria and Denmark. Scenario 3b, which only 
compensates the bottom 20 % of households, produces an average increase in VAT 
liability of 1.5 % of GDP, and a median of 1.4 %. The same countries as in 3a register 
the highest and lowest increases, respectively. On average, the compensation required 
to shield the bottom 40 % of households from the effects of VAT increases is 0.3 % 
(with a median of 0.4 %) and for the bottom 20 % it declines to 0.2 % of GDP (with a 
median of 0.2 %). 
 
These simulations show that the potential for increases in VAT revenues from the 
abolition of zero and reduced rates is substantial for a considerable number of countries 
– these funds could, for instance, help achieve budget deficit reduction targets. 
However, as seen earlier, this would come at the cost of potentially difficult-to-accept 
increases in the liability of households, and in many cases of non-households. If, on the 
other hand, a mechanism were put in place to compensate lower-income households 
(not a trivial task in itself), the effect on revenues would decrease, but would remain 
substantial even for a number of countries that have to deal with big budgetary 
problems at the moment. The challenge would obviously be to set-up and administer 
such a compensation system. 
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Table 26: Revenue effects and compensation, scenarios 1 and 3, expressed in % of GDP 
Country 
Baseline 
VAT 
Liability 
Scenario 1 
Increase 
Scenario 3a Scenario 3b 
      Comp. Increase Comp. Increase 
BE 8.3% 2.0% 0.4% 1.6% 0.2% 1.8% 
BG 10.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
CZ 10.0% 1.4% 0.4% 1.0% 0.2% 1.2% 
DK 10.9% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 
DE 8.5% 1.1% 0.3% 0.8% 0.1% 1.0% 
EE 10.6% 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 
EL 11.9% 2.6% 0.7% 1.9% 0.3% 2.3% 
ES 6.8% 2.9% 0.6% 2.3% 0.3% 2.6% 
FR 8.7% 1.9% 0.4% 1.5% 0.2% 1.7% 
IE 6.8% 2.6% 0.5% 2.1% 0.2% 2.4% 
IT 8.5% 3.0% 0.5% 2.5% 0.2% 2.8% 
CY 7.9% 1.9% 0.4% 1.6% 0.1% 1.8% 
LV 11.6% 0.7% 0.1% 0.6% 0.1% 0.7% 
LT 12.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 
LU 7.7% 1.5% 0.2% 1.3% 0.1% 1.4% 
HU 11.7% 1.5% 0.4% 1.2% 0.2% 1.4% 
MT 8.2% 2.8% 0.6% 2.1% 0.3% 2.5% 
NL 7.7% 1.4% 0.3% 1.1% 0.2% 1.2% 
AT 8.8% 1.7% 0.4% 1.3% 0.2% 1.5% 
PL 9.5% 3.3% 0.6% 2.7% 0.3% 3.1% 
PT 9.9% 3.3% 0.6% 2.7% 0.3% 3.1% 
RO 16.6% 0.8% 0.1% 0.7% 0.0% 0.8% 
SI 9.2% 2.1% 0.4% 1.7% 0.2% 2.0% 
SK 11.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 
FI 10.3% 1.4% 0.3% 1.2% 0.1% 1.3% 
SE 9.8% 1.6% 0.4% 1.2% 0.2% 1.4% 
UK 8.6% 2.0% 0.5% 1.5% 0.2% 1.7% 
              
Average   1.6% 0.3% 1.3% 0.2% 1.5% 
Median   1.6% 0.4% 1.3% 0.2% 1.4% 
Source: WIOD, EUROSTAT, IBFD, European Commission, Communications from national authorities 
and own calculations. 
Legend: Scenarios 3a and 3b: Comp. = compensation to 1st+2nd and 1st quintile(s) of households, 
respectively. 
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Table 27: Revenue effects and compensation, scenarios 1 and 3 (Million Euros) 
Country 
Baseline VAT 
Liability  
Scenario 1 
Increase 
Scenario 3a Scenario 3b 
Comp. Increase Comp. Increase 
BE 30,612 7,391 1,381 6,010 624 6,767 
BG 4,001 9 1 8 0 8 
CZ 15,481 2,241 615 1,626 331 1,910 
DK 26,112 342 103 239 41 301 
DE 219,804 28,106 7,070 21,037 2,925 25,181 
EE 1,694 51 8 43 4 48 
EL 24,813 5,453 1,490 3,963 695 4,757 
ES 72,315 31,024 6,874 24,151 3,007 28,017 
FR 175,004 37,817 7,395 30,423 3,204 34,613 
IE 10,831 4,152 754 3,398 335 3,817 
IT 133,938 46,722 7,428 39,294 2,786 43,937 
CY 1,422 345 64 281 25 320 
LV 2,340 148 26 122 12 136 
LT 3,805 76 11 65 4 72 
LU 3,281 644 87 557 36 608 
HU 11,630 1,542 354 1,188 160 1,382 
MT 541 183 43 140 18 165 
NL 46,146 8,340 1,976 6,364 1,020 7,320 
AT 26,349 5,093 1,309 3,784 635 4,458 
PL 35,241 12,381 2,314 10,067 979 11,402 
PT 16,892 5,694 1,023 4,671 469 5,225 
RO 21,789 1,032 114 917 42 990 
SI 3,319 764 149 616 57 707 
SK 7,573 85 23 63 10 76 
FI 19,465 2,736 550 2,186 245 2,492 
SE 38,067 6,057 1,480 4,577 694 5,363 
UK 149,809 34,309 8,564 25,745 3,867 30,442 
              
Average   8,990 1,896 7,094 823 8,167 
Median   2,736 615 2,186 331 2,492 
Source: WIOD, EUROSTAT, IBFD, European Commission, Communications from national authorities 
and own calculations.  
Legend: Scenarios 3a and 3b: Comp. = compensation to 1st+2nd and 1st quintile(s) of households, 
respectively. 
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Figure 4: Increase in VAT liability (percent of GDP) 
 
Source: WIOD, EUROSTAT, IBFD, European Commission, Communications from national authorities 
and own calculations. 
3 General equilibrium effects of VAT reforms 
To assess the effects of different VAT reform scenarios on sectoral production and 
employment for task 4, we use the WorldScan Computational General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model. Section 3.1 summarises the main features of the WorldScan model, the 
inputs and adjustments necessary to run the general equilibrium scenarios are described 
in section 3.2, while section 3.3 summarises the results of these scenarios. 
3.1 Methodology: The WorldScan model 
WorldScan is a recursively dynamic CGE model (Lejour et al., 2006). The model fits 
into the tradition of applied general equilibrium models: it builds upon neoclassical 
theory, has strong micro-foundations and explicitly determines simultaneous 
equilibrium on a large number of markets. WorldScan is a multi-sector, multi-region 
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model that draws on the GTAP-database (Narayanan et al., 2012), which covers a total 
of 57 sectors and 129 countries. As any standard CGE model, WorldScan is an 
extensive macroeconomic model capable of dealing with trade and trade protection, 
production, consumption, taxation, labour and capital markets, government finances, 
growth and dynamic calibrations.  
 
One of the main features of CGE models is that the behavioural responses of all 
economic agents are directly built into the model. In other words, the model is 
constructed to automatically take into account how different economic agents react to 
policy shocks. Our CGE structure allows us not only to take the consumption responses 
to VAT rate changes into account, but also to incorporate how these VAT rate changes 
affect all relative prices in the model. These relative price changes in turn affect 
production, consumption, trade, tax revenues and governmental transfers – among other 
endogenous variables in the model.87 
 
It is important to note, however, that standard CGE models are developed for the 
analysis of medium-term questions that involve inter-regional and inter-sectoral effects. 
That is, CGE models are designed to assess the likely macroeconomic consequences of 
policy changes that affect more than one country at the same time, and can have 
varying effects on different economic sectors. For instance, CGE models are routinely 
used in the fields of international trade, economic integration and climate change. In 
addition, CGE models are mainly concerned with the “real economy” effects of certain 
economic policies, which include the effects of policy shocks (e.g. changes in taxes 
and/or tariffs) on the efficient allocation of resources between sectors and countries, and 
how this affects sectoral production, trade, employment and overall macroeconomic 
indicators such as GDP and consumption. Since the scope of CGE models is limited to 
medium to long-term effects of policy shocks on the real economy, they do not 
incorporate features that can assess short-term effects (e.g. how labour markets adjust in 
the short term to policy shocks). In particular, CGE models do not model some features 
that are important for short-term adjustments, like inflation, nominal interest rates and 
nominal exchange rates fluctuations; therefore, it is not possible to model monetary 
policy. Although the model includes relative prices, a broadly defined real interest rate, 
real exchange rates and terms-of-trade, these are defined as long-term perfectly flexible 
equilibrium values, and thus are not suitable to account for the short-term variations and 
adjustment paths of the policy shocks.  
 
                                                     
87 Such as labour and capital market outcomes, international capital flows and terms-of-trade. 
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Thus in the context of the present study WorldScan is a valuable instrument to analyse 
the medium-term economic impact of a VAT reform that incorporates the behavioural 
reactions of consumers and producers to VAT rate changes. In particular, it can show 
how consumption and production changes within sectors (given that the scenarios 
involve changing VAT rates at the sectoral level), how the EU-wide reform affects 
sectoral trade flows and it can forecast the (expected) real effects of the reform on GDP, 
consumption and employment.  
 
In what follows we highlight the features of the WorldScan model that are most 
relevant to the VAT scenarios. 
Labour market 
To capture changes in the labour market, we use the WorldScan labour market module 
from Boeters and van Leeuwen (2010). There are two main labour types: low- and 
high-skill workers. Labour demand for both labour types is determined by the 
production process (see below). The main feature of the model extension from Boeters 
and van Leeuwen (2010) is that the labour market features endogenous labour supply, 
unemployment and collective wage bargaining. The model incorporates endogenous 
labour supply at two margins: participation and hours of work. Involuntary 
unemployment is captured through a collective bargaining set-up. The bargained wage 
is set at a too high level, for which labour supply exceeds demand, causing structural 
unemployment. WorldScan distinguishes five types of households: employed low and 
high skilled workers, unemployed low and high skilled workers and a residual 
household (earning capital income and receiving income transfers). Households are 
assumed to be homogeneous with respect to their labour-leisure choice (intensive 
margin of labour supply), but they differ with respect to their participation decision. 
Non-participating individuals face a higher fixed cost of taking up work than 
participating individuals, which makes taking up work less attractive for them 
(extensive margin of labour supply). Of the four worker households, employed 
high/low skilled workers receive wage income, and unemployed workers receive 
unemployment benefits. It is important to note that the unemployment benefits included 
in WorldScan are price-indexed, meaning that unemployed households are 
automatically compensated for price increases – for instance, for final price increases 
associated with VAT rate increases.  
 
The labour market module of WorldScan is calibrated to use 2004 as its base year and 
runs until 2020, when the full general equilibrium effects of policy shocks are realized. 
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Moreover, this version of the model uses a particular aggregation of 30 regions and 9 
sectors, for which the labour market data components were calibrated.88 Thus, we have 
sectoral data for each of the 27 Member States plus the USA, other OECD countries 
and the Rest of the World (ROW). The precise sectoral aggregation is shown in Annex 
A.6, together with an intermediate GTAP aggregation of 36-sectors that was required to 
map the effective VAT rates for households and non-households to the WS 9-sector 
aggregation. 
Taxation 
From the input-output tables implicit in the GTAP database we have information on the 
consumption of intermediate and final goods and services. All taxes on goods and 
services are captured by effective tax rates, that is, the wedge between producer prices 
(before taxation) and user prices (after taxation), such that: 
 
  
    
 (    
 ), 
 
where   
  is the user price for sector s,   
  is the market price and   
  is the effective tax 
rate for that sector.  
 
Final consumer prices and taxes are defined separately for households and the 
government, while production (Intermediate Consumption) input prices and taxes are 
estimated as a wedge between production at market and user prices at the sectoral level. 
Thus, changes in the effective tax rate will affect final consumption both directly 
through the effective tax rate, but also indirectly through changes in the tax rate of 
intermediate goods and services. 
Consumption and production 
Any empirically relevant consumption demand system needs to be non-homothetic 
(expenditures do not change proportionally with income). It is a well-known fact from 
the empirical consumption literature, that with rising income the budget share spent on 
necessary goods becomes smaller, while the share spent on luxury goods becomes 
larger. Therefore, in WorldScan, the household demand for final goods and services is 
specified as a Linear Expenditure System (LES). This demand structure includes a 
“subsistence level” or “basic consumption” that is satisfied first. Any remaining budget 
                                                     
88 We added WorldScan-specific data that are not present in the GTAP database, such as data on the R&D 
input/production structure, and projections on demographic, growth and investment variables. 
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is then distributed across all consumption goods according to their marginal budget 
shares. This implies that the income elasticities are not equal to one.89 The demand 
system is calibrated to mimic the empirical consumption structure for each country.  
 
The production technology is modelled as a nested structure of constant elasticities of 
substitution (CES) functions. Each nest combines production factors that are considered 
to be substitutes for each other (i.e. national and international intermediate inputs; 
labour and capital) and have nest-specific elasticities of substitution. A nesting structure 
reflects views on substitution and complementarity between inputs. It allows 
complementarity between certain factors, but precludes complementarity between 
others. As is standard in CGE models, the same production structure is assumed for all 
sectors and regions. The values of the substitution parameters reflect the degree of 
substitution between inputs. These values may differ across sectors, reflecting the 
different degrees of substitution of (factor) inputs. There is one representative firm per 
sector within any region.90 
Savings and investment 
Given the relevance of ageing in developed countries, WorldScan uses an estimated 
relation between savings, demographics (which include the projected ageing process), 
and national income (cf. Lejour et al., 2006). The estimated macroeconomic savings 
rate in the model is thus determined by the demographic composition of the country in a 
given year, and this rate expresses savings as a share of the endogenously determined 
national income.  
 
Investment is then determined by the fact that demand has to be matched by supply on a 
regional capital market. In a closed economy, domestic savings equal domestic 
investment. In WorldScan it is assumed that all regions are linked not only by trade in 
goods and services but also by international capital mobility. This implies that regional 
savings and investments can diverge. Therefore, savings have to be equal to investment 
only at the global level. In view of the incomplete integration of regional capital 
                                                     
89 In a non-homothetic demand system a 1 % increase in income is not associated with a 1 % increase in all 
consumption categories. 
90 The model cannot capture firm organisational issues, such as the decision to produce inputs internally or 
contract them to another firm. Thus, we are not able to analyse changes in firm size and sectoral coverage 
that may arise from different VAT rates for intermediate inputs. 
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markets, we assume that there is imperfect international capital mobility.91 The precise 
bilateral capital barriers are estimated using gravity equations (cf. Lejour et al., 2006), 
and using these estimated barriers it is possible to balance the international capital 
market. 
Government behaviour 
As is common in CGE models, WorldScan does not model the government in a detailed 
way. The main modelling constraint is that it is not feasible – in a CGE framework – to 
endogenously determine government decisions at any given administration level: 
regional, national, nor international. In other words, the political process involved in the 
endogenous decision to tax, consume, invest and borrow by governments is too 
complex to include in a CGE model. Therefore, the common practice is to assume that 
government-related variables, such as tax and subsidy rates, transfer shares, and 
regulations are fixed and the decisions to change these variables are exogenously 
determined. Moreover, most CGE models specify changes in these variables to simulate 
policy shocks – e.g. changes in tariffs, taxes, subsidies, and/or transfers – and construct 
what-if scenarios. In particular, in our simulations we will exogenously change the EU 
VAT rates calibrated in the model in order to analyse what are the expected 
macroeconomic changes in each EU Member State if the VAT rates were actually 
changed. 
 
In WorldScan the government collects taxes on trade, production and consumption. It 
then spends tax income on transfers, subsidies and consumption. Tax revenue is 
automatically determined in the model: tax rates are fixed, unless the rates are changed 
as part of the policy shock, and the collected tax revenue is then simply calculated as 
the base (trade, production or consumption) multiplied by the tax rate. The same 
automatic mechanism applies to subsidy payments (e.g. with a fixed subsidy rate, 
subsidy payments change in proportion to the change in the activity level on which the 
subsidy is given).  
 
There are two types of transfers: general transfers to the residual household (these are 
related to pensions and welfare payments) and unemployment benefits (which are paid 
to both the low- and high-skill unemployed households). We estimate base-year transfer 
levels from the GTAP database and the model assumes that the real value of these 
                                                     
91 Even though the elimination of capital controls and other barriers have stimulated international capital 
mobility since the 1980s, there are still many international capital flow barriers that do not allow the 
equalization of returns on investment between countries. 
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transfers is maintained in every period. For instance, unemployed benefits are price-
indexed and therefore maintain their real value over time. 
 
Government consumption is then determined as the (positive) difference between tax 
revenues and the sum of subsidy payments and transfers.92 Government consumption is 
assigned by sector using the base year calibrated shares (i.e. the shares of public 
consumption by sector) and the same LES demand system applied to household 
consumption, which takes into account relative prices and price elasticities of goods and 
services provided by each sector. This means that the actual consumption of the 
government and households by sector is different (as determined by initial base year 
calibrated values), but that government and households make their consumption 
decisions in the same way. For example, if the relative price of a final good rises due to 
a tax increase, both the government and households will substitute their consumption 
away from that final good towards relatively cheaper ones. 
 
Finally, there is no explicit government budget constraint. The government and all five 
households are aggregated into what is called the “regional household”. In WorldScan, 
each EU Member State has a “regional household”, and thus, for each Member State a 
country-wide budget constraint holds: total income of the regional household equals 
total expenditure plus savings. This means that when, for example, tax revenues 
increase exogenously (as in scenario A following the elimination of zero and reduced 
VAT rates), the additional income is first assigned to the regional household. This 
income, in turn, is then distributed between savings and consumption (following the 
mechanism explained above). The income share that remains for the regional household 
consumption is then used to maintain the real (price-adjusted) value of governmental 
transfers and any remaining income is consumed by the government. 
 
This modelling structure is common to CGE models, and it is usually assumed that in 
the baseline the government’s budget is balanced.93 It can then be simulated that tax 
revenues remain equal to their baseline values in the presence of external shocks, so 
                                                     
92 This implies that tax revenues need to be always greater than subsidy payments and transfers. 
93 Alternatively, it can be assumed that the private households of that country hold all domestic public debt. 
So the “regional household” balanced budget can be associated with government deficits or surpluses that 
are exactly compensated by private domestic household holdings of domestic public debt. The distinction 
is usually not made, because CGE models are only concerned with medium and long-term effects of 
policies, and not with short-term fluctuations in public deficit/surplus that may affect inflation and/or 
interest rates. 
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that a balanced budget is maintained after implementing the scenario. This will be the 
case for the scenarios B and D simulations.  
Baseline scenario and adjustment mechanisms in GE models 
Since WorldScan is a recursively dynamic CGE model, first we need to construct a 
“baseline” or “business-as-usual” scenario. This provides a time-trend of our variables 
between the year 2004 and 2020. This baseline scenario is effectively a stylized 
extrapolation of the calibrated values in the base-year provided by the GTAP database. 
The baseline is constructed using demographic projections from United Nations and a 
series of assumptions concerning expected growth and investment levels (cf. Lejour et 
al., 2006).  
 
The simulations in our scenarios are then “counterfactual” experiments on how the 
projected values of economic variables change with respect to the “baseline” values 
after a policy shock (the experiment) has been implemented. For our current VAT 
scenarios, which are associated with a permanent policy shock (i.e. a country/sector-
specific change in VAT rates in 2013), we only present the difference between the 
baseline values and the scenario values for 2020. We take the 2020 changes as 
representative of the medium-term effect of the VAT reforms. As explained before, 
CGE models are not suitable for analysing short-term effects and short-term 
adjustment, since many of the adjusting mechanisms in the model work unrealistically 
quickly. For example, CGE models usually assume that workers are highly mobile 
between sectors and thus, sectoral employment changes can take as little as one year, 
while in reality the adjustment (workers changing jobs to firms in other sectors) usually 
is only fully realized after several years.  
 
The main adjustment mechanism in any CGE model is provided by changes in relative 
prices. Most policy experiments that are implemented in CGE models are directly 
associated with changes in the price of certain goods and services, which in turn will 
change the relative price of that good or service with respect to all other goods and 
services. For instance, an increase in the VAT rate in a particular sector in a particular 
country will increase the final price paid by consumers of the good or service produced 
by that sector in that country. In turn, this will increase its relative price. Based on the 
underlying neoclassical micro-foundations of the model, when consumers face higher 
relative prices, they will substitute away to other goods and services and purchase more 
of relatively cheaper goods and services (i.e. the substitution effect). The price increase 
will also decrease their real income and therefore also reduce the consumption of all 
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goods and services (the income effect). The exact substitution and income effects are 
driven by the underlying parameters in the LES consumption function: the elasticities 
of substitution, subsistence levels and initial consumption shares.94 
 
However, in a general equilibrium model this is only the initial adjustment effect, which 
is followed by second-round adjustments that are necessary to bring all markets into 
equilibrium again. Using our example above, the reduction in the consumption of the 
good that has a higher VAT rate will decrease the domestic production (or imports) of 
that good. This in turn will require fewer workers, capital and intermediate inputs to 
produce the good, and this implies that workers have to move to other sectors, which 
can also be associated with changes in wages, and overall employment levels. 
Moreover, the change in the relative price of that particular good can also have effects 
on the amount of the good that is exported and/or imported. The precise changes in 
trade are related to comparative advantages (differences in technology, productivity) 
and trade barriers between countries. 
 
In our VAT reform scenarios, where several sector/country-specific VAT rates are 
changed simultaneously, the relative prices, all initial adjustments and the subsequent 
general equilibrium adjustments are quite complex. The main function of a CGE model 
as WorldScan is to have a reliable and micro-founded framework that can mix the 
different specifications of the model to obtain the medium to long-term impact of the 
policy shock.  
3.2 Implementation of status quo and reform scenarios 
In order to analyse the economic impact of changes in the VAT rates, a series of 
adjustments have to be made to the core WorldScan model. First, we need to calibrate 
the effective VAT rates provided for households and non-households into the current 
tax rates in the WorldScan model. In particular, these are: 
 VAT paid by households by consumption category using the UN COICOP (codes 
at different aggregation levels (i.e. 2, 3, and 4-digit level)). The application of the 
VAT rates follows information provided by TAXUD (European Commission, 
2011a) and national legislations. 
                                                     
94 Note that since the substitution and the income effect reduce the consumption of that good, then the 
expenditure share of that good relative to total income will be reduced. Therefore, the percentage 
reduction in real income associated with the VAT rate increase in a particular good is usually less than 
the percentage VAT rate increase. For example, a 10 % VAT rate increase in a particular good, will 
usually represent a real income reduction of less than 10 %. 
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 VAT paid by non-households by production category using the EUROSTAT CPA 
codes at the 2-digit level. The application of the VAT rates is based on information 
provided by TAXUD and IBFD.95  
 
Unfortunately, there exists no direct link between the 57 GTAP sectors with the 
COICOP or CPA-2002 classifications. Thus, we start by calibrating the VAT rates with 
the following procedure: 
1. We map the COICOP and the CPA-2002 classification codes into a 36-GTAP 
sectoral aggregation. These 36 sectors are more easily mapped than the total 57 
sectors in GTAP, in particular, with respect to the production sectors from CPA. 
2. We then map these 36 sector rates to the 9 sectors we use in WorldScan. Using the 
consumption/production shares by sector we obtain weighted average VAT rates 
for our final 9 sectors.  
3. We then need to distinguish these sectoral VAT effective tax rates from other 
consumption taxes (e.g. excise taxes on fuel, alcohol and tobacco) in   
  (the current 
total tax rate in GTAP). This implies an equation for final consumption prices:  
  
    
 (    
    
 ) 
where   
  is the VAT average effective tax rate, and   
  will then include all other 
taxes. 
4. From the analysis on households and non-households we know about effective 
VAT rates for 2011 and for scenario 1 (all taxable supplies taxed at the standard 
rate). We then compare these 2011 VAT 9-sector rates (  
     ) with the 
consumption tax rates for households and non-households from GTAP (    
  
  
 ). Since these GTAP rates (T) implicitly include VAT plus other taxes (  
 ), we 
need to separate the VAT component from other consumption taxes in GTAP.  
5. So we calibrate the tax rates using this procedure: 
a.   
      
       if     
     . In this case we are assuming that the 
implicit VAT rates in GTAP in 2004 are equal to the rates in 2011 (  
     ), 
and thus there is no change in VAT rates between 2004 and 2011. 
b. However,   
      is not always smaller than T. Thus, in these cases we have 
a two-stage adjustment. First, we estimate the VAT rate differential:    
 = 
  
        and we assume that   
     Then, in year 2004 we have that 
    
         
 , or equivalently   
        
         
 . The implicit 
GTAP rates in 2004 are lower than the 2011 rates. The second step is then 
to adjust the rates in year 2011 so we have     
    
      and the rates in 
                                                     
95 For a description on how effective VAT rates were obtained both for households and non-households 
please refer to section 2.1. 
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WorldScan from 2011 onwards are calibrated to the values provided by our 
partners. 
c. Then we run WorldScan with this baseline VAT rates for the period 2004-
2020, and these outcomes are taken as our reference baseline values. The 
scenarios – explained below – are simulations where changes in the VAT 
rates (  
 ) are applied in the year 2013. 
 
It is important to note that in the GTAP database most sectors in the EU-27 countries 
have negative production tax rates (i.e. subsidies), while only some country-sector 
combinations have positive rates (e.g. the energy sector). This contrasts with the final 
consumption effective rates in GTAP that are generally in line with the VAT rates 
applied in the EU-27. We therefore assume that the GTAP database includes no explicit 
VAT taxes for intermediate inputs and the VAT rates are applied exclusively to final 
consumption. Hence, the VAT rates from the GTAP data at the final consumption stage 
are, in principle, a weighted average of the different VAT rates for intermediate inputs 
in the whole production supply chain together with the VAT rates applied to the final 
sectoral output.  
 
We simulate five reform scenarios where we abolish zero and reduced rates (resulting 
in all taxable supplies being taxed at the standard rate). Depending on the scenario, the 
standard rate either remains the same or decreases such that VAT revenues remain 
constant. However, since we take into account exempted goods and services when 
calculating sector-specific (effective) VAT rates, sector-specific VAT rates can differ 
from the single standard rate. In other words, the sector-specific VAT rates depend on 
the relative importance of exempted sub-sectors and therefore, rates vary by sector. 
 
We first calibrate the sector-specific VAT rates (  
 ) for the base scenario for every 
country, and then run five scenarios96: 
 Scenario A: Zero and reduced rates are increased to the level of the standard rate. 
We set   
  in 2013 to the new sector/country-specific VAT rates, taxing all taxed 
supplies at the standard rate, but taking into account exemptions97  
                                                     
96 Note that scenarios A and B are similar, but not identical, to scenarios 1 and 2 in previous sections. The 
CGE model by construction already includes the behavioural reaction of consumer and producers to the 
tax changes, and therefore, the results of both sets of scenarios are not directly comparable and are 
conceptually different. Specifically, note that the additional tax revenues in scenario A are automatically 
transferred back in the economy, while scenario 1 does not specify how the additional funds are used.  
97 Recall that the unemployment benefits included in WorldScan are price-indexed and automatically 
compensate unemployed households for the price increases associated with higher VAT rates. Therefore, 
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 Scenario B: We abolish zero and reduced rates and calibrate   
  to find a new 
standard rate that is budget neutral – after behavioural responses – for each EU-27 
Member State. To achieve this we endogenise the sector-specific VAT rate   
  such 
that it is budget neutral: the total tax revenue from the government is kept constant 
at its baseline value.98  
 Scenario C: Abolishing the zero and reduced rates and tax all (non-exempt) 
supplies at the standard rate is expected to reduce the administrative burden 
associated with VAT collection. In this scenario we explore the economic effects of 
simplifying the VAT compliance and administration associated with the use of 
country-specific standard VAT rates on all taxed supplies. The expected efficiency 
gains associated with a simplified VAT rates system are then applied to the same 
VAT rates changes as in scenario B. 
 Scenario D: The VAT increase caused by the abolition of zero and reduced rates is 
compensated by an endogenously calculated decrease in the capital-investment tax 
that assures that overall tax revenue remains constant as in scenario B.99 
 Scenario E: The same as in Scenario A, but the additional tax revenues associated 
with the VAT increase are transferred to both low-skilled households (employed 
and unemployed). 
3.3 Results 
Scenario A 
To implement scenario A, we substitute the VAT rates previously calibrated until 2011 
(which still include zero and reduced rates) for the sector- and country-specific VAT 
rates calibrated without zero and reduced rates in 2013, and run the WorldScan model 
until 2020. However, it is important to keep in mind that sector-specific VAT rates will 
still differ among sectors due to VAT exemptions. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
scenario A is more related to scenario 3 than to scenario 1 in the static analysis. The definitions of 
households, however, are different in both scenarios and thus, they are not entirely comparable. 
98 Note that this is more intricate than just keeping the VAT revenues constant. Our CGE structure allows 
us not only to take the consumption responses into account, but also other tax revenues are affected. In 
addition, we used an alternative specification where the total tax revenue is kept constant as a percentage 
of real GDP, but our results do not change. 
99 As with scenario B, endogenous means that the model automatically finds the tax level (in this case the 
capital-investment tax) that balances the budget by maintaining tax revenues in the scenario equal to the 
baseline values. 
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Once we apply the new VAT rates in 2013 we find that average VAT rates increase in 
all countries, in particular for the following sectors: agriculture (AGO), low-tech 
manufacturing (LTM, mainly through increases in the rates on processed food), 
transport (TRA, for non-households) and other services (OSR); see the first four 
columns in Table 28.100  
Table 28: Scenario A, changes in VAT rates and sectoral output, simple EU-27 averages 
Sector 
Households Non- households Output 
share 
change 
VAT 
baseline 
VAT 
scenario A 
VAT 
baseline 
VAT 
scenario A 
Agric. & mining 11.60% 20.70% 10.20% 19.00% -0.07% 
Energy 19.60% 20.70% 18.90% 19.90% 0.00% 
Low tech. manuf. 15.70% 20.70% 16.10% 19.80% -0.22% 
Medium-low tech. 20.70% 20.70% 19.80% 19.90% 0.01% 
Medium-high tech. 20.70% 20.70% 18.50% 19.80% 0.06% 
High tech. manuf. 20.70% 20.70% 19.90% 19.90% 0.03% 
Transport 19.30% 20.50% 8.40% 12.60% -0.02% 
Commercial serv. 18.60% 18.80% 15.20% 16.20% 0.11% 
Other services 9.30% 14.00% 5.40% 6.90% 0.10% 
Source: Own estimations using the WorldScan model. 
 
This pattern of sectoral VAT increases is reflected by changes in sectoral output. In the 
last column of Table 28, we present the medium-term changes in the sectoral shares of 
total output between the baseline and scenario A in the EU-27 average (Table 30 
contains sectoral output share changes by Member state).101 We observe that those 
sectors for which VAT rates increase the most are those sectors that experience 
decreases in relative terms. The exception is the sector other services (OSR), which 
increases its relative production share even though VAT taxes for this sector rise. This 
is caused by the general equilibrium effects of the tax shock: the reduction of 
production in one sector releases production factors that are then used by other sectors, 
in accordance with the changes in relative prices and ultimately in sector profitability 
(i.e. the interaction of relative changes in input costs and final prices). For instance, the 
decrease in the relative output of the low tech manufacturing sector (LTM; mainly 
                                                     
100 Due to the dimensions of the data (27 countries and 9 sectors) we only present simple EU-27 averages 
in Table 28. Moreover, we also show sectoral output share changes by Member State for scenarios A to 
D. Additional Country/sector specific results for each scenario are available in the scenario specific 
spreadsheet annex (sheet “All”). 
101 Note that these changes in output shares are percentage point differences in production composition and 
all changes must sum up to zero, i.e. the changes must exactly compensate each other. 
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caused by changes in the production of processed food) frees resources, and therefore 
output increases in other sectors as those resources are re-employed, in this case by 
services sectors (OCS and OSR). However, these changes in production composition 
remain relatively small (less than a quarter of a percentage point decrease for LTM, for 
instance). 
 
The changes in the main economic indicators for scenario A are presented in Table 29. 
First, we analyse the EU-27 as a whole and we observe that following the abolition of 
zero and reduced rates, overall macroeconomic indicators experience relatively small 
changes. For instance, GDP decreases by around a third of a percentage point.
102
 These 
changes in GDP are in line with reductions in consumption, which we would expect 
following an increase in a consumption tax. Following the GDP decrease, employment 
decreases slightly with low-skill workers losing more jobs than high-skill workers. 
Unemployment rates (see the spreadsheets) remain unchanged, while changes in labour 
demand are also reflected in a small increase in wage inequality (low-skill wages 
decline relative to high-skill wages). Finally, we observe that the abolition of zero and 
reduced rates also reduces international trade. The changes in relative prices triggered 
by the new VAT rates, which initially change the composition of sectoral production, 
are also responsible for changes in trade flows.  
 
These overall changes in the EU-27 are broadly reflected by the changes for each 
individual Member State, with some exceptions. GDP decreases for most countries, 
with the exception of Cyprus and Latvia. Consumption decreases for all countries 
except for Latvia. Trade volumes also decline for all countries but Hungary. Finally, 
employment decreases in all countries. 
 
In general, economic activity declines due to the tax increase associated with the 
abolition of zero and reduced rates. On the other hand, the very few exceptions can be 
explained by general equilibrium adjustments where initial decreases in consumption 
and GDP can be later reversed by the changes in output composition and increases in 
trade volumes within the EU-27 and with its main partners. We would expect that a 
more uniform VAT would induce a more efficient allocation of resources towards 
productive sectors, but the changes in relative prices can also create export 
                                                     
102 Since the population data remain unchanged in both the baseline and the reform scenario, percentage 
changes in GDP and GDP per capita are equivalent. The same applies to consumption and consumption 
per capita. 
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opportunities as well as more import competition for particular sectors.103 However, 
note that in this scenario we are not taking into account potential 
administrative/compliance efficiency gains that are expected from the introduction of a 
uniform VAT rate on all taxed supplies. These administrative efficiency gains will be 
analysed in scenario C.  
 
To sum up, the abolition of zero and reduced VAT rates in each Member State should 
induce a less distorted sectoral resource allocation. At the same time, however, the 
overall tax revenues increase, and this results in less economic activity. Thus, it is 
interesting to analyse what happens in scenario B when zero and reduced rates are 
abolished but in addition the standard rate is lowered such that tax revenues remain 
constant.  
 
                                                     
103 For example, the country-specific increases in the different sector-specific VAT rates can result (as part 
of the general equilibrium mechanism) in different relative price changes for a particular sector in two 
different member countries. This price change will in turn make it more attractive for the country with the 
lower relative price to export to the country with the higher relative price in that particular sector. 
Therefore, differences in relative prices between countries can result in changes in trade flows. 
114 
Study on VAT rates structure 
Table 29: Scenario A – percentage changes in main economic indicators, relative changes 
with respect to baseline values in 2020 
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BE -0.62 -0.95 -0.90 -0.65 -0.71 -0.90 -0.48 -0.23 
BG -0.02 -0.06 -0.26 -0.30 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 
CZ -0.14 -0.56 -0.35 -0.25 -0.38 -0.48 -0.21 -0.42 
DK -0.07 -0.13 -0.27 -0.38 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 
DE -0.27 -0.49 -0.59 -0.46 -0.42 -0.61 -0.17 -0.32 
EE -0.07 -0.16 -0.23 -0.27 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 
EL -0.38 -0.70 -1.00 -0.36 -0.48 -0.60 -0.24 -0.75 
ES -0.32 -0.91 -0.78 -0.36 -0.54 -0.66 -0.30 -0.21 
FR -0.60 -0.91 -0.96 -0.58 -0.72 -0.96 -0.38 -0.23 
IE -0.26 -1.10 -0.26 -0.19 -0.68 -0.80 -0.51 -0.59 
IT -0.14 -0.43 -0.67 -0.49 -0.28 -0.37 -0.15 -0.39 
CY 0.01 -0.27 -0.33 -0.34 -0.20 -0.28 -0.04 -0.58 
LV 0.29 0.00 -0.57 -0.31 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 -0.35 
LT -0.24 -0.34 -0.26 -0.27 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.07 
LU -0.50 -0.87 -0.26 -0.15 -0.62 -0.74 -0.48 -0.22 
HU -0.40 -0.69 0.10 0.07 -0.45 -0.48 -0.41 0.17 
MT -0.32 -0.63 -0.63 -0.52 -0.64 -0.89 -0.29 -1.13 
NL -0.24 -0.53 -0.82 -0.71 -0.42 -0.56 -0.27 -0.55 
AT -0.40 -0.98 -0.35 -0.13 -0.63 -0.69 -0.52 -0.32 
PL -0.54 -1.08 -1.20 -0.58 -0.81 -1.11 -0.29 -0.79 
PT -1.09 -1.64 -2.15 -0.94 -0.91 -1.10 -0.47 -0.69 
RO -0.07 -0.26 -0.20 -0.28 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.05 
SI -0.32 -0.79 -0.76 -0.48 -0.30 -0.37 -0.17 -0.44 
SK -0.04 -0.13 -0.01 -0.10 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 
FI -0.54 -0.86 -0.47 -0.23 -0.64 -0.74 -0.50 -0.27 
SE -0.33 -0.54 -0.55 -0.38 -0.42 -0.54 -0.28 -0.48 
UK -0.54 -0.89 -0.94 -0.43 -0.57 -0.75 -0.32 -0.49 
  
        
EU-27 -0.37 -0.71 -0.69 -0.45 -0.49 -0.65 -0.26 -0.36 
Source: Own estimations using the WorldScan model.  
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Table 30: Scenario A – percentage changes in sectoral output share, relative changes with 
respect to the baseline values in 2020 
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BE -0.03 0.01 -0.12 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 
BG -0.04 0.01 -0.26 -0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.15 0.09 
CZ 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
DK -0.24 0.02 -0.15 0.01 0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.13 0.15 
DE -0.07 0.02 -0.24 0.02 0.09 0.02 -0.01 0.12 0.04 
EE -0.03 0.00 -0.08 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 
EL -0.03 0.00 -0.24 0.00 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.17 
ES -0.02 0.00 -0.12 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 
FR -0.04 0.02 -0.24 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.14 0.00 
IE -0.07 -0.01 -0.27 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.17 0.12 
IT -0.12 0.00 -0.32 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.23 0.23 
CY -0.03 0.00 -0.08 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.15 
LV -0.10 -0.01 -0.23 0.01 0.21 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.07 
LT -0.07 -0.01 -0.30 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.24 0.09 
LU -0.05 -0.02 -0.18 0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.16 
HU -0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.00 
MT -0.08 0.00 -0.15 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.00 
NL -0.29 -0.07 -0.23 0.00 -0.04 0.33 -0.04 0.01 0.33 
AT -0.06 0.02 -0.25 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.21 
PL -0.12 0.03 -0.50 0.03 0.13 0.01 -0.01 0.21 0.21 
PT -0.13 -0.01 -0.53 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.30 0.37 
RO -0.01 0.01 -0.13 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.06 
SI -0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
SK -0.03 0.00 -0.33 0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.12 0.17 
FI -0.08 0.01 -0.27 0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.23 0.03 
SE -0.04 0.01 -0.25 0.01 0.09 0.00 -0.09 0.10 0.17 
UK -0.04 0.00 -0.32 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.16 0.20 
                    
EU-27 -0.07 0.00 -0.22 0.01 0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.10 
 Source: Own estimations using the WorldScan model.  
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Scenario B 
To simulate scenario B in WorldScan we first need to change the core model to 
introduce a standard VAT rate on all taxed supplies that is endogenous while total tax 
revenues are fixed at the baseline levels. However, we still have different sector-
specific VAT rates, which reflect deviations from the standard rate due to the sub-
sectors that are VAT exempted. In particular, we use the deviation of each sectoral 
VAT rate from the standard rate in scenario A as a measure of these sectoral deviations 
in scenario B. Previously, the VAT rate was exogenous and total tax revenues were 
endogenously determined by changes not only in the VAT rates, but also by changes in 
economic activity.104 
 
Table 31 compares the estimated new revenue-neutral standard VAT rates with the 
actual standard rates and the new standard rates as estimated in scenario 2 (chapter 2). 
As expected, the revenue-neutral rates estimated by WorldScan are lower than the 
actual standard rates. The extent of the reduction is related to the initial distribution of 
VAT rates across country-specific sectors (i.e. countries with effective VAT rates more 
distant from the actual standard rate can afford to have lower revenue-neutral standard 
rates when zero and reduced rates are abolished) and the general equilibrium effects 
that adjust the final VAT rates to incorporate changes in economic activity. 
                                                     
104 Note that our endogenously estimated VAT rate assures that total tax revenue is equal to the baseline 
value and not only VAT revenues. 
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Table 31: Comparison of standard VAT rates (as of 2011), revenue neutral standard rates 
as obtained in scenario 2 and revenue neutral standard rates as obtained in scenario B 
Country 
Actual standard 
VAT rate 
Scenario 2 
revenue-neutral 
VAT rate 
Scenario B 
revenue-neutral 
VAT rate 
BE 21.0% 16.9% 17.8% 
BG 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 
CZ 20.0% 17.5% 16.5% 
DK 25.0% 24.7% 24.8% 
DE 19.0% 16.8% 17.2% 
EE 20.0% 19.4% 19.7% 
EL 23.0% 18.9% 14.5% 
ES 18.0% 12.6% 15.0% 
FR 19.6% 16.1% 16.9% 
IE 21.0% 15.2% 16.6% 
IT 20.3% 15.1% 18.2% 
CY 15.0% 12.1% 12.0% 
LV 22.0% 20.7% 18.9% 
LT 21.0% 20.6% 20.4% 
LU 15.0% 12.5% 11.2% 
HU 25.0% 22.1% 22.9% 
MT 18.0% 13.5% 14.2% 
NL 19.0% 16.1% 16.7% 
AT 20.0% 16.8% 15.9% 
PL 23.0% 17.0% 17.4% 
PT 23.0% 17.2% 17.3% 
RO 24.0% 22.9% 23.0% 
SI 20.0% 16.3% 16.5% 
SK 20.0% 19.8% 19.8% 
FI 23.0% 20.2% 19.5% 
SE 25.0% 21.6% 22.4% 
UK 20.0% 16.3% 15.8% 
  
   
EU-27 20.70% 17.7% 17.8% 
Source: WIOD, EUROSTAT, IBFD, European Commission, Own Submissions and own calculations, own 
estimations using the WorldScan model.  
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The revenue-neutral rates estimated using WorldScan are in general comparable to 
those estimated for the static analysis (section 2.2). The differences can be explained by 
the fact that WorldScan estimates VAT rates that make all tax revenues equivalent to 
the baseline values and not only the VAT revenues. In addition, WorldScan takes into 
account the general equilibrium effects of changes in economic activity that affect the 
revenues of other taxes plus those of the VAT revenues itself. These effects include 
changes in overall consumption and production, sector-specific consumption, changes 
in trade flows between Member States and other trading partners. All the changes in 
these variables affect tax revenues in different ways. The different level of aggregation 
used in their estimation can explain additional differences between both rates. 
 
Using these revenue-neutral VAT rates we find that the changes in sectoral production 
composition are very similar to those from scenario A (see Table 32, Table 34 contains 
output share changes disaggregated by Member State). The main difference is that the 
reduction in the production share of the low-tech manufacturing sector is less 
pronounced than in scenario A (-0.15% instead of -0.22%) and the service sectors 
develop somewhat differently. The share of commercial services expands by 0.15% 
(instead of 0.11% in scenario A), at the expense of a decrease in the share of other 
services by -0.08% (in scenario A, this sector increased by 0.05). This relative decrease 
in the service sectors reflects a more efficient resource allocation caused by the 
abolition of zero and reduced rates, accompanied by a simultaneous reduction in the 
standard rate. This more efficient resource allocation changes the relative importance of 
the various sectors. 
 
The changes in the main economic indicators for scenario B are presented in Table 33. 
For the EU-27 as a whole we see that the new revenue-neutral standard VAT rates still 
reduce consumption, but to a much lesser extent than in scenario A. GDP remains 
unchanged, while we saw a small decrease in scenario A. The main difference between 
both scenarios, however, is that with the new standard VAT rates employment 
increases, and now employment gains are larger for low-skilled than for high-skilled 
workers. This relatively large increase in demand for low-skilled labour is also reflected 
in a reduction in wage inequality, as the wages of low skilled workers increase relative 
to high skilled workers. Unemployment is again unchanged (see the spreadsheets). 
Finally, export volumes expand while imports decrease.  
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Table 32: Sectoral output share for each scenario for the EU-27 as a whole, percentage 
changes with respect to the baseline 
Sector 
Scenario 
A 
Scenario 
B 
Scenario 
C 
Scenario 
D 
Scenario 
E 
Agric. & mining -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.16 -0.07 
Energy 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.02 
Low tech. manuf. -0.22 -0.15 -0.15 -0.34 -0.22 
Medium-low tech. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 
Medium-high tech. 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.28 0.07 
High tech. manuf. 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.51 0.03 
Transport -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.15 -0.01 
Commercial serv. 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.11 
Other services 0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.36 0.05 
Source: Own estimations using the WorldScan model. 
 
With respect to the country-specific results, we observe that changes in economic 
activity are more heterogeneous now than in scenario A. Very few countries experience 
the same macroeconomic changes following the VAT reform as we observe in the EU-
27 as a whole. For some countries there are increases in GDP and consumption, while 
others experience the opposite effects.  
 
Even though the expected allocation efficiencies from a revenue neutral abolition of 
zero and reduced VAT rates are not realized, overall EU-27 macroeconomic values 
remain basically unchanged. This result reflects general equilibrium effects associated 
with the changes in relative prices, not only internally but also with respect to each 
country’s main trading partners (most of which are within the EU-27). Although the 
VAT rate changes from scenario B harmonise sectoral VAT rates within EU Member 
States, there are still big differences between Member States, from a new standard VAT 
rate of almost 25 % in Denmark to 11 % in Luxembourg (see Table 31). For instance, a 
country that initially experiences an increase in GDP due to the efficiency gains of a 
uniform VAT system can in later rounds experience a reduction of sectoral output due 
to an increase in import competition from diverging international sectoral prices within 
the EU-27. Since the sectoral output and overall GDP changes are almost zero, the 
results can be driven by changes in production in a few or one single sector. 
 
For example, Spain experiences a reduction in the relative producer prices with respect 
to EU-27 producer prices for almost all sectors (results in attached spread sheet files). 
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Thus, the overall changes in relative prices associated with the general equilibrium 
effects provide them with an international comparative advantage and this is reflected 
by an increase in exports of 0.2 %, which in turn spurs GDP that increases by 0.13 %. 
Moreover, the changes in relative prices that affect trade are also reflected by the 
changes in the sectoral production and consumption structure. In the case of Spain, 
decreases in the relative price of agriculture and other services are directly reflected by 
a decrease in the production share of those sectors. On the contrary, France experiences 
an increase in relative producer prices with respect to EU-27 prices and this yields an 
export decrease of 0.15 % and a GDP fall by 0.17 %. At the sectoral level this is 
translated into different export and import changes between sectors. For instance, 
France is exporting relatively more agriculture and low-tech manufactures, and less 
medium-, medium-high- and high-tech manufactures.  
 
Therefore, the potential gains from an internally less distorted resource allocation 
following the introduction of a uniform VAT system within each Member State can be 
offset by the effect of an internationally (or within-EU) inefficient allocation due to the 
still divergent VAT rates between countries.105 Since the VAT rates in all sectors are 
changing in scenario B (first by imposing a standard rate for those sectors that 
previously had zero or reduced rates, and second, by changing the standard rate to make 
the VAT reform revenue-neutral), the changes in relative prices in scenario B are larger 
than those in scenario A (where the VAT rates did not necessarily change in sectors that 
were not directly affected by zero or reduced rates). Nevertheless, as expected, the 
results from scenario B are more favourable than those from scenario A. 
 
                                                     
105 For instance, a previous study to TAXUD (IFS et al., 2011), using WorldScan, found sizeable and 
positive GDP gains when VAT rates between EU Member States were harmonized. Divergent VAT rates 
between Member States result in significant distortions in relative input and production prices that affect 
the competitiveness between firms in different EU countries since there are no internal frontiers within 
the single European market. In addition, divergent VAT rates also result in higher compliance and 
administrative costs for firms that operate in more than one EU country. 
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Table 33: Scenario B – percentage changes in main economic indicators, relative changes 
in 2020 with respect to baseline values  
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BE 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.18 
BG -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
CZ 0.12 0.07 0.31 0.23 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.32 
DK -0.06 -0.05 -0.12 -0.11 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 
DE -0.02 -0.01 -0.12 -0.08 -0.06 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 
EE 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 
EL 0.27 -0.19 2.56 0.40 0.73 1.02 0.12 2.67 
ES 0.13 0.09 0.20 -0.01 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.34 
FR -0.17 -0.18 -0.15 -0.12 -0.14 -0.17 -0.10 0.14 
IE -0.04 -0.09 0.08 0.09 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.11 
IT 0.09 0.06 -0.12 -0.27 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.18 
CY 0.36 0.33 0.59 0.47 0.18 0.22 0.09 0.56 
LV 1.02 0.98 0.76 0.26 0.34 0.42 0.19 0.54 
LT -0.16 -0.16 0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 0.08 
LU 0.20 0.11 0.72 0.55 0.14 0.21 0.05 0.42 
HU -0.18 -0.28 0.41 0.32 -0.10 -0.06 -0.17 0.46 
MT 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 0.02 -0.02 
NL -0.03 -0.03 -0.26 -0.24 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 
AT 0.07 0.06 0.40 0.26 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.41 
PL 0.06 -0.02 0.22 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.40 
PT 0.36 0.34 0.22 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.35 
RO 0.05 0.02 0.18 0.04 0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.35 
SI 0.24 0.18 0.57 0.37 0.16 0.19 0.12 0.35 
SK -0.03 -0.03 0.14 0.16 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 
FI -0.02 -0.02 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.17 
SE 0.07 0.10 -0.10 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.06 
UK -0.04 -0.07 0.11 -0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.28 
  
        
EU-27 0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.19 
Source:  Own estimations using the WorldScan model. 
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Table 34: Scenario B – percentage changes in sectoral output share, relative changes with 
respect to the baseline values in 2020 
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BE -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.06 -0.17 
BG -0.04 0.02 -0.18 0.02 0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.21 -0.10 
CZ 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
DK -0.18 0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.24 -0.20 
DE -0.05 0.01 -0.15 0.03 0.11 0.01 -0.02 0.15 -0.08 
EE -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 
EL -0.03 0.00 -0.19 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.03 
ES -0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.01 
FR -0.04 0.02 -0.18 0.04 0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.21 -0.12 
IE -0.06 0.00 -0.20 0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.23 -0.05 
IT 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.19 0.40 -0.98 
CY -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.09 -0.19 
LV -0.08 0.00 -0.16 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.16 -0.03 
LT -0.05 0.00 -0.24 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.29 -0.05 
LU 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.01 -0.03 0.16 -0.33 
HU 0.00 0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 
MT -0.06 0.00 -0.08 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.29 -0.25 
NL -0.24 -0.04 -0.13 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.20 0.03 
AT -0.05 0.01 -0.18 0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.15 0.02 
PL -0.10 0.02 -0.35 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.29 -0.09 
PT -0.10 0.01 -0.32 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.38 -0.16 
RO 0.01 0.03 -0.09 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.14 
SI -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
SK -0.02 0.00 -0.13 0.04 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.15 -0.17 
FI -0.06 0.01 -0.16 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.26 -0.15 
SE -0.04 0.01 -0.19 0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.07 0.17 0.06 
UK -0.04 0.00 -0.20 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.28 -0.14 
                    
EU-27 -0.06 0.01 -0.15 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.15 -0.08 
Source:  Own estimations using the WorldScan model. 
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Scenario C 
It is expected that the introduction of a uniform VAT system in each Member State 
without zero and reduced rates would simplify the administrative procedures associated 
with both VAT payments by firms and collection by tax authorities. These potential 
administrative efficiencies are different from the allocation efficiencies associated with 
the VAT reforms. In this scenario we simulate the macroeconomic effects of taking into 
account these administrative efficiency gains associated with a uniform VAT system. 
 
To implement the reduction of administrative costs in WorldScan, we rely on Kox 
(2005) and Djankov et al. (2002) to assess the impact of reducing the administrative 
burden on firms. Kox (2005) combined detailed information on the administrative 
burden of government regulations for the Netherlands with data from Djankov et al. 
(2002) on inter-country differences in firm start-up costs. This approach provided a 
meaningful international comparison to obtain estimates of the administrative burden 
per country. Furthermore, this approach assumes that wages for workers that firms need 
to hire to comply with government regulations and to provide the government with 
information make up a large part of the administrative costs for firms. Reducing the 
administrative burden implies that some of these workers can contribute directly to 
production. The reduction therefore takes the form of an increase in labour efficiency: 
fewer workers are needed, while production is not directly affected.  
 
These administrative costs can be sizeable. For the Netherlands in 2002, the 
administrative burden was equivalent to 3.7 % of GDP.106 According to 2002 data for 
the Dutch labour income share, reducing this administrative burden by 25 % amounts to 
a labour-efficiency increase of 1.6 %. The administrative Dutch data also show that the 
burden associated with VAT compliance represented 9 % of the total administrative 
burden – i.e. around 0.33 % of GDP. The equivalent labour-efficiency increases for all 
EU Member States can be found in Kox (2005).107  
 
For scenario C we begin with the VAT changes from scenario B and then assume that 
the abolition of zero and reduced rates will reduce the administrative burden associated 
with VAT compliance by 20%.108 This leads to a labour productivity increase of around 
                                                     
106 The equivalent figures for the EU estimated by Kox (2005) vary from 1.5 % in Finland, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, to 6.8 % in Greece and Hungary. 
107 For the EU, the 25% reduction is associated with a 1.5% labour productivity increase, with country-
specific effects ranging from 0.9% for the United Kingdom to 2.3% for Hungary. 
108 It is difficult to estimate the exact administrative efficiency gains of the proposed VAT reform. We use 
the 20 % value as an indicator of the potential gains of abolishing zero and reduced rates. However, we 
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0.12 % for the EU, where the country-specific values are those estimated by Kox 
(2005).  
 
In Table 35 we present the results for scenario C. We find that GDP in the EU increases 
slightly, as do consumption, trade and employment. High-skill employment remains 
unchanged while the wage gap between low and high-skill workers decreases. These 
EU-wide results are mostly mirrored by individual Member States, with the exception 
of France and Hungary. These countries experience GDP decreases, but these are 
smaller than those associated with scenario B. The relative sectoral production share 
changes are very similar to those from scenario B (see Table 32, sectoral production 
share changes disaggregated by Member State are presented in Table 36). 
 
In summary, including potential administrative efficiencies related to a simplified VAT 
structure produces small but positive GDP and employment increases in the EU. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
regard this 20 % decrease as an upper bound value, since the overall administration of the VAT system 
remains largely unchanged (e.g. the administrative costs associated with exempted sectors remain in 
place). As a sensitivity test, we also ran the scenario with a 10 % decrease, and the resulting changes in 
GDP are roughly half of those resulting from a 20 % decrease.  
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Table 35: Scenario C – percentage changes in main economic indicators, relative changes 
in 2020 with respect to baseline values  
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BE 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.20 
BG 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.06 
CZ 0.22 0.17 0.42 0.32 0.14 0.17 0.10 0.36 
DK 0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 
DE 0.09 0.11 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.03 
EE 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.07 
EL 0.40 -0.08 2.69 0.46 0.75 1.05 0.13 2.71 
ES 0.26 0.22 0.33 0.07 0.14 0.18 0.06 0.37 
FR -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.12 -0.08 0.16 
IE 0.04 0.01 0.14 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.14 
IT 0.19 0.16 -0.02 -0.20 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.21 
CY 0.48 0.45 0.70 0.55 0.20 0.25 0.10 0.62 
LV 1.19 1.13 0.92 0.36 0.37 0.45 0.21 0.57 
LT 0.00 -0.02 0.18 0.14 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.12 
LU 0.30 0.20 0.82 0.64 0.16 0.24 0.06 0.45 
HU -0.03 -0.13 0.55 0.43 -0.06 -0.01 -0.15 0.51 
MT 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.02 
NL 0.07 0.07 -0.17 -0.17 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
AT 0.21 0.19 0.53 0.37 0.11 0.16 0.02 0.45 
PL 0.19 0.10 0.35 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.43 
PT 0.52 0.49 0.39 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.38 
RO 0.19 0.15 0.33 0.13 0.07 0.10 -0.01 0.40 
SI 0.38 0.31 0.70 0.48 0.19 0.22 0.14 0.37 
SK 0.11 0.10 0.28 0.27 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.07 
FI 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.20 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.19 
SE 0.14 0.18 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.04 
UK 0.03 -0.01 0.18 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.29 
                  
EU-27 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.21 
Source: Own estimations using the WorldScan model. 
 
126 
Study on VAT rates structure 
Table 36: Scenario C – percentage changes in sectoral output share, relative changes with 
respect to the baseline values in 2020 
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BE -0.04 0.01 -0.26 -0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.15 0.09 
BG 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
CZ -0.07 0.02 -0.24 0.02 0.09 0.02 -0.01 0.12 0.04 
DK -0.03 0.00 -0.08 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 
DE -0.03 0.00 -0.24 0.00 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.17 
EE -0.02 0.00 -0.12 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 
EL -0.12 0.00 -0.32 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.23 0.23 
ES -0.08 0.01 -0.27 0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.23 0.03 
FR -0.07 -0.01 -0.27 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.17 0.12 
IE -0.10 -0.01 -0.23 0.01 0.21 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.07 
IT -0.07 -0.01 -0.30 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.24 0.09 
CY -0.24 0.02 -0.15 0.01 0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.13 0.15 
LV -0.05 -0.02 -0.18 0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.16 
LT -0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.00 
LU -0.08 0.00 -0.15 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.00 
HU -0.03 0.00 -0.08 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.15 
MT -0.29 -0.07 -0.23 0.00 -0.04 0.33 -0.04 0.01 0.33 
NL -0.06 0.02 -0.25 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.21 
AT -0.03 0.01 -0.12 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 
PL -0.12 0.03 -0.50 0.03 0.13 0.01 -0.01 0.21 0.21 
PT -0.13 -0.01 -0.53 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.30 0.37 
RO -0.01 0.01 -0.13 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.06 
SI -0.03 0.00 -0.33 0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.12 0.17 
SK -0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
FI -0.04 0.02 -0.24 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.14 0.00 
SE -0.04 0.01 -0.25 0.01 0.09 0.00 -0.09 0.10 0.17 
UK -0.04 0.00 -0.32 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.16 0.20 
                    
EU-27 -0.06 0.01 -0.15 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.15 -0.08 
Source: Own estimations using the WorldScan model. 
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Scenario D 
An alternative policy option is to do a tax replacement exercise, where the increase in 
VAT revenue is exactly offset by a decrease in capital-investment tax revenues.109 In 
scenario D we abolish zero and reduced VAT rates (as in scenario A) and keep the tax 
revenues constant (as in scenario B). However, instead of endogenously calculating a 
new revenue-neutral standard VAT rate in WorldScan, in scenario D we maintain the 
standard VAT rates from scenario A, but endogenously decrease the capital-investment 
tax rate such that the total tax revenues are equal to the baseline values.  
 
In Table 37 we present the macroeconomic results for scenario D. For the EU-27 as a 
whole we find that GDP increases by half a percentage point. This significant increase 
is the result of a more efficient allocation of resources associated with the replacement 
of a distorting tax (capital investment tax) with a less distorting one (VAT). On the 
other hand, consumption and employment now decrease. We would expect this result, 
given that a reduction in the capital investment tax incentives more savings and 
investment, which in a general equilibrium setting need to be compensated by less 
consumption. Making capital more attractive increases the amount of capital per worker 
and decreases the demand for labour. The demand decreases more for low-skill labour, 
which tends to be a substitute for capital in many sectors. 
The changes in the sectoral production shares are very different from the previous 
scenarios (see Table 32 and Table 38). This is what we would expect, given that the 
general equilibrium effects associated with the changing investment and production 
decisions following the reduction in the capital investment tax entails a series of 
additional adjustments in the model. Therefore, besides the changes in the VAT sector-
specific rates, in this scenario we also have that the relative price of capital is 
decreasing after the reduction in the capital investment tax. This second round of effects 
is what makes the sectoral changes in this scenario different from previous scenarios. 
For instance, for the EU27 in Table 38 we observe an expansion in the medium-high 
and high-tech manufacturing sectors, both of which are capital intensive and thus, 
benefit more from the decrease in the relative price of capital. The relative increase in 
these capital-intensive sectors draws resources away from other sectors and this creates 
a general equilibrium effect where other sectors most reduce their relative production 
                                                     
109 In WorldScan there are no corporate taxes as such. The profits of a representative firm in each sector are 
equal to the fixed costs of production associated with a monopolistic competition modelling framework. 
However, the tax on capital investments in WorldScan can be interpreted as an alternative to corporate 
taxes. Note that the capital-investment tax affects the flow and not the stock of capital. 
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(e.g. low-tech manufactures, and government and other services) to accommodate the 
expansion of the capital intensive sectors. 
Although labour productivity increases with the amount of capital per worker --which 
in turn creates pressure for higher wages and more consumption-- this effect is 
dominated by the increased attractiveness of saving/investment as compared to 
consumption in this scenario. Thus it becomes relatively more attractive to save than to 
consume. 
With some exceptions, individual Member States also experience a GDP increase 
together with consumption and employment decreases. The general equilibrium 
mechanisms in scenario D are more complex than in previous scenarios where the VAT 
changes were strongly associated with final goods prices. The change in the capital 
investment tax, however, also generates a direct effect on factor prices, namely: capital 
costs and wages, which has an impact on the production structure for each Member 
State, but also generates incentives for capital movements between Member States. 
 
These results are in line with the main findings from Boeters et al. (2010). Using a CGE 
model for Germany they also find that the overall economic effects of a pure VAT 
reform is relatively small, while the introduction of a standard VAT rate in conjunction 
with a budget-neutral tax replacement can generate substantial positive economic 
effects. 
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Table 37: Scenario D – percentage changes in main economic indicators, relative changes 
in 2020 with respect to baseline values  
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BE -0.32 -1.95 0.86 1.12 -0.73 -0.88 -0.55 0.11 
BG 0.20 0.09 0.23 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.01 
CZ 1.84 -1.53 1.67 2.10 -0.37 -0.51 -0.15 -0.43 
DK 0.17 -0.06 0.38 0.32 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 
DE 0.57 -0.88 0.58 1.14 -0.37 -0.54 -0.14 -0.27 
EE 0.20 -0.18 0.28 0.20 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 
EL 0.26 -1.43 0.40 0.66 -0.51 -0.58 -0.37 -0.25 
ES 0.42 -1.82 0.55 1.02 -0.49 -0.58 -0.31 0.05 
FR 0.30 -1.58 0.24 1.07 -0.66 -0.87 -0.36 -0.12 
IE 1.45 -2.07 1.63 2.25 -0.63 -0.73 -0.47 -0.39 
IT 0.37 -1.05 0.68 0.73 -0.31 -0.36 -0.22 -0.01 
CY 1.36 -0.87 1.44 1.48 -0.16 -0.18 -0.12 0.09 
LV 0.66 -0.98 1.37 0.98 -0.15 -0.13 -0.21 0.46 
LT -0.01 -0.40 0.52 0.36 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 0.01 
LU -0.04 -2.22 1.76 1.84 -0.64 -0.70 -0.55 0.12 
HU 0.44 -1.25 1.75 1.86 -0.40 -0.45 -0.32 0.10 
MT 2.08 -1.90 2.44 2.72 -0.68 -0.91 -0.34 -0.56 
NL 0.87 -1.12 0.45 0.85 -0.37 -0.49 -0.26 -0.34 
AT 0.86 -2.17 1.39 1.79 -0.59 -0.65 -0.50 -0.18 
PL 1.80 -2.95 1.48 2.61 -1.06 -1.40 -0.46 -0.27 
PT -0.05 -3.33 0.29 1.51 -0.98 -1.10 -0.70 0.11 
RO 0.30 -0.50 0.81 0.53 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 0.20 
SI 0.58 -1.98 1.12 1.38 -0.37 -0.42 -0.29 0.03 
SK 0.24 -0.04 1.01 0.93 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
FI -0.69 -2.07 -1.49 -0.03 -0.64 -0.68 -0.58 0.04 
SE 0.53 -1.02 0.87 1.63 -0.38 -0.55 -0.18 -0.59 
UK 1.04 -1.89 0.92 2.00 -0.51 -0.67 -0.28 -0.34 
                  
EU-27 0.56 -1.45 0.72 1.28 -0.48 -0.62 -0.27 -0.15 
Source: Own estimations using the WorldScan model. 
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Table 38: Scenario D – percentage changes in sectoral output share, relative changes with 
respect to the baseline values in 2020 
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BE -0.03 0.01 -0.15 0.12 0.27 0.03 -0.04 0.24 -0.45 
BG -0.03 0.03 -0.27 0.05 0.31 0.02 0.00 0.35 -0.45 
CZ 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
DK -0.28 0.02 -0.17 0.04 0.33 0.06 -0.07 0.55 -0.46 
DE -0.09 -0.02 -0.34 0.09 0.33 0.09 -0.11 0.30 -0.24 
EE -0.04 0.00 -0.12 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.03 
EL -0.04 -0.01 -0.27 0.03 0.15 0.05 -0.02 0.22 -0.12 
ES -0.03 -0.01 -0.21 0.04 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.06 -0.02 
FR 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.19 -0.09 -0.63 0.00 0.63 -0.27 
IE -0.08 -0.01 -0.30 0.05 0.15 0.03 -0.04 0.47 -0.26 
IT -0.12 -0.01 -0.35 0.05 0.11 0.03 -0.05 0.50 -0.16 
CY -0.07 -0.02 -0.19 0.03 0.29 0.18 -0.02 0.09 -0.29 
LV -0.13 -0.03 -0.35 0.02 0.52 0.20 -0.05 0.08 -0.27 
LT -0.08 -0.01 -0.36 0.10 0.18 0.03 -0.01 0.38 -0.23 
LU -0.04 0.02 -0.08 0.13 0.23 0.06 -0.05 0.27 -0.55 
HU -0.02 0.01 -0.12 0.03 0.12 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.08 
MT -0.09 0.01 -0.17 0.06 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.55 -0.61 
NL -0.36 -0.09 -0.29 0.03 0.13 0.91 -0.10 0.09 -0.32 
AT -0.07 0.01 -0.26 0.04 0.22 0.02 -0.04 0.25 -0.17 
PL -0.18 -0.03 -0.64 0.13 0.61 0.06 -0.07 0.49 -0.36 
PT -0.13 0.00 -0.61 0.08 0.26 0.05 -0.03 0.92 -0.54 
RO -0.05 0.01 -0.19 0.06 0.24 0.02 -0.01 0.10 -0.20 
SI -0.03 -0.02 -0.18 0.03 0.18 0.10 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
SK -0.03 -0.01 -0.33 0.15 0.21 0.06 -0.02 0.33 -0.37 
FI -0.09 0.00 -0.31 0.07 0.17 0.02 -0.02 0.49 -0.32 
SE -0.03 0.03 -0.27 0.06 0.21 0.04 -0.12 0.28 -0.20 
UK -0.03 0.00 -0.30 0.06 0.20 0.07 -0.04 0.52 -0.47 
                    
EU-27 -0.16 -0.05 -0.34 0.05 0.28 0.51 -0.15 0.23 -0.36 
Source: Own estimations using the WorldScan model. 
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Scenario E110 
Finally, for scenario E we simulate a government policy where the increase in VAT tax 
revenue from scenario A is redistributed back to low-skilled worker households (both 
employed and unemployed).111   
  
It is important to recall that in WorldScan all additional tax revenues – besides 
unemployment benefits – are implicitly transferred back to households. For 
unemployed households, the model specifies a payment of unemployment benefits and 
in the simulation of scenario A, these unemployment benefits are adjusted sufficiently 
to compensate for the VAT rate increases.112 Therefore, in scenario E, the higher VAT 
revenues associated with the abolition of zero and reduced rates are used to pay for the 
price-indexed unemployment benefits, with the remainder being transferred to low-
skilled households. Therefore, the real value of transfers to other households (high-skill 
employed and unemployed households and the residual household) and government 
consumption is lower in scenario E than in scenario A. 
 
However, the results of scenario E are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to 
those of scenario A. There is an overall small decrease in GDP, consumption and 
employment. The main difference is that the real income of both low-skill households 
increases, at the expense of the high-skill and residual households. This suggests a 
decrease in overall income inequality. However, since the residual household in the 
model includes both high-income households (who receive capital rents and pension 
transfers) and low-income households (who receive welfare and social security 
transfers), it is not clear that all low-income households will benefit in this particular 
scenario. Thus the actual inequality outcome is uncertain.113  
 
Moreover, the aggregated consumption structure of scenario E does not differ from the 
consumption structure in scenario A, even though the model accounts for non-
                                                     
110 The results can be found in the annexed spread sheets. 
111 It is important to note that this scenario is conceptually different from a pure income distribution 
analysis, since in WorldScan, households are not divided into income groups. Recall that such a 
distributional analysis was performed in Scenario 3 in the previous section. 
112 This applies to both unemployment benefits present in the model: the “basic income” and the “wage-
indexed benefits” payments. In other words, the real value of social benefits is automatically kept 
constant in the model. Moreover, we do not change these unemployment benefits in scenario E because 
this can generate additional effects on the household decision to work or not, which are not relevant to the 
VAT reform. 
113 The particular household classification of this version of WorldScan was chosen to model the 
endogenous decision of households to supply labour, but not to directly assess distributional issues. 
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homotheticity (i.e. that the consumption structure changes when income changes). The 
actual income changes that occur in scenario E are too small to significantly affect the 
aggregated sectoral consumption shares. 
 
To sum up, Table 39 summarizes the main macroeconomic outcomes for each scenario 
for the EU-27.  
Table 39: Summary of macroeconomic consequences for each scenario for the EU-27 as a 
whole, percentage changes with respect to the baseline 
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A -0.37 -0.71 -0.69 -0.45 -0.49 -0.65 -0.26 -0.36 
B 0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.19 
C 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.21 
D 0.56 -1.45 0.72 1.28 -0.48 -0.62 -0.27 -0.15 
E -0.37 -0.71 -0.69 -0.45 -0.49 -0.65 -0.26 -0.36 
Source: Own estimations using the WorldScan model. 
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4 Conclusions 
This report compiles data on VAT liabilities for households and non-household entities 
(exempt sectors, governments or others entities who pay VAT on their intermediate 
consumption) in the EU-27 Member States. The objective of the study is to estimate 
VAT payments of different sectors in 2011, broken down by category of goods and 
services, and how VAT contributions vary across subgroups defined by various 
characteristics (such as household characteristics or sectors). We also analyse how the 
zero and reduced VAT rates currently in place in EU-27 countries influence VAT 
payments by simulating various reform scenarios that abolish these rates. We calculate 
the additional VAT revenues that would be generated by these reforms, and analyse the 
impact of changes in the VAT rates structure on important macroeconomic indicators.  
 
To analyse the effects of changes in the VAT rates structure we take two different 
approaches. We use a static model to assess the effects of an abolition of zero and 
reduced rates on private households, non-households entities and VAT revenues. This 
static approach enables us to analyse the distributional effects of the differentiated VAT 
rates structure at one point in time, and estimate the additional revenues that could be 
raised by abolishing zero and reduced VAT rates. This analysis is purely mechanical – 
that is, we do not take into account behavioural reactions of households and non-
households, although we would expect them to adjust their demand and supply in 
response to a change in relative prices, which would change the results. We also do not 
take into account that governments might not be able to collect all of the VAT liabilities 
we calculate. Nevertheless, static approaches are widely used, especially in the field of 
distributional analysis, as they enable a detailed insight into basic mechanisms and 
short-term effects.  
 
We then use a comprehensive general equilibrium model (WorldScan) to analyse the 
medium term consequences of various VAT reforms on important macroeconomic 
aggregates. This dynamic model integrates important economic parameters (firms, 
households and governments) in the EU-27 countries and takes into account 
behavioural reactions. The complexity of the model precludes modelling each sector of 
the economy in great detail in order to preserve computability. Standard Computational 
General Equilibrium models like WorldScan are developed for the analysis of medium 
and long-term questions that involve inter-regional and inter-sectoral effects of policy 
shocks to the real economy, predicting changes in aggregates like GDP, consumption 
and employment. In general, these models do not incorporate features to analyse short-
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term or monetary consequences like inflation, nominal interest rates and nominal 
exchange rates fluctuations.  
 
Although we simulate similar reform scenarios in both parts of the analysis (we 
consider abolishing zero and reduced rates, or compute a new standard rate such that 
revenues remain neutral), the scenarios are not entirely the same. For example, the 
static analysis of scenario 1 (abolishing zero and reduced rates) does not specify how 
the government spends the additional VAT revenues. In contrast, the general 
equilibrium analysis automatically channels these revenues back into the economy to 
keep the budget balanced. The two approaches are complementary, in that each 
approach can tackle different aspects of the analysis of VAT reform: while the dynamic 
approach indicates how important economic parameters will change in the medium 
term following a change in the VAT rate structure, it cannot assess the distributional 
consequences of such changes; the static approach, on the other hand, can answer 
distributional questions, but is not capable of assessing medium term effects.  
 
We find a very heterogeneous pattern of VAT rates structures across EU-27 Member 
States. Some Member States make very little use of zero and reduced rates (Bulgaria, 
Denmark, the Baltic states, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia), while others apply zero, 
super reduced, reduced or parking rates to a large number of supplies (Cyprus, 
Luxembourg, Ireland, and the UK among others). This differentiated picture makes it 
hard to draw general conclusions for the EU-27 as a whole. We nevertheless want to 
summarise some general results.  
 
VAT is often believed to be a regressive tax, as households with a low income at a 
given point in time spend a higher share of their current income on VAT payments. 
However, the conclusion on whether VAT is regressive or progressive to a great extent 
depends on whether we believe the income or the expenditure distribution to be more 
indicative of economic inequality, and whether we look at VAT payments in proportion 
to income or in proportion to expenditures (Carrera 2010, Crossley et al. 2009, IFS et 
al. 2011). Given the available data we can only assess whether a VAT system is 
progressive, proportional or regressive based on the ratio between VAT payments and 
expenditures for different income classes; although it would be interesting to also have 
this information for different expenditure classes. However, we do not consider the fact 
that we do not have data on VAT payments in relation to income as a caveat of our 
study, because this is a misleading indicator of the progressivity of a VAT system 
according to IFS et al. (2011). 
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Using this measure we find that in about half of the EU-27 Member States, reduced 
rates, in combination with exemptions, achieve one of their main objectives – 
alleviating the VAT burden for lower income households. In these countries, the VAT 
rates structure is progressive, leading to a lower tax burden for low-income households 
relative to their expenditure. However, countries that have a progressive VAT system 
do not limit reduced rates to goods and services that are disproportionally consumed by 
poor households. For example, high-income households typically spend a larger share 
of their budgets on restaurants, accommodation services and books and newspapers 
than poorer households do; therefore, a lower tax burden on these supplies is not 
progressive. The remaining countries can be described as having a roughly proportional 
VAT system – on average, low- and high-income households pay about the same share 
of their expenditure in VAT. Hungary’s VAT system is the only one we would classify 
as regressive.  
 
The effect of abolishing zero and reduced rates differs between Member States. 
Unsurprisingly, countries with few supplies taxed at zero and reduced rates experience 
almost no change. But many countries could raise significant additional VAT revenues 
(amounting to up to 3.3 % of GDP) by abolishing zero and reduced rates. In most 
countries, increases in VAT liability are higher for households than for non-households 
paying non-recoverable VAT on their inputs. This is due to the fact that most zero and 
reduced rates apply to supplies consumed primarily by households. Nevertheless, 
certain sectors face a considerable increase in their VAT burdens; examples are the real 
estate, education and health sectors. For sectors that depend on subsidies, such as health 
or education, or non-profit institutions serving households, additional subsidies might 
be necessary to maintain the level of services provided; that is, part of the additional 
VAT revenues might have to be redistributed.  
 
Regarding the impact on the income distribution, we find that in most countries, the 
abolition of zero and reduced rates hits lower-income households harder when we look 
at VAT payments as a fraction of total expenditure. In absolute terms, however, higher-
income households suffer more. That is, in absolute terms, high-income households 
benefit more from the existing zero and reduced rates than low-income households. 
This points to the limits of the potential of zero and reduced VAT rates as a tool for 
redistribution. What is more, we find that if we grant low-income households a lump-
sum transfer that enables them to purchase the same consumption bundle as before the 
reform, the additional VAT revenues generated by the reform are still substantial. The 
otherwise high additional burden that abolishing zero and reduced VAT rates would put 
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on low-income households could thus be avoided at a relatively low cost. The challenge 
would be to set-up and administer such a compensating benefit.  
 
If we abolish zero and reduced rates, and, at the same time, decrease the standard VAT 
rate such that the reform is revenue neutral, we find that in most countries, VAT bills of 
private households increase, while those of non-households decrease. Within the 
household sector we show that this reform is regressive for most countries: as a fraction 
of expenditure, the additional burden is higher for low-income households than for 
households further up the income distribution. In some countries, this is the case even 
in absolute terms. For richer households, the lower standard rate compensates for the 
abolition of zero and reduced rates. By design, this reform does not change the wide 
gap in effective VAT rates between EU Member States – in countries that make heavy 
use of zero and reduced rates, the standard VAT rate decreases sharply, while in other 
countries there is hardly any change: Denmark’s new standard rate is twice as high as 
Cyprus’ or Luxembourg’s new rate.  
 
This variation in VAT rates across Member States might also be part of the explanation 
as to why the general equilibrium analysis only finds marginal effects of a revenue 
neutral abolition of zero and reduced rates on GDP in the EU-27 on average. While 
results differ across Member States, with some experiencing gains while others face 
losses following the introduction of a new uniform, budget neutral standard VAT rate, 
we hardly find the increase in allocative efficiency we would have expected. This is 
because, although the reform scenarios generate a uniform VAT rates system within 
each country, the exempt status of several sectors is kept in place, and because VAT 
rates continue to differ between Member States. On the other hand, employment 
increases, especially for the low-skilled, which could attenuate the negative 
distributional effects caused by the change in the VAT rates structure. Moreover, if we 
include potential administrative cost reductions associated with a simplified VAT 
system, we do find marginally positive effects on GDP for the EU-27 as a whole. When 
we increase zero and reduced rates to the standard rate and decrease investment capital 
tax revenues to keep overall tax revenues constant, we find a sizeable increase in GDP.  
 
Although we believe our data to be generally sound, there are several issues, especially 
regarding the household analysis, which are caused by the fact that we have to work 
with aggregate instead of micro data. For some countries, there is no information on 
imputed rents, which could bias the results; we assume household income and 
expenditures not to be equivalised to account for household size; and we lack more 
detailed socio-economic and demographic information that might facilitate the 
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comparison of results between countries.114 Furthermore, there is a significant time lag 
in the data delivery: the aggregate HBS data is from 2005, a newer wave (2010) is only 
expected to be released later this year. 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this report presents a comprehensive overview of the 
distributional impact of the diversified VAT rates structure across the EU. It presents an 
estimate of the budgetary effects of abolishing this diversified VAT rates structure for 
each Member State, of the effect this would have on households and non-household 
entities before behavioural responses, and of the effects a more unified VAT rates 
structure within each Member State might have in the medium run on the economy in 
general.  
 
  
                                                     
114 For example, our data do not allow us to answer basic questions, like: Are households in the first 
quintile disproportionately headed by an old or economically inactive person? Which income quintiles 
contain the most children? 
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A. Annex 
A.1 Growth rates applied to HBS data  
Table 40: Growth rates applied to HBS data (uprate from 2005 to 2011) 
GROWTH 
RATES  
(2005 - 2011) 
AT BE BG** CY CZ DE DK EE EL 
CP01 14.3% 18.5% 45.6% 10.2% 44.1% 20.2% 15.9% 36.1% 11.8% 
CP02 15.8% 7.9% 223.5% 26.3% 75.8% 6.4% 8.0% 43.4% 14.9% 
CP03 10.1% 18.3% 57.5% 7.1% 0.3% 8.5% 11.2% 23.5% -23.7% 
CP04 20.4% 18.8% 42.9% 42.2% 64.8% 16.3% 22.4% 37.5% 41.0% 
CP05 16.4% 15.3% 219.3% 3.6% 47.9% 8.0% 0.6% 3.4% -11.2% 
CP06 15.0% 24.2% 79.4% 30.8% 76.3% 26.5% 18.9% 9.0% 21.1% 
CP07 21.4% 21.9% 58.8% -6.4% 33.5% 13.9% 6.2% 40.7% 4.3% 
CP08 -10.2% -12.2% 58.0% 15.3% 39.9% 3.6% -3.8% 38.5% 5.3% 
CP09 19.8% 14.4% 146.1% 14.9% 27.7% 10.1% 8.2% -9.8% 10.4% 
CP10 7.6% 16.3% 79.4% 26.9% 47.7% 35.4% 33.0% -27.0% 22.1% 
CP11 28.1% 22.5% 17.2% 11.7% 50.8% 25.4% 20.7% 39.7% -0.7% 
CP12 20.0% 22.6% 111.7% 2.1% 64.5% 13.8% 12.3% 15.9% 3.7% 
Total (NA)* 18.5% 18.1% 69.2% 14.1% 49.4% 14.9% 13.7% 28.1% 11.6% 
Total (HBS)* 18.0% 18.3% 63.7% 16.0% 46.9% 15.0% 13.7% 29.5% 12.9% 
 
GROWTH 
RATES  
(2005 - 2011) 
ES** FI FR HU IE IT LT LU LV 
CP01 8.8% 27.2% 12.0% 14.7% 1.3% 5.5% 64.3% 14.3% 57.7% 
CP02 13.1% 19.5% 11.7% 34.4% -4.2% 12.0% 80.3% -10.7% 84.7% 
CP03 0.8% 28.1% -1.3% -7.6% -19.7% 1.0% 36.4% 25.8% 22.3% 
CP04 32.1% 33.9% 18.1% 31.4% -0.9% 21.7% 90.3% 22.9% 107.1% 
CP05 -1.4% 25.4% 10.0% -23.1% -34.9% 4.4% 64.3% 7.5% 68.5% 
CP06 12.2% 36.6% 21.5% 18.2% 21.1% 7.5% 61.1% 35.8% 73.8% 
CP07 4.2% 11.2% 13.3% -7.4% 0.5% 2.5% 68.4% 19.9% 112.7% 
CP08 16.3% -0.5% 4.7% -1.6% -19.0% -3.2% 81.2% 6.4% 38.5% 
CP09 0.5% 21.5% 5.9% -4.1% -8.1% 12.8% 59.1% -2.7% 67.2% 
CP10 8.3% 22.0% 31.8% 4.1% 66.3% 16.1% 112.0% 175.1% 23.5% 
CP11 1.9% 19.2% 11.0% 19.2% -11.7% 18.4% 61.1% 8.2% 56.9% 
CP12 -2.0% 38.5% 16.6% 26.0% -29.5% 7.2% 89.8% 18.1% 129.1% 
Total (NA)* 8.6% 25.8% 13.0% 11.4% -8.3% 9.9% 71.2% 13.9% 76.5% 
Total (HBS)* 12.9% 26.1% 13.2% 11.0% -7.4% 10.8% 69.8% 17.3% 73.9% 
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GROWTH 
RATES  
(2005 - 2011) 
MT NL PL PT RO** SE SI SK UK*** 
CP01 18.6% 18.9% 30.2% 16.9% 40.0% 27.1% 30.9% 71.2% -5.6% 
CP02 18.9% 15.7% 41.6% 0.7% 74.8% 23.6% 44.9% 69.5% -9.5% 
CP03 -16.5% 10.9% 32.3% 13.1% 65.1% 24.6% 26.8% 67.2% -4.4% 
CP04 47.7% 15.5% 48.2% 21.1% 62.0% 24.1% 34.9% 77.0% 10.3% 
CP05 4.3% 1.6% 48.4% 2.6% 51.8% 27.4% 35.5% 102.1% -19.9% 
CP06 42.5% -44.1% 60.7% 33.3% 172.9% 26.3% 39.4% 118.5% 2.4% 
CP07 25.3% 15.2% 65.9% -1.7% -4.4% 15.2% 29.5% 61.1% -12.9% 
CP08 14.9% -5.5% 26.0% 9.5% 268.5% 16.3% 21.6% 81.8% -7.3% 
CP09 26.0% 5.7% 47.6% 7.4% 122.7% 21.4% 5.5% 94.9% -16.2% 
CP10 20.4% 28.2% 38.4% 33.2% -15.8% 37.7% 42.4% 83.4% -6.3% 
CP11 38.2% 7.4% 43.8% 17.1% -3.4% 39.9% 39.6% 44.8% -12.1% 
CP12 48.8% -0.5% 54.2% 27.6% 160.2% 36.2% 42.3% 109.2% -25.6% 
Total (NA)* 26.1% 6.8% 44.9% 14.2% 51.7% 24.8% 31.2% 79.1% -9.1% 
Total (HBS)* 22.7% 9.2% 43.8% 15.6% 67.0% 24.2% 30.9% 77.6% 0.0% 
Source: National Accounts Data (Eurostat), own calculations. 
* Because the expenditure structure differs between HBS and NA data to begin with, applying the category 
specific growth rates from the NA data to the HBS data leads to different aggregate growth rates between 
the HBS and NA data.  
** NA data not available for 2011 (we uprate to the latest year for which NA data are available, after that 
we uprate using GDP growth to 2011). 
Note: Exchange rates of 1.956 Bulgarian levs, 24.590 Czech koruny, 7.451 Danish kroner, 0.706 Latvian 
lats, 3.453 Lithuanian litai, 279.370 Hungarian forints, 4.121 Polish zloty, 4.212 Romanian lei, 9.030 
Swedish kronor and 0.868 British pounds to 1 Euro. 
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A.2 COICOP Classification 
COICOP groups (two-digit level) 
CP00 - Total 
CP01 - Food and non-alcoholic beverages 
CP02 - Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics 
CP03 - Clothing and footwear 
CP04 - Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels 
CP05 - Furnishings, household equipment and routine maintenance of the house 
CP06 - Health 
CP07 - Transport 
CP08 - Communication 
CP09 - Recreation and culture 
CP10 - Education 
CP11 - Restaurants and hostels 
CP12 – Miscellaneous 
 
COICOP groups (three-digit level) 
CP011 - Food 
CP012 - Non-alcoholic beverages 
CP021 - Alcoholic beverages 
CP022 - Tobacco 
CP023 - Narcotics 
CP031 - Clothing 
CP032 - Footwear including repair 
CP041 - Actual rentals for housing 
CP042 - Imputed rentals for housing 
CP043 - Maintenance and repair of the dwelling 
CP044 - Water supply and miscellaneous services relating to the dwelling 
CP045 - Electricity, gas and other fuels 
CP051 - Furniture and furnishings, carpets and other floor coverings 
CP052 - Household textiles 
CP053 - Household appliances 
CP054 - Glassware, tableware and household utensils 
CP055 - Tools and equipment for house and garden 
CP056 - Goods and services for routine household maintenance 
CP061 - Medical products, appliances and equipment 
CP062 - Out-patient services 
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CP063 - Hospital services 
CP071 - Purchase of vehicles 
CP072 - Operation of personal transport equipment 
CP073 - Transport services 
CP081 - Postal services 
CP082 - Telephone and telefax equipment 
CP083 - Telephone and telefax services 
CP091 - Audio-visual, photographic and information processing equipment 
CP092 - Other major durables for recreation and culture 
CP093 - Other recreational items and equipment, gardens and pets 
CP094 - Recreational and cultural services 
CP095 - Newspapers, books and stationery 
CP096 - Package holidays 
CP101 - Pre-primary and primary education 
CP102 - Secondary education 
CP103 - Post-secondary non-tertiary education 
CP104 - Tertiary education 
CP105 - Education not definable by level 
CP111 - Catering services 
CP112 - Accommodation services 
CP121 - Personal care 
CP122 - Prostitution 
CP123 - Personal effects n.e.c. 
CP124 - Social protection 
CP125 - Insurance 
CP126 - Financial services n.e.c. 
CP127 - Other services n.e.c. 
 
COICOP groups (four-digit level) 
CP0111 - Bread and cereals 
CP0112 - Meat 
CP0113 - Fish and seafood 
CP0114 - Milk, cheese and eggs 
CP0115 - Oils and fats 
CP0116 - Fruit 
CP0117 - Vegetables 
CP0118 - Sugar, jam, honey, chocolate and confectionery 
CP0119 - Food products n.e.c. 
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CP0121 - Coffee, tea and cocoa 
CP0122 - Mineral waters, soft drinks, fruit and vegetable juices 
CP0211 - Spirits 
CP0212 - Wine 
CP0213 - Beer 
CP0221 - Tobacco (ND) 
CP0231 - Narcotics (ND) 
CP0311 - Clothing materials 
CP0312 - Garments 
CP0313 - Other articles of clothing and clothing accessories 
CP0314 - Cleaning, repair and hire of clothing 
CP0321 - Shoes and other footwear 
CP0322 - Repair and hire of footwear 
CP0411 - Actual rentals paid by tenants 
CP0412 - Other actual rentals 
CP0421 - Imputed rentals of owner-occupiers 
CP0422 - Other imputed rentals 
CP0431 - Materials for the maintenance and repair of the dwelling 
CP0432 - Services for the maintenance and repair of the dwelling 
CP0441 - Water supply 
CP0442 - Refuse collection 
CP0443 - Sewerage collection 
CP0444 - Other services relating to the dwelling n.e.c. 
CP0451 - Electricity 
CP0452 - Gas 
CP0453 - Liquid fuels 
CP0454 - Solid fuels 
CP0455 - Heat energy 
CP0511 - Furniture and furnishings 
CP0512 - Carpets and other floor coverings 
CP0513 - Repair of furniture, furnishings and floor coverings 
CP0521 - Household textiles (SD) 
CP0531 - Major household appliances whether electric or not 
CP0532 - Small electric household appliances 
CP0533 - Repair of household appliances 
CP0541 - Glassware, tableware and household utensils (SD) 
CP0551 - Major tools and equipment 
CP0552 - Small tools and miscellaneous accessories 
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CP0561 - Non-durable household goods 
CP0562 - Domestic services and household services 
CP0611 - Pharmaceutical products 
CP0612 - Other medical products 
CP0613 - Therapeutic appliances and equipment 
CP0621 - Medical services 
CP0622 - Dental services 
CP0623 - Paramedical services 
(CP063 - see above) 
CP0711 - Motor cars 
CP0712 - Motor cycles 
CP0713 - Bicycles 
CP0714 - Animal drawn vehicles 
CP0721 - Spares parts and accessories for personal transport equipment 
CP0722 - Fuels and lubricants for personal transport equipment 
CP0723 - Maintenance and repair of personal transport equipment 
CP0724 - Other services in respect of personal transport equipment 
CP0731 - Passenger transport by railway 
CP0732 - Passenger transport by road 
CP0733 - Passenger transport by air 
CP0734 - Passenger transport by sea and inland waterway 
CP0735 - Combined passenger transport 
CP0736 - Other purchased transport services 
CP0811 - Postal services (S) 
CP0821 - Telephone and telefax equipment (D) 
CP0831 - Telephone and telefax services (S) 
CP0911 - Equipment for the reception, recording and reproduction of sound and 
       pictures 
CP0912 - Photographic and cinematographic equipment and optical instruments 
CP0913 - Information processing equipment 
CP0914 - Recording media 
CP0915 - Repair of audio-visual, photographic and information processing 
       equipment 
CP0921 - Major durables for outdoor recreation 
CP0922 - Musical instruments and major durables for indoor recreation 
CP0923 - Maintenance and repair of other major durables for recreation and culture 
CP0931 - Games, toys and hobbies 
CP0932 - Equipment for sport, camping and open-air recreation 
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CP0933 - Gardens, plants and flowers 
CP0934 - Pets and related products 
CP0935 - Veterinary and other services for pets 
CP0941 - Recreational and cultural services 
CP0942 - Cultural services 
CP0943 - Games of chance 
CP0951 - Books 
CP0952 - Newspapers and periodicals 
CP0953 - Miscellaneous printed matter 
CP0954 - Stationery and drawing materials 
(CP096 - see above) 
CP1011 - Pre-primary and primary education (S) 
CP1021 - Secondary education (S) 
CP1031 - Post-secondary non-tertiary education (S) 
CP1041 - Tertiary education (S) 
CP1051 - Education non definable by level (S) 
CP1111 - Restaurants, cafés and the like 
CP1112 - Canteens 
CP1121 - Accommodation services (S) 
CP1211 - Hairdressing salons and personal grooming establishments 
CP1212 - Electrical appliances for personal care 
CP1213 - Other appliances, articles and products for personal care 
CP1221 - Prostitution (S) 
CP1231 - Jewellery, clocks and watches 
CP1232 - Other personal effects 
CP1241 - Social protection services (S) 
CP1252 - Insurance connected with the dwelling 
CP1253 - Insurance connected with health 
CP1254 - Insurance connected with transport 
CP1255 - Other insurance 
CP1262 - Other financial services n.e.c. 
CP1271 - Other services n.e.c. (S) 
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A.3 Validation exercise: Comparison with results based on micro data 
Since we are working with aggregated data, it is interesting to see how our analysis 
compares to an analysis that is based on household level data. As a validation exercise, 
we therefore repeat our simulations using micro data for a subgroup of countries for 
which we have access to disaggregated consumption surveys: Austria, Italy and the UK.  
Validation with Micro-Data: Austria 
We repeat our analysis for Austria using the Austrian Household Budget Survey 2005 
as provided by Statistik Austria. This dataset contains detailed expenditure information 
on 8,400 households representative for the Austrian population; annual expenditure data 
are disaggregated to the COICOP 6-digit level. In accordance with the analysis using 
aggregated data, we uprate expenditure information using the specific growth rate of the 
12 main COICOP expenditure categories from 2005 to 2011, disposable income is 
uprated using the wage growth rate 2005-2011.  
 
If we were performing the analysis of this report based on this micro-data, we would 
adjust household expenditure to take household size into account. This is typically 
accomplished by dividing expenditure by the modified OECD scale115, making 
expenditures comparable across differently sized households. When considering the 
impact of reforms of the VAT structure on income distribution, we would also adjust 
household income by household size before assigning households to income quintiles. 
Because the HBS data are apparently not equivalised, we work with unequivalised 
income and expenditure for the sake of comparability.  
                                                     
115 The modified OECD scale gives a weight of one to the first member of each household, a weight of 0.5 
to every additional adult member and a weight of 0.3 to every child living in the household. This 
approach assumes economies of scale in consumption. A family of two adults and one child would thus 
have to spend 1.8 times as much as a single person to be considered as having the same “equivalised” 
expenditure; see 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Equivalised_disposable_income 
[13/03/25] 
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Table 41: Comparison of estimates of VAT bills, in absolute values and as a percentage of 
total expenditure, by COICOP category, estimated on aggregate HBS data as in this 
report, and micro-HBS data, for Austria  
COICOP  
(2-digit) 
Absolute deviation 
from micro result 
(in €) 
Deviation from micro 
result as a fraction of 
total VAT payments 
Absolute difference in 
VAT paid per 
household expenditure 
CP01 0 +0.0% -0.0%p 
CP02 0 +0.0% -0.0%p 
CP03 0 +0.0% -0.0%p 
CP04 -1 -0.1% -0.0%p 
CP05 0 -0.0% -0.0%p 
CP06 1 +2.0% +0.0%p 
CP07 66 +6.8% +0.2%p 
CP08 0 -0.0% -0.0%p 
CP09 23 +4.3% +0.1%p 
CP10 0 +0.0% +0.0%p 
CP11 20 +8.0% +0.0%p 
CP12 5 +2.0% +0.0%p 
Sum 114 +2.8% +0.2%p 
Source: Konsumerhebung 2004/05 (Statistik Austria), Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts 
(Eurostat), own calculations. 
 
Table 41 shows the results of a comparison between the VAT paid by an average 
household, by the 12 main COICOP categories, as calculated from the micro- and 
aggregated data, respectively. These results show a very good correspondence between 
the two datasets: the biggest discrepancy in absolute VAT payments occurs in the 
category transport (CP07); the deviation as a percentage of average expenditure on this 
expenditure category is 6.8 %. In relation to total VAT payments, we observe the 
largest difference in the category CP11 “Restaurants and hotels”, 8 %. Nevertheless, 
this analysis gives us confidence that our aggregated data is overall sound. 
 
Comparing the more detailed results, differences between the results based on micro- 
and aggregated data emerge. Table 42 presents the deviations of the main results from 
the micro-data results in the same fashion as Table 41, but with VAT bills and 
expenditure disaggregated by income quintile. 
 
From Table 42, it is clear that there are some problems with the association of 
households to income quintiles in the aggregated data. First, VAT paid is higher for the 
first income quintile than for the second income quintile, which could be justified by a 
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larger household size for lower income households, as households with children are 
often younger and therefore have less disposable income. However, this story is refuted 
by the micro-results, which show a steady increase of VAT paid by quintiles. Moving 
from the first income quintile to the second, the average VAT bill increases by about 
€ 900, from the second quintile to the third, it increases by about € 800, moving from 
the third to the fourth it increases by € 1,200, while it only rises by about € 400 moving 
from the fourth quintile to the fifth in the results based on micro data. In the results 
based on the aggregated data, however, VAT paid is € 141 lower in the second quintile 
than in the first, increases moderately moving from the second to the third and from the 
third to the fourth income quintile (by about € 700 and € 600, respectively), and then 
rises sharply from the fourth to the fifth income quintile (about € 1,200). In comparison, 
this pattern of increase is much smoother in the results based on micro data.  
 
Also, the expenditure categories do not quite seem to add up: for example, expenditure 
on category CP07 “Transport” is a category that sees rapid growth over the income 
quintiles. In the micro data results, households in the first quintile pay € 250 VAT for 
goods and services in that category per year, while households in the fifth quintile pay 
€ 1,431. The average VAT rate for the lowest income quintile in this category is 
17.2 %, while the richest households pay an average VAT rate of 18 %, suggesting a 
higher share of (standard rated) private means of transport as compared to (reduced 
rated) public transport in the highest income quintile. In the results based on aggregated 
data, however, households in the first quintile have a higher average VAT rate on 
transport goods and spend more on transport than in the second quintile. This suggests 
that individuals might be incorrectly sorted into income categories in the aggregated 
data.  
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Table 42: Comparison of estimates of VAT bills, in absolute values and as a percentage of total expenditure, by income quintile and COICOP category, 
estimated on aggregate HBS data as in this report, and micro-HBS data, for Austria  
  First Income Quintile  Second Income Quintile Third Income Quintile 
COICOP 
(2-digit) 
Absolute 
deviation from 
micro result 
(in €) 
Deviation 
from micro 
result as a 
fraction of 
total VAT 
payments 
Absolute 
difference in 
VAT paid per 
household 
expenditure 
Absolute 
deviation from 
micro result 
(in €) 
Deviation 
from micro 
result as a 
fraction of 
total VAT 
payments 
Absolute 
difference in 
VAT paid per 
household 
expenditure 
Absolute 
deviation from 
micro result 
(in €) 
Deviation 
from micro 
result as a 
fraction of 
total VAT 
payments 
Absolute 
difference in 
VAT paid per 
household 
expenditure 
CP01 144 +32.8% -0.1%p 79 +18.3% +0.2%p 17 +3.7% +0.0%p 
CP02 34 +22.2% -0.1%p 3 +2.1% -0.0%p 6 +3.8% +0.0%p 
CP03 111 +42.6% +0.1%p 7 +3.2% -0.0%p 38 +12.3% +0.1%p 
CP04 75 +13.6% -0.7%p 40 +6.9% +0.0%p -52 -8.7% -0.2%p 
CP05 106 +36.4% -0.0%p 33 +11.7% +0.1%p -6 -1.8% -0.0%p 
CP06 15 +41.8% +0.0%p -4 -8.5% -0.0%p 7 +12.4% +0.0%p 
CP07 479 +65.7% +1.1%p 41 +6.5% +0.0%p 50 +5.5% +0.1%p 
CP08 24 +22.5% -0.1%p 1 +1.2% -0.0%p 8 +6.7% +0.0%p 
CP09 175 +44.8% +0.2%p -3 -0.8% -0.1%p 35 +7.2% +0.1%p 
CP10 0 +0.0% +0.0%p 0 +0.0% +0.0%p 0 +0.0% +0.0%p 
CP11 55 +30.3% -0.1%p -7 -4.2% -0.1%p 20 +9.2% +0.1%p 
CP12 32 +17.0% -0.2%p 12 +6.5% +0.0%p -48 -22.2% -0.1%p 
Sum 1,250 +37.6% +0.0%p 204 +6.4% +0.0%p 76 +2.0% +0.2%p 
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  Fourth Income Quintile Fifth Income Quintile 
COICOP 
(2-digit) 
Absolute 
deviation from 
micro result  
(in €) 
Deviation 
from micro 
result as a 
fraction of 
total VAT 
payments 
Absolute 
difference in 
VAT paid per 
household 
expenditure 
Absolute 
deviation from 
micro result  
(in €) 
Deviation 
from micro 
result as a 
fraction of 
total VAT 
payments 
Absolute 
difference in 
VAT paid per 
household 
expenditure 
CP01 -119 -26.2% -0.1%p -184 -39.9% -0.4%p 
CP02 13 +7.1% +0.1%p -47 -25.5% -0.1%p 
CP03 -106 -34.1% -0.1%p 14 +3.4% +0.0%p 
CP04 -28 -4.1% +0.2%p 24 +3.0% +0.0%p 
CP05 -104 -25.9% -0.1%p 36 +6.9% +0.1%p 
CP06 1 +1.7% +0.0%p 11 +13.4% +0.0%p 
CP07 -58 -5.1% +0.2%p 38 +2.6% +0.0%p 
CP08 -15 -11.9% +0.0%p -19 -15.5% -0.0%p 
CP09 -128 -22.1% -0.1%p 200 +24.3% +0.4%p 
CP10 0 +0.0% +0.0%p 0 +0.0% +0.0%p 
CP11 30 +10.9% +0.2%p 85 +21.8% +0.2%p 
CP12 -17 -7.3% +0.0%p 102 +28.6% +0.2%p 
Sum -532 -12.0% +0.3%p 260 +4.6% +0.3%p 
Source: Konsumerhebung 2004/05 (Statistik Austria), Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
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While the results from the two data sources are roughly in line if disaggregated by 
number of active persons in the household, large differences emerge when 
disaggregated by household type. Average VAT paid per household is much more 
dispersed in the results based on micro data than in the results based on aggregated 
data. Here, it is worth re-emphasising that the calculation of VAT is performed without 
equalisation of any kind, that is, we calculate average VAT payments per household 
without considering household size; while when working with household level data, it 
is often customary to divide both household incomes and expenditure through EU-
equivalence scales that make income and expenditure of households of different sizes 
comparable. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is therefore, that Eurostat 
already performed some equalization on household size in the data, generating more 
evenly distributed expenditure patterns across household types. This must have been 
done on the data disaggregated by household type and not on the data disaggregated by 
the number of household members who are active on the labour market.  
Validation with Micro-Data: Italy 
For the analysis of the distributive impact of the VAT system based on micro-data for 
Italy, we use the 2005 Household Budget Survey. This survey contains detailed 
information on expenditure patterns, but lacks data on household income. We therefore 
have to impute disposable income into this dataset. This information comes from the 
Italian SILC for 2006, that contains income information for 2005, as well as socio-
demographic data for 2006. Since the SILC does not contain any information on 
household consumption, any link between the HBS and the SILC would have to be 
based solely on demographic variables. We did not consider this to be sufficient to 
provide a consistent relationship between total household income and total expenditure. 
We therefore turned to the only survey that collects data on both income and total 
consumption in Italy, the Bank of Italy survey on household income and wealth, which 
is carried out every two years.  
 
In this survey, we regress the log of total household consumption on disposable income, 
area of residence, profession and education of the household head, and number of 
children and adults. We use the coefficients of these regressions to impute total 
consumption into the SILC. The sole purpose of this imputation is to assign the 
households in the SILC to deciles of total imputed consumption. After also assigning 
the households in the HBS to deciles of total consumption, we match each household in 
the HBS to a household in the SILC that belongs to the same imputed consumption 
decile, using the STATA psmatch2 routine (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). We use the 
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number of workers, number of family members, profession and gender of the head, 
tenure status and area of residence as covariates. Table 43 compares original and 
imputed incomes per equivalent income decile in the EU-SILC and HBS.  
Table 43: Original and imputed incomes per equivalent income decile in the EU-SILC 
2006 and HBS 2005. 
Deciles 
HBS 2005 SILC 2006 (2005 incomes) 
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
1 6,442 2,204 1 8,810 5,969 2,325 0 8,827 
2 10,277 907 8,822 11,780 10,246 797 8,828 11,551 
3 12,714 529 11,781 13,586 12,765 707 11,551 13,969 
4 14,988 735 13,594 16,146 15,088 642 13,971 16,173 
5 17,492 687 16,148 18,490 17,302 640 16,174 18,402 
6 19,568 693 18,491 20,748 19,631 726 18,403 20,905 
7 22,031 679 20,750 23,111 22,310 844 20,907 23,830 
8 24,866 1,084 23,113 26,835 25,623 1,127 23,830 27,766 
9 30,171 2,078 26,887 34,224 30,844 2,012 27,768 34,785 
10 48,361 16,825 34,226 175,551 49,533 21,696 34,787 549,563 
Total 20,675 12,602 1 175,551 20,929 13,704 0 549,563 
Source: Italian Household Budget Survey 2005, Italian EU-SILC 2006, Bank of Italy Survey on Household 
Income and Wealth 2006, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
 
Table 44 shows the disparities of the overall VAT bill of private households in Italy 
according to aggregate HBS data and micro data, disaggregated to the COICOP 2-digit 
level. Although the deviation of the results based on aggregate data from those based on 
micro data do not seem too big when looking at the aggregate difference in estimated 
VAT bills in Euro, the differences do seem substantial as a proportion of VAT 
payments per COICOP category, although they even out as a sum (only 1.3 % 
difference in overall VAT payments). The biggest discrepancy emerges in the category 
CP04 “Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels” were the aggregate data estimate 
the VAT bill to be € 89, or 32 %, lower than the micro-data. The aggregate data also 
estimate VAT payments in the category CP09 “Recreation and culture” to be € 41, or 
18 %, higher than the micro-data; also worth mentioning is the discrepancy in the 
category CP11 “Restaurants and hotels” (€ 21 or 14.1 % for the average household). 
The € 15 discrepancy in the category CP10 “Education” is due to small discrepancies in 
the assumptions about VAT exempted goods and services between the main analysis on 
aggregated HBS data and the micro validation exercise.116 The absolute differences in 
                                                     
116 There are some goods and services, like school excursions, which might be subject to VAT, although 
most goods and services belonging to the category CP10 “Education” are exempt from VAT. Because the 
aggregated data on education is of low quality for all Member States including Italy, and the goods and 
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the estimate of VAT bills as a fraction of household expenditure remain below 0.4 
percentage points for all categories. We use the results based on the HBS micro data for 
Italy disaggregated by income quintiles in the main report, because the Italian HBS 
lacks income information (as discussed above). Because we base our main analysis on 
these data, we naturally cannot provide a micro validation for these.  
 
The discrepancies between the results based on aggregate data are more accentuated 
when households are separated according to the number of members who are active in 
the labour market, and the discrepancies increase with the number of active household 
members. While the estimated household VAT bills are higher in the calculation based 
on micro data for all households with two active members or less (the discrepancy 
ranges between € 33 for households with no active member to € 67 for households with 
two active members), the micro result estimates a VAT bill that is € 1,015 lower than 
the estimate based on aggregate data for households with three or more active members. 
The bulk of this discrepancy comes from the category transport, but the categories 
CP09 “Recreation and Culture” and CP03 “Clothing and Footwear” also contribute to 
the difference. The fact that this discrepancy is concentrated on bigger households to 
such a degree points to problems with the aggregate data. In the results based on micro 
data, household VAT bills rise more smoothly with the addition of an active adult to the 
household (roughly € 1,000 per active adult from zero to two active members of the 
household, an additional € 500 for three active members or more). In the calculation 
based on the aggregate data, on the other hand, the VAT bill follows the same pattern, 
but jumps by nearly € 1,600 euros from the category “two active persons” to “three or 
more”.  
 
We observe the same (although less accentuated) pattern when looking at the 
discrepancies between the results based on aggregate and micro data, disaggregated 
according to household type. Households with three or more adults, but without 
dependent children, show the biggest difference between the calculations (the VAT bill 
estimated with micro data is € 112 higher). Discrepancies are biggest in the categories 
CP07 “Transport” and CP04 “Housing”.  
 
In addition to possible equalisation of household expenditures in the HBS data from 
Eurostat we are not aware of, which could tilt our results based on aggregate data, also 
the different aggregation of goods and services in the two analyses cause the differing 
                                                                                                                                              
services that are likely to be subject to VAT only make up a small proportion of this category, we 
assumed the entire category to be exempt in our analysis of the VAT bills of private households.  
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results for Italy. The micro data for Italy, for example, distinguishes between used cars, 
that are zero rated, and new cars, that are taxed at the standard rate, while our most 
minute category is “Motor cars” which we assume to be taxed at the standard rate.  
Table 44: Comparison of estimates of VAT bills, in absolute values and as a percentage of 
total expenditure, by COICOP category, estimated on aggregate HBS data as in this 
report, and micro data, for Italy 
COICOP  
(2-digit) 
Absolute deviation 
from micro result 
(in €) 
Deviation from micro 
result as a fraction of 
total VAT payments 
Absolute difference in 
VAT paid per 
household expenditure 
CP01 2 +0.4% +0.0%p 
CP02 0 +0.0% +0.0%p 
CP03 23 +7.0% +0.1%p 
CP04 -89 -32.1% -0.3%p 
CP05 -11 -4.0% -0.0%p 
CP06 -2 -3.5% -0.0%p 
CP07 30 +5.5% +0.1%p 
CP08 0 +0.2% +0.0%p 
CP09 41 +18.3% +0.1%p 
CP10 -15   
 
CP11 -21 -14.1% -0.1%p 
CP12 6 +2.8% +0.0%p 
Sum -36 -1.3% +0.1%p 
Source: Italian Household Budget Survey 2005, Italian EU-SILC 2006, Bank of Italy Survey on Household 
Income and Wealth 2006, Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
Validation with Micro-Data: the UK 
The micro-data validation exercise for the UK is based on the Living Costs and Food 
Survey (LCFS)117 2010; expenditure and income is uprated with the nominal GDP 
growth rate from the relevant reference quarter to the second quarter of 2011.118  
 
To incorporate housing into our measure of total consumption, rents for owner 
occupiers and those living in (subsidised) social housing are imputed based on data on 
                                                     
117 This is the same Household Budget Survey the aggregate data published by Eurostat are based on; 
however, the Eurostat data is from 2005, at which time the name of the survey was the Expenditure and 
Food Survey (EFS).  
118 Data from the Living Costs and Food Survey are produced by the Office for National Statistics and are 
Crown Copyright. They are reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen’s 
Printer for Scotland.  
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rented unfurnished dwellings.119 We exclude cash outlays on housing such as mortgage 
interest payments and capital payments from our measure of consumption, because we 
interpret these items as forms of investment rather than consumption. Instead, we use 
actual rent paid (for households renting privately) or imputed rent (for all other 
households). For owner-occupier households, we add the imputed rental value of their 
property to their income, and subtract mortgage interest payments, for occupiers of 
social housing, we also add imputed rent, and subtract actual rent paid. We include the 
rental income of private landlords into our measure of income; for those renting 
privately, no adjustment is needed.120  
 
Regrettably, we do not know how Eurostat treat housing in their definition of both 
expenditure and income. That is, we have no knowledge of how rents are imputed and 
if, and how, imputed rent, actual rent and mortgage interest are included in the 
calculation of both income and consumption for different groups of households (owner-
occupiers, private renters, those in social housing etc.). This is not straightforward 
conceptually, and Eurostat might have chosen a very different path from ours. Because 
housing is a very big component of both income and consumption, different approaches 
to incorporating it might well lead to very different results. Differences in the way 
imputed rent (and housing in general) is dealt with in our analysis based on micro data, 
and by Eurostat, is therefore a prime candidate for explaining the discrepancies between 
the results. We further discuss this point when comparing the results of this study to a 
previously published report dealing with the VAT system, IFS et. al. (2011), in the next 
subsection.  
 
Unfortunately, we only have estimates on aggregate tax bills of private households, not 
on VAT bills by consumption category as in the cases of Austria and Italy.121 According 
                                                     
119 In the first stage of the two stage procedure, we run a linear regression on rent for privately rented 
unfurnished property from the 1978 to 2010 waves of the LCFS. We then predict a rental value for all 
households in the 2010 wave, drawing randomly from the (estimated) distribution of errors. For 
households that are not renting an unfurnished property, we impute a rental value by taking the actual 
rental value from the household with the smallest absolute difference in the predicted rental value. The 
covariates in the regression are geographical region, number of rooms, the level of the local (property) tax 
bill, and the education of the household head.  
120 The net income from housing is always the value a household gets from living in a property over and 
above the cash amount they pay for doing so. In the case of private renters, these are the same, and 
therefore net out to zero.  
121 The IFS tax microsimulation model TAXBEN is based on consumption categories that do not 
correspond to the COICOP classification. Mapping the consumption categories of this model to COICOP 
categories is not straightforward, and would imply rewriting a significant part of the code of the micro-
simulation model. 
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to the micro-data, the average household in the UK pays € 2,827 of VAT per annum, 
€ 218 or 8.4 % more than in the estimate based on aggregate data (€ 2,609). This is due 
to the higher average VAT rate in the calculation based on micro data: 8.6 % as 
compared to the estimate based on aggregate data, 8.0 %.  
Table 45: Comparison of estimates of VAT bills, in absolute values and as a percentage of 
total expenditure, by income quintile, estimated on aggregate HBS data as in this report, 
and micro data, for the UK 
  
Absolute 
deviation from 
micro result 
Deviation from 
micro result as 
a fraction of 
total VAT 
payments 
Absolute 
difference in 
VAT paid per 
household 
expenditure  
Absolute 
difference in 
average VAT 
rate 
First Quintile 141 +11.2% -0.5%p -0.5%p 
Second Quintile 79 +4.4% -0.6%p -0.7%p 
Third Quintile -146 -6.3% -0.9%p -1.1%p 
Fourth Quintile -239 -7.7% -0.7%p -0.8%p 
Fifth Quintile -929 -20.5% -0.3%p -0.4%p 
Source: Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS) 2010, Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts 
(Eurostat), own calculations. 
 
Regarding VAT payments by income quintile, the micro results match the aggregate 
data quite well for households in quintiles two to four. For the lowest quintile, the 
estimate of average aggregate expenditure is significantly higher in the calculations 
based on aggregate data than in those based on micro data; the difference amounts to 
€ 3,510 or 17.5 %. The divergence between the estimates of the average VAT bill for 
households in the lowest income quintile however is only € 141 (or 11.2 %); as a 
consequence, the average VAT rate is higher in the results based on micro-data. In the 
second quintile, the analysis based on aggregate data arrives at only 12.2 % higher 
mean expenditures than the micro data; while the estimates of the average VAT bill 
nearly coincide (with the results based on aggregate data only being € 79, or 4.4 %, 
higher than the results based on micro data), this results in a higher average VAT rate 
according to the micro data. Although the estimates for average aggregate expenditure 
based on aggregate data are closer to those based on micro data for the third and the 
fourth income quintile, the differences in the estimated VAT bills between aggregate 
and micro data are actually bigger. Estimates for average aggregate expenditure differ 
by € 1,624 and € 100 between the estimates based on aggregate and micro-data for the 
third and fourth income quintiles respectively. The differences in average VAT bills 
however are 6.3 % and 7.7 % of the estimate based on aggregate data, with average 
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VAT bills being lower according to this calculation. As a consequence, the estimates of 
the average VAT rates according to micro-data are higher than those based on 
aggregate data. There is a rather large deviation of estimated average VAT bills for the 
fifth income quintile; estimates based on aggregate data are € 929 lower than those 
based on micro-data. The main difference here is the strikingly lower estimate of 
aggregate expenditures: € 8,216 lower than the micro estimate (16.2 %). The average 
VAT rates are not so far apart, 9.8 % according to aggregate, and 10.2 % according to 
micro data. This of course implies a much steeper increase in estimated expenditure 
moving from the fourth to the fifth income quintile in the results based on micro data 
than in the results based on aggregate data.  
 
Looking at the results by number of active persons in the household, we see the biggest 
discrepancies for households without an active member, the estimate of the VAT bill of 
households that fit this description are € 324 (or 22.9 %) higher based on the micro than 
on the aggregate data. For households with one, two or three active members, this 
discrepancy is lower (€ 2115 or 4.7 % and € 264 and 7.5 % higher VAT bills according 
to micro data for households with one and two active persons, respectively, € 145 or 
3.0 % higher estimated VAT bill for households of three or more active persons 
according to micro data). Also here, the estimate of aggregate expenditure for 
households of three or more active persons (who will be classified as higher income 
households, especially without equivalisation of household income) is estimated to be 
significantly lower when the estimate is based on micro data (€ 2,264 or 4.4 %). 
 
When comparing the results disaggregated by household type, no clear pattern emerges. 
The largest difference between the results occurs for households consisting of two 
adults without dependent children, where the estimate of the average VAT bill based on 
micro data is € 427 or 15.5 % higher than the corresponding estimate based on 
aggregate data.  
Comparison with previous Results (IFS et al., 2011) 
Making use of the results of IFS et al. (2011), we can also perform a limited validation 
exercise for those countries that are covered in this study: Belgium, Germany, Greece, 
Spain, France, Italy, Hungary, Poland and the UK. Because the definition of household 
types in IFS et al. (2011) is not comparable with the household type definition in our 
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analysis, we only compare VAT paid as a percentage of household expenditure by 
income quintile (which we calculate from the income deciles presented in the report).122  
 
The degree of concurrence between our results and the results in IFS et al. (2011) varies 
between countries. For Belgium, we arrive at consistently higher estimates for the 
fraction of total household expenditure that accrues to VAT payments. The difference is 
the largest for the third income quintile, where it amounts to 1.5 percentage points 
(18 % of the fraction estimated in IFS et al. (2011)).  
 
Our results for Germany coincide very well with the results in IFS et al. (2011). The 
fraction of total expenditure spent on VAT is the same in both studies for the third 
income quintile, and our results lie only between 0.1 and 0.3 percentage points below 
the results in IFS et al. (2011) (as a percentage of the estimated VAT liability in the 
cited study, the divergence is the greatest for the richest quintile of households, where it 
is 3.5 %, with our estimated fraction being lower).  
 
There is quite a bit of divergence between our estimates of VAT payments as a 
percentage of expenditure and the percentages estimated in IFS et al. (2011) for Greece: 
our results show significantly less variation over the income distribution – we estimate 
households in the first income quintile to spend 10.4 %, and households in the fifth 
income quintile 10.5 % of their total expenditure on VAT, while in the IFS et al. (2011) 
study, the poorest households spend 12.5 %, and the richest households 13.5 % of their 
total expenditure on VAT. As a percentage of the fraction estimated in IFS et al. (2011), 
the divergence is greatest for the richest quintile of households, 21.9 %.  
 
For Spain, our estimates of VAT payments as a fraction of total expenditure are 
consistently 0.6 to 0.8 percentage points below those published in IFS et al. (2011); the 
absolute deviation is highest in the richest income quintile (0.9 percentage points, or 
11.8 % of the fraction estimated in IFS et al. (2011)).  
 
For France, our results and the results in IFS et al. (2011) nearly coincide for the first 
income quintile (ours are 0.1 percentage point higher), but are between 0.7 and 0.9 
percentage points above their estimates for income quintiles two to five. This is because 
we estimate the VAT liability as a percentage of expenditure to steadily increase with 
                                                     
122 We do not compare our new budget-closing standard VAT rate from scenario 2 with its counterpart 
from IFS et al. (2011), because our estimate of this rate includes VAT payments from non-households, 
while IFS et al. (2011) only consider households.  
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income – from 7.6 % for the poorest quintile of households to 8.6 % for the richest – 
while IFS et al. (2011) arrive at a quite uniform fraction of VAT payments of total 
expenditures (around 7.5 %). The divergence is the greatest for the fifth quintile, where 
it amounts to 12 % of the estimated VAT ratio in IFS et al. (2011).  
 
For Italy, our results are quite well aligned with the results published in IFS et al. 
(2011) (recall that for Italy, data on disposable income, and hence association to income 
quintiles, is imputed from the EU-SILC, and that we compare results based on micro 
data to those of the former study). In comparison to VAT bills as a percentage of total 
expenditures as estimated in IFS et al. (2011), we underestimate the average VAT bill 
in the first income quintile by 0.6 percentage points (8.3 % of the ratio published in IFS 
et al. (2011)), and overestimate the average VAT bill of households in the highest 
income quintile by 0.4 percentage points (4.7 % of the ratio published in IFS et al. 
(2011)). For quintiles two to four, we are very close to IFS et al. (2011) (the divergence 
being -0.1 %p, 0.2 %p and 0.3 %p respectively). Overall, VAT bills as a fraction of 
expenditure rise more steeply in our calculations, from 7 % for the first income quintile 
to 9.3 % for the fifth income quintile, while IFS et al. (2011) arrive at an estimation of 
7.7 % for the first, and 8.9 % for the fifth quintile.  
 
In the case of Hungary, we estimate a higher fraction of expenditure spent on VAT for 
households in income quintiles one to three (0.7 to 0.2 percentage points higher), and a 
lower fraction being spent on VAT for the deciles four and five (0.4 and 1.1 percentage 
points lower, respectively). As a percentage of the fraction estimated in IFS et al. 
(2011), the biggest divergence occurs in the richest income quintile (our results are 
6.2 % lower than those in IFS et al. (2011)).  
 
Our results for Poland differ quite substantially from the results published in IFS et al. 
(2011). We estimate consistently higher VAT payments as a fraction of total 
expenditure, the difference ranges between 1.4 percentage points for the first income 
quintile (17.1 % of the ratio estimated in the IFS et al. (2011) study) and 2 percentage 
points (22.6 % of the ratio estimated in the cited study) in the fourth income quintile.  
 
As for the UK, the distributional effect of VAT is more progressive in our results than 
in IFS et al. (2011): according to our results, VAT payments as a percentage of average 
expenditure rise fairly smoothly from 6.3 % in the first quintile to 8.9 % in the fifth 
quintile; whereas in IFS et al. (2011), they are almost constant over the income 
distribution, with VAT payments per expenditure ranging between 8.6 % in the first 
income quintile and 9.1 % in the fifth, see Table 46. IFS et al. (2011) worked with both 
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equivalised income and expenditures, while the micro results in this section use raw 
data not adjusted for household size. We are not sure whether the aggregated HBS data 
provided by Eurostat is equivalised, but do not assume it is. As can be seen from Table 
46, if we equivalise income and expenditures in the micro data, UK’s VAT structure 
seems to be less progressive – especially for the first quintile, VAT bills as a percentage 
of expenditure increase considerably. The micro results are furthermore based on 
reported income, while IFS et al. (2011) use modelled income. Re-running our micro-
validation exercise with modelled income and equivalisation, the results look much 
more like IFS et al. (2011). That is, the definition of income and equivalisation alone 
can lead to a quite different overall assessment of the VAT structure in the UK 
(proportional with equivalisation and modelled income, progressive without 
equivalisation and self-reported income). As mentioned above, we think that using 
equivalised data is more appropriate for distributive analysis, while the choice of 
income concept is less straightforward. However, this comparison is instructive as it 
clearly shows the importance of choices made regarding data preparation and 
presentation; that we do not have information about these choices made by Eurostat is a 
severe limitation of this study.  
Table 46: Comparison of estimates of VAT bills as a percentage of total expenditure, by 
income quintile, as in IFS et al. (2011), estimated on aggregate data and micro data, taking 
into account different concepts of equivalisation and income definition 
Quintile 
IFS et al. 
(2011) 
Micro 
results (this 
report) 
Aggregate 
results  
Micro results 
with 
equivalisation 
Micro results 
with modelled 
income and 
equivalisation 
1 8.6% 6.8% 6.3% 7.6% 8.5% 
2 8.3% 7.8% 7.1% 8.1% 8.3% 
3 8.6% 8.7% 7.7% 8.8% 8.3% 
4 8.6% 9.0% 8.4% 9.0% 9.0% 
5 9.1% 9.2% 8.9% 8.9% 8.8% 
Source: IFS et al. (2011), Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS) 2010, Household Budget Surveys, 
National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
 
The conclusion we draw from this validation exercise is, that overall, our data appear to 
be of sound quality, especially when looking at coarse categories of goods and services. 
For finer sub-categories, our data becomes less reliable, and the association with the 
appropriate VAT rates becomes problematic. This is especially the case if key features 
of the data collection, aggregation and presentation are not known. We could not find 
out whether and if so, how, the HBS data were adjusted by household size by Eurostat. 
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Having said that, very detailed categories of goods and services might be especially 
prone to measurement error, also in the best of micro datasets. This is because even the 
highest quality household surveys question households only for a limited period of 
time, and then impute expenditures over the year. Even if households are asked 
specifically about more infrequent purchases, this information is less reliable than 
expenditures that are recorded on a daily basis. This is especially problematic for 
specialised items that are not consumed at all by a large fraction of households, and 
consumed rarely by those who do consume them.  
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A.4 VAT reductions on expenditure categories potentially in conflict with other 
EU policies  
The second guiding principle of the review of the current VAT rates structure calls for 
an “Abolition of reduced rates on goods and services for which the consumption is 
discouraged by other EU policies. This could notably be the case for goods and services 
harmful to the environment, health and welfare” (European Commission 2011b, p. 11). 
Categories that have been identified to be both containing products and services that are 
eligible for reduced VAT rates and are potentially in conflict with other EU policies 
trying to reduce or change their consumption are Water, Energy products, Street 
cleaning, refuse collection and waste treatment and Housing. Table 47 shows the 
average increase in VAT payments of private households in the EU-27 countries, if all 
products and services that fall into these categories and are currently taxed at a zero or 
reduced rate were taxed at the standard rate, while reductions were kept in place for all 
other expenditure categories. Put differently, Table 47 shows the contribution these 
specific categories make to the overall VAT increases in scenario 1 (abolition of all 
zero and reduced rates). For ease of comparison, average VAT bill increases in scenario 
1 can also be found in the table. To estimate the additional VAT burden of private 
households, we included the following categories:  
CP0432 - Services for the maintenance and repair of the dwelling123 
CP0441 - Water supply 
CP0442 - Refuse collection 
CP0444 – Other services relating to the dwelling n.e.c124 
CP0451 – Electricity 
CP0452 - Gas.  
CP0454 – Solid fuels 
CP0455 – Heat energy  
                                                     
123 Renovation and repairing of private dwellings can be taxed at a zero or reduced rates, if materials do not 
account for a significant part of the value of the service (see the VAT directive, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:347:0001:0118:en:PDF [2013/10/7], Annex II, 
category (10a). Because high value materials are not eligible for reduced rates, including this category 
means that additional VAT payments for private households might be overestimated (the estimated 
additional payment is an upper bound).  
124 The average VAT rate on this category is only in Austria significantly lower than the standard rate 
(10 % vs. 20 %).  
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Note that not all of these categories are eligible for reduced VAT rates in their entirety. 
In the category Gas, only natural gas is eligible for a reduced rate; in the category Solid 
fuels, only firewood may be taxed at a reduced rate; and in the category Heat energy, 
only district heating may be taxed at a reduced rate. Here we assume the same fraction 
of goods and services that is eligible for a VAT rate reduction within each category as 
we do in the household analysis in section 2of this study; for the specific assumptions 
see the Addendum delivered with this report (section 29).   
Table 47: Abolition of zero and reduced rates for the categories Water, Energy products, 
Street cleaning, refuse collection and waste treatment, Housing 
Country 
VAT bill (in % of expenditure) VAT bill in € 
2011 Scenario 1 
Increase 
due to 
Water, 
Energy etc.  
2011 Scenario 1 
Increase 
due to 
Water, 
Energy etc. 
BE 10.0% +2.7%p +0.1%p 3,735 +1,156 +32 
BG 12.9% +0.1%p +0.0%p 639 +3 +0 
CZ 12.1% +2.4%p +0.2%p 1,275 +294 +28 
DK 13.3% +0.1%p +0.0%p 5,035 +41 +12 
DE 9.2% +1.7%p +0.1%p 3,078 +631 +28 
EE 12.7% +0.3%p +0.0%p 1,139 +35 +0 
EL 11.5% +2.6%p +0.5%p 3,521 +925 +165 
ES 7.2% +3.1%p +0.1%p 1,914 +920 +37 
FR 8.3% +3.5%p +0.6%p 2,767 +1,311 +210 
IE 8.9% +3.6%p +0.3%p 3,684 +1,719 +122 
IT 8.6% +3.3%p +0.5%p 2,682 +1,175 +180 
CY 6.8% +2.3%p +0.2%p 2,417 +903 +67 
LV 15.3% +0.5%p +0.0%p 1,595 +57 +0 
LT 14.7% +0.5%p +0.0%p 1,275 +53 +0 
LU 6.2% +2.9%p +0.3%p 3,841 +2,006 +170 
HU 17.5% +1.1%p +0.0%p 1,303 +96 +0 
MT 10.0% +4.2%p +0.3%p 2,321 +1,122 +77 
NL 7.7% +2.6%p +0.1%p 2,548 +957 +24 
AT 11.4% +2.8%p +0.2%p 4,089 +1,164 +95 
PL 10.6% +4.8%p +0.4%p 988 +528 +43 
PT 9.0% +4.3%p +0.6%p 1,827 +1,002 +137 
RO 17.8% +0.8%p +0.0%p 853 +45 +0 
SI 10.5% +2.5%p +0.2%p 2,426 +656 +53 
SK 13.7% +0.3%p +0.0%p 1,591 +37 +0 
FI 11.0% +2.1%p +0.0%p 4,105 +926 +0 
SE 11.7% +2.2%p +0.0%p 4,355 +958 +0 
UK 8.0% +3.0%p +0.7%p 2,609 +1,108 +242 
EU-27 11.0% +2.2%p +0.2%p 2,504 +734 +64 
Source: Household Budget Surveys, National Accounts (Eurostat), own calculations. 
Note: Exchange rates of 1.956 Bulgarian levs, 24.590 Czech koruny, 7.451 Danish kroner, 0.706 Latvian 
lats, 3.453 Lithuanian litai, 279.370 Hungarian forints, 4.121 Polish zloty, 4.212 Romanian lei, 9.030 
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A.5 WIOD Classifications of products and sectors 
Table 48: WIOD Classification of sectors 
CPA 
code 
Description 
A01  Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 
A02  Forestry, logging and related service activities 
B05  Fishing, fish farming and related service activities 
CA10  Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat 
CA11 
 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas 
extraction, excluding surveying 
CA12  Mining of uranium and thorium ores 
CB13  Mining of metal ores 
CB14  Other mining and quarrying 
DA15  Manufacture of food products and beverages 
DA16  Manufacture of tobacco products 
DB17  Manufacture of textiles 
DB18  Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 
DC19 
 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and 
footwear 
DD20 
 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of 
articles of straw and plaiting materials 
DE21  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 
DE22  Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
DF23  Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
DG24  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
DH25  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
DI26  Manufacture of other non -metallic mineral products 
DJ27  Manufacture of basic metals 
DJ28  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
DK29  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
DL30  Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
DL31  Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
DL32  Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
DL33  Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
DM34  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
DM35  Manufacture of other transport equipment 
DN36  Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 
DN37  Recycling 
E40  Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 
E41  Collection, purification and distribution of water 
F45  Construction 
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G50  Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 
G51  Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
G52  Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods 
H55  Hotels and restaurants 
I60  Land transport; transport via pipelines 
I61  Water transport 
I62  Air transport 
I63  Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 
I64  Post and telecommunications 
J65  Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 
J66  Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security 
J67  Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 
K70  Real estate activities 
K71  Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods 
K72  Computer and related activities 
K73  Research and development 
K74  Other business activities 
L75  Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
M80  Education 
N85  Health and social work 
O90  Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 
O91  Activities of membership organizations n.e.c. 
O92  Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 
O93  Other service activities 
P95  Activities of households as employers of domestic staff 
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Table 49: WIOD Classification of products 
WIOD 
sector 
codes 
Description 
AtB Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 
C Mining and Quarrying 
15t16 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 
17t18 Textiles and Textile Products 
19 Leather, Leather and Footwear 
20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 
21t22 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing 
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products 
25 Rubber and Plastics 
26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 
27t28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 
29 Machinery, Nec 
30t33 Electrical and Optical Equipment 
34t35 Transport Equipment 
36t37 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 
E Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 
F Construction 
50 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel 
51 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
52 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods 
H Hotels and Restaurants 
60 Inland Transport 
61 Water Transport 
62 Air Transport 
63 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies 
64 Post and Telecommunications 
J Financial Intermediation 
70 Real Estate Activities 
71t74 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities 
L Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security 
M Education 
N Health and Social Work 
O Other Community, Social and Personal Services 
P Private Households with Employed Persons 
A.6 GTAP and WorldScan Classifications and Aggregations 
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Table 50: GTAP sectors and WorldScan intermediate and final sectoral aggregations 
 
GTAP 
Code 
GTAP Description WS 36 
Intermediate 36-
sector aggregation 
WS 9 
Final 9 sector 
aggregation 
1 PDR Paddy rice AGR Agriculture AGO Agric. & mining 
2 WHT Wheat AGR Agriculture AGO Agric. & mining 
3 GRO Cereal grains nec AGR Agriculture AGO Agric. & mining 
4 V_F Vegetables & fruits AGR Agriculture AGO Agric. & mining 
5 OSD Oil seeds AGR Agriculture AGO Agric. & mining 
6 C_B Sugar cane AGR Agriculture AGO Agric. & mining 
7 PFB Plant-based fibers AGR Agriculture AGO Agric. & mining 
8 OCR Crops nec AGR Agriculture AGO Agric. & mining 
9 CTL Bovine cattle  AGR Agriculture AGO Agric. & mining 
10 OAP Animal prods. nec AGR Agriculture AGO Agric. & mining 
11 RMK Raw milk AGR Agriculture AGO Agric. & mining 
12 WOL Wool AGR Agriculture AGO Agric. & mining 
13 FRS Forestry FRS Forestry AGO Agric. & mining 
14 FSH Fishing FSH Fishing AGO Agric. & mining 
15 COA Coal COA Coal ENG Energy 
16 OIL Oil OIG Oil and gas AGO Agric. & mining 
17 GAS Gas OIG Oil and gas ENG Energy 
18 OMN Minerals nec OMN Other mining LTM Low tech. manuf. 
19 CMT Bovine meat prods. PFD Processed food LTM Low tech. manuf. 
20 OMT Meat products nec PFD Processed food LTM Low tech. manuf. 
21 VOL Vegetable oils & fats PFD Processed food LTM Low tech. manuf. 
22 MIL Dairy products PFD Processed food LTM Low tech. manuf. 
23 PCR Processed rice PFD Processed food LTM Low tech. manuf. 
24 SGR Sugar PFD Processed food LTM Low tech. manuf. 
25 OFD Food products nec PFD Processed food LTM Low tech. manuf. 
26 B_T Beverages & tobacco B_T Beverages & tobacco LTM Low tech. manuf. 
27 TEX Textiles TEX Textiles LTM Low tech. manuf. 
28 WAP Wearing apparel WAP Wearing apparel LTM Low tech. manuf. 
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29 LEA Leather products LEA Leather products LTM Low tech. manuf. 
30 LUM Wood products LUM Wood products LTM Low tech. manuf. 
31 PPP Paper prods. & publ. PPP Paper prods. & publ. LTM Low tech. manuf. 
32 P_C Petroleum & coke P_C Petroleum & coke ENG Energy 
33 CRP Chemical & plastic CRP Chemical & plastic MHM Medium-high tech. 
34 NMM Mineral products nec NMM Mineral products nec MLM Medium-low tech. 
35 I_S Ferrous metals BMT Basic metals  MLM Medium-low tech. 
36 NFM Metals nec BMT Basic metals  MLM Medium-low tech. 
37 FMP Metal products FMP Metal products MLM Medium-low tech. 
38 MVH Motor vehic. & parts MVH Motor vehic. & parts MHM Medium-high tech. 
39 OTN Transport equip. nec OTN Transport equip. nec MHM Medium-high tech. 
40 ELE Electronic equip. ELE Electronic equip. HTM High tech. Manuf. 
41 OME Mach. & equip. nec OME Mach. & equip. nec MHM Medium-high tech. 
42 OMF Manufactures nec OMF Manufactures nec LTM Low tech. manuf. 
43 ELY Electricity ELG Electricty & gas ENG Energy 
44 GDT Gas manuf. & distr. ELG Electricty & gas ENG Energy 
45 WTR Water WTR Water OSR Other services 
46 CNS Construction CNS Construction OCS Commercial serv. 
47 TRD Trade TRD Trade OCS Commercial serv. 
48 OTP Transport nec OTP Transport nec TRA Transport 
49 WTP Water transport WTP Water transport TRA Transport 
50 ATP Air transport ATP Air transport TRA Transport 
51 CMN Communication CMN Communications OCS Commercial serv. 
52 OFI 
Financial services 
nec 
OFI 
Financial services 
nec 
OCS Commercial serv. 
53 ISR Insurance ISR Insurance OCS Commercial serv. 
54 OBS 
Business services 
nec 
OBS 
Business services 
nec 
OCS Commercial serv. 
55 ROS 
Recreat. & other 
serv. 
ROS 
Recreat. & other 
serv. 
OSR Other services 
56 OSG Public services OSG Public serv. OSR Other services 
57 DWE Dwellings ROS 
Recreat. & other 
serv. 
OSR Other services 
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